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Introduction  
On 29 May 2014, Rachel Reeves MP, the Shadow Work and Pensions Secretary, launched an 
Independent Review of Retirement Income to look at how to boost defined contribution 
;DCͿ saǀeƌs͛ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt iŶĐoŵe. This review is led by Professor David Blake, Director of the 
Pensions Institute, with Professor Debbie Harrison of the Pensions Institute as a senior 
consultant. 
A consultation document
1
 was published on 24 November 2014 with a response deadline of 
20 February 2015. David Blake invited me to summarise the responses to the consultation 
document which I do in this report. 
I have tried to provide nothing but a summary and to avoid putting my own interpretation 
on the responses: obviously in summarising verbal questions, it is impossible to avoid some 
degree of interpretation.
2
 Before being asked to take on this task I had submitted a 
response of my own (I was the only UK academic to do so): since then, I decided that in the 
interests of impartiality it would be better to withdraw that response. One of the responses 
explicitly questioned whether the Review was genuinely independent. I have written this 
summary without any input from David Blake and Debbie Harrison other than an initial 
discussion about presentation. My own preference for government policy to contain an 
element of compulsion is not relevant here as I take the new pension freedoms as given.
3
 
A total of 30 responses were received from a variety of individuals and organisations, the 
largest single group consisting of ten insurance companies or pension providers, eleven 
consultants of various types and one lawyer. The following eight organisations also provided 
submissions: the 100 Group of Finance Directors (100 Group); AGE UK; the Association of 
Consulting Actuaries (ACA); the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), the Institute and 
Faculty of Actuaries (IFoA); the National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF); the Society of 
Pension Professionals (SPP); and the Trades Union Congress (TUC). Six of the respondents 
asked that their submissions be confidential (and some of the other respondents were 
ambiguous on this point) and for this reason I have not provided a breakdown of the other 
respondents in order to preserve anonymity. They are, however, gratefully acknowledged in 
the main report. 
The consultation document consisted of 76 questions in five sections. Not every respondent 
answered every question and the total numbers of question-responses was 956. Relatively 
                                                     
 
1
 Blake and HarrisoŶ ;ϮϬϭϰͿ ͞IŶdependent Review of RetireŵeŶt IŶĐoŵe: CoŶsultatioŶ Papeƌ͟, PeŶsioŶs 
Institute, Cass Business School. Reproduced in Appendix A. 
2
 In particular, not all respondents used the template provided, so I had to assign material to questions. 
3
 As I say in the text: I decided to remove my submission from the summary to make it easier to be impartial. 
My submission is available on my website. The only important substantive point therein refers to my ongoing 
research on the marked for deferred annuities in the 1950s. 
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few responses were received to the final three sections on longevity risk, NEST and 
collective defined contribution schemes, but many more responses were received on the 
first two sections about how to ensure savers get the best products and supporting savers 
to make the right choices. 
The consultation document contained an initial introduction and then some background and 
introductory material in each of the five sections (the full text is in the appendix). I have 
summarised the consultation document material in the main text of this report, while the 
questions are re-produced verbatim (paraphrases and material from the consultation 
document is in a blue font and the material that I have added is in a black font). Some of the 
respondents did not agree with all of the underlying assumptions in the consultation 
documents and I draw attention to that throughout the document. 
 
Edmund Cannon 
University of Bristol 
and the Pensions Institute 
 
March 2016 
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1. How to ensure that savers can get the best products in retirement  
The 2014 Budget removed the requirement to buy a lifetime annuity at retirement and 
opened up the possibility that new types of retirement product would become available. In 
this section the consultation document elicited responses on what new products would be 
suitable and what governance and quality standards would be appropriate for these 
products. In addition respondents were asked about how longevity insurance could be 
combined with scheme drawdown to ensure that savers do not run out of money before 
they die. 
1. (a) What should be the primary aims of a ͚good͛ DC scheme? Please explain.   
(b) If the provision of a predictable income should be a primary aiŵ of a ͚good͛ DC 
scheme, how should this be defined?  
(c) If value for money should be a pƌiŵaƌǇ aiŵ of a ͚good͛ DC sĐheŵe, how should 
this be defined? 
There were twenty-six responses to this question. There was considerable variety in the 
responses to parts (a) and the most common aims mentioned are summarised in the 
following figure (n.b. that some responses contained more than one aim). 
 
One possible issue is whose aims are being considered, since the aims of employers might 
ďe diffeƌeŶt to those of the saǀeƌs: fƌoŵ aŶ eŵploǇeƌ͛s peƌspeĐtiǀe, the primary aim is to 
ensure agreed contributions are made and ensure good governance of the savings scheme.  
Thirty-one per cent of responses mentioned a pension income as being a primary aim of a 
DC scheme. In some cases this meant a predictable income: 
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͞(Consultant) ... the purpose of a pension is to give someone a 
(predictable) income in retirement. It is an insurance product for which you 
save, not just a savings product. For those who will die with liquid assets, 
no matter how long they live, it is not very important. For others it is a vital 
service.͟ 
However, in some cases, respondents noted explicitly that predictable income was the aim 
of DB rather than DC schemes:  
͞(SPP) By definition, a defined contribution scheme cannot provide a 
predictable income in the way that a defined benefit scheme can. 
We suggest that important elements of a good defined contribution 
scheme are efficient investment, with appropriate attention to risk and 
appƌopƌiate optioŶs foƌ pƌoǀidiŶg iŶĐoŵe at ƌetiƌeŵeŶt.͟ 
One respondent argued that this was due to changes in what was expected from or 
appropriate for a pension: 
͞;ϭϬϬ GƌoupͿ ... giǀeŶ the faĐt that todaǇ͛s ǁoƌkfoƌĐe is highlǇ ŵoďile, it 
seems questionable whether most employers are ever likely to want to 
sponsor schemes that will provide members with a predictable income in 
retirement. The days when employees accrued a full 2/3 pension in a single 
scheme sponsored by a single employer are gone (except perhaps in the 
public sector). The emphasis has to be on employees receiving appropriate 
and timely information (from employers, schemes, providers and 
Government) as well as being given the opportunity to access guidance 
and advice. This will assist them in taking the appropriate decisions over 
individual contribution levels, investment choices, retirement age and 
decumulation options to ensure the best outcome for their own individual 
ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes.͟ 
However, many respondents either implicitly or explicitly did not think that the distribution 
phase was an important component of a DC scheme, instead suggesting that a DC scheme 
was primarily a long-term savings vehicle directed towards retirement, for example: 
͞;Pension provider) A good DC scheme should aim to provide value for 
money for its members. We do not believe that providing solutions for the 
deĐuŵulatioŶ stage should ďe a keǇ eleŵeŶt of the sĐheŵe͛s aiŵs, 
although the scheme should ensure that members have a route to access 
appropriate products and are adequately prompted to engage and receive 
the level of advice / guidance appropriate to their circumstance.͟ 
Among the ways to increase the size of fund were maximising return (usually explicitly risk-
adjusted) and engaging savers so that they made adequate contributions. 
Twenty-three per cent of responses said that flexibility and choice were important, three of 
them explicitly saying that this was due to the heterogeneity of savers and their diverse 
needs. 
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͞(Consultant) Research by the International Longevity Centre4 has found 
that there is no such thing as a tǇpiĐal ͚oldeƌ ĐoŶsuŵeƌ͛ aŶd that speŶdiŶg 
patteƌŶs iŶ lateƌ life aƌe ƌeallǇ Ƌuite diǀeƌse.͟ 
There were fourteen responses to 1(c). Thirty-six per cent referred to low charges and costs, 
although recognising that higher charges could be justified by better quality products. One 
response was quite specific on acceptable charges: 
͞;Lawyer) From a value for money perspective, the starting presumption is 
that the sĐheŵe͛s total eǆpeŶse ƌatio should ďe ďeloǁ Ϭ.7ϱ% ;iŶ the 
absence of exceptional circumstances such as unanticipated costs from 
legislative change or in circumstances of winding-upͿ.͟ 
One response said that it was important for charges to be comparable, using a single metric 
analogous to the APR (suggesting the reduction-in-yield measure); alternatively another 
response suggested that there should be guidelines on fees for different products. Other 
responses provided vaguer measures or ones harder to measure such as maximising 
income, maximising return or efficiently moving income from the period when the saver 
was working to when retired. On the other hand, three responses thought that value for 
money was either so subjective or so difficult to measure (ex ante) that it was not a useful 
metric. 
SUMMARY: Responses to this question were quite varied (and some respondents listed 
many desiderata while others noted just one). However, there was surprisingly little 
agreement amongst pension professionals about what the aims of a good DC pension 
scheme should be. With this important point in mind, three themes did stand out as being 
important. First, the level of pension savings should be adequate. Second, pension savers 
need choice and flexibility. Finally, pension savers needed simplicity to help them engage 
with the process. 
2. (a) Do you agree with the breakdown of risks listed in the Introduction?  
2. (b) Are there any important risks we have not identified? 
Out of nineteen responses, 95 per cent agreed or largely agreed with the breakdown of 
risks. Four emphasised the risk that contributions could be too low. One response said that 
risks in the decumulation phase were not relevant (consistent with the view that a DC 
scheme is primarily a long-term savings vehicle as mentioned above), but another wanted to 
emphasise longevity risk. 
 
                                                     
 
4
 International LongeǀitǇ CeŶtƌe ;ϮϬϭϰͿ ͚FiŶaŶĐial ǁellďeiŶg iŶ lateƌ life͛ aǀailaďle fƌoŵ 
http://www.ilcuk.org.uk. 
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SUMMARY: Ninety-five per cent of respondents agreed or largely agreed with the 
breakdown of risks. Additional risks (or issues) were also mentioned: health and long-term 
care risk; risk via shocks to a partner or family; lack of engagement by savers; sequence of 
return risks and shocks; delays in realising that mistakes had been made and consequent 
delay in remedial action; the risk that regulation might stifle competition and raise costs.
 5
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 For convenience, the risks are listed here: 
  Contribution risk  – The risk that pension contributions (and hence pension savings) are lower than 
planned, e.g., because the scheme member becomes unemployed, is unable to work due to ill health, 
or is unable to pay off their debts  Retirement timing risk – Uncertainty about when the scheme member will retire and/or begin to 
make withdrawals  Product choice risk – Uncertainty about how the scheme member will make withdrawals, not least 
because of the very large set of choices now available   Investment risk – The risk that investment performance is worse than expected or the risk that 
investments do not generate incomes in a way that matches the desired pattern of consumption in 
retirement. A particularly important example of investment risk is sequence-of-returns risk  Inflation risk – The risk that inflation is higher than anticipated  Interest rate risk – The risk that interest rates are low at the point of annuity purchase  Longevity risk – The risk that individual savers live longer than their life expectancy (i.e., idiosyncratic 
longevity risk) and the risk that savers as a whole live longer than anticipated (i.e., systematic or 
aggregate longevity risk)  Cost risk – The risk that the total costs of running the pension scheme during accumulation and 
decumulation are higher than expected or understood  Political risk – The risk that the Government changes the rules in an adverse way (e.g., reduces the 
level of tax relief)  Regulatory risk – The risk that regulations change in an adverse way (e.g., the regulator increases 
regulatory capital requirements, which has the effect of reducing annuity rates)  Demographic/cultural risk – The risk that younger cohorts refuse or are unable to honour the implicit 
intergenerational contract that underlies many pension schemes. For example, the next generation of 
workers refuses – or is unable – to pay the pensions the retired generation expects to receive, 
because they are unwilling to honour the implicit contract or because there are too few of them in 
relation to the size of the retired population. Also, an arrangement that works in one culture (e.g., 
Holland) might not work in another (e.g., the UK)  Market conduct risk – The risk that those who provide services to the scheme act in a way that 
disadvantages scheme members (e.g., investment managers subject to a charge cap negate the 
effects of the charge cap by increasing portfolio turnover, or the benefits of economies of scale go to 
sĐheŵe pƌoǀideƌs͛ shaƌeholdeƌs ƌatheƌ thaŶ to ŵeŵďeƌsͿ; fƌaud aŶd the aĐtiǀities of sĐaŵŵeƌs ǁould 
be included here  Behavioural risk – The risk that scheme members behave in a way that is not considered to be rational 
(i.e., is not in their long-term interests, since they make short-term decisions that they subsequently 
regret and are unable to learn from past mistakes). Inertia and lack of engagement would be included 
here, as would be the risk that members fail to understand the risks they face 
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2. (c) To deal with political risk, would it make sense to have an independent Pension 
Commission to set pension policy (similar to the independent Monetary Policy 
Committee)? 
From twenty-two responses, 82 per cent were in favour of a permanent Pensions 
Commission.  
 
In most cases, this was explicitly due to the perceived short-termism of governments: 
͞(Insurance company) The phrase ͚unprecedented change͛ seems to have 
been used in relation to the pensions industry on an annual basis over the 
past feǁ Ǉeaƌs. … We aƌe suppoƌtiǀe of  an Independent Pension 
Commission (IPC) if part of its mandate is to provide long-term stability.͟ 
Several responses made the point that pensions are already a divided responsibility 
between the Department for Work and Pensions and HM Treasury and therefore it was not 
clear how a Pensions Commission would fit in. Among those who were positive, many said 
that the effectiveness would depend on the remit and none seemed particularly keen on the 
                                                                                                                                                                     
 
 Financial knowledge and understanding risk – The ƌisk that a ŵeŵďeƌ͛s fiŶaŶĐial kŶoǁledge aŶd 
uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg aƌe iŶsuffiĐieŶt foƌ the ŵeŵďeƌ eǀeƌ to ŵake aŶ ͚iŶfoƌŵed͛ ĐhoiĐe  Mental impairment risk – The risk that a scheŵe ŵeŵďeƌ͛s ŵeŶtal faĐulties aƌe ƌeduĐed due to the 
onset of dementia, for example.  
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Monetary Policy Committee as a model: alternative models were the Low Pay Commission 
or the Office for Budget Responsibility. 
͞(TUC) The establishment of a new Pensions Commission would have the 
potential to inject an ethos of evidence-gathering and analysis coupled 
with a long-term perspective into pensions policy, which can too often fall 
ǀiĐtiŵ to aŶ adŵiŶistƌatioŶ͛s shoƌt-term electoral calculations. However, to 
be effective it would have to operate according a very different model than 
the MoŶetaƌǇ PoliĐǇ Coŵŵittee. … a Đoŵŵittee ĐoŶtaiŶiŶg ƌepƌeseŶtatiǀes 
of the social partners, employers and employees, could play a valuable role 
by considering the evidence regarding the effectiveness of prevailing 
pensions policy and alternative courses of aĐtioŶ.͟ 
The responses that were against a commission argued that pensions could not so easily be 
delegated to an independent body: 
͞(Consultant) pension provision is inherently a political issue, so to hand it 
over to independent experts would be profoundly mistaken.͟ 
SUMMARY: There was strong support from 82 per cent of respondents for a permanent 
pensions commission in some form or another. Only nine per cent were opposed to a 
pensions commission. 
3. (a) Do you expect products with longevity insurance (e.g., a lifetime annuity) to 
remain an essential component of a well-designed retirement programme? 
The twenty-three responses to this question were unanimous that products with some form 
of longevity insurance would be an essential component for at least some pensioners. 
Several quoted either their own or other research showing that significant proportions of 
pensioners expressed an interest in some form of longevity insurance. Three companies 
referred to a figure of 70 per cent favouring a guaranteed income in research by ILC-UK. For 
example: 
͞;Insurance company) We strongly believe that annuities will continue to 
plaǇ aŶ esseŶtial ƌole iŶ peoples͛ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt plaŶŶiŶg. UŶdeƌpiŶŶiŶg the 
concept of pension saving is the wish to provide income security for the 
ǁhole of oŶe͛s ƌetiƌeŵeŶt aŶd to eŶsuƌe that soŵeoŶe does Ŷot run out of 
ƌetiƌeŵeŶt fuŶds ďefoƌe theǇ die. It is also fuŶdaŵeŶtal to a peŶsioŶeƌ͛s 
͚peaĐe of ŵiŶd͛ aŶd foƌ theiƌ faŵilies. ‘eĐeŶt ƌeseaƌĐh fƌoŵ the ILC‐UK 
suggests that nearly 70% of all those with DC pots favoured their pension 
to deliver a secure guaranteed income for life over anything else. While 
current low interest rates remain, people should be encouraged to 
aŶŶuitise iŶ stages, aŶd sĐheŵes should suppoƌt this.͟ 
Other responses came up with figures also suggesting a high proportion putting at least 
some of their wealth in guaranteed income: 
͞;Insurance company) Our research tells us that a group of customers will 
want the certainty of income in retirement that an annuity provides. In 
research covering 1,000 of our customers, 18% said they would look for 
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their pension to provide them with income only, with a further 54% 
iŶdiĐatiŶg theǇ ǁaŶted a ŵiǆtuƌe of luŵp suŵs aŶd iŶĐoŵe.͟ 
͞;NAPFͿ NAPF ƌeseaƌĐh aŵoŶg peŶsioŶ saǀeƌs, ďoth Ƌualitatiǀe aŶd 
quantitative,
6
 reveals that the majority of savers want to use their DC 
pension to generate a regular income in retirement. In response to a 
question that gave them a (forced) choice between a regular lifetime 
income and flexible access to a pot of money that might not last their 
whole retirement, 82% chose the former. However, the research also 
highlighted, in common with several other studies, the poor perception of 
annuities. The NAPF supports measures to improve the functioning of the 
annuity market, including the recommendation by the FCA to require FCA 
regulated firms to provide their customers with a comparison of their 
annuity rate with the open market, showing not only the annual difference 
but also the estimated lifetime difference. 
We therefore anticipate that some form of longevity insurance will remain 
attractive to many reaching retirement, whether in the form of lifetime 
annuities or some other form of deferred insurance. The NAPF supports the 
development of new retirement income solutions that can deliver value for 
money to those with modest pensioŶ.͟ 
Among the possible forms of insurance suggested were conventional annuities, 
conventional annuities purchased after retirement (e.g. at age 75), and deferred annuities, 
where a deferred annuity might be purchased via a regular premium payable paid in 
ƌetiƌeŵeŶt ;soŵetiŵes these pƌoduĐts ǁeƌe desĐƌiďed iŶ the laŶguage of ͞loŶg-stop͟ 
insurance). This would involve produce innovation: 
͞;Consultant) ... we see new types of longevity protection products being 
produced that will allow clients to buy ͚loŶg stop͛ defeƌƌed loŶgeǀitǇ 
protection that will be mixed with other capital & income units to produce 
the oǀeƌall iŶĐoŵe solutioŶ.͟ 
SUMMARY: All respondents agreed that some form of longevity insurance would be needed 
at some point in retirement. However, there was a diversity of opinion about how this 
should be achieved. The two most commonly suggested options were to purchase an 
annuity later in retirement or to purchase a deferred annuity, possibly via the payment of 
regular premiums. Product innovation would be needed to deliver such products in practice.  
3. (b) How should those individuals who continue to buy lifetime annuities be assisted 
to obtain the best value products for their circumstances?  
There were twenty-one responses for part (b), of which 24 per cent said explicitly that it 
would be necessary to have a combination of approaches. One response emphasised that a 
certain amount of inertia on the part of savers should be accepted as inevitable. The most 
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 Understanding Retirement, wave I. 
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common responses are illustrated in the figure below (some respondents made more than 
one suggestion). 
Fourteen per cent of responses thought that advice would be suitable, but other 
respondents suggested that there should be improved guidance or a level of help between 
advice and guidance (this suggestion also occurs for other questions). While some hoped 
that Pension Wise could fulfil this role, others thought that it could not do this at present. 
 
Alongside advice there were several suggestions for improving take-up of the Open Market 
Option (OMO), which was not felt to be adequate currently: 
͞;Pension provider) The operation of the at-retirement market has been 
uŶsatisfaĐtoƌǇ foƌ soŵe tiŵe, aŶd this is paƌtlǇ ǁhǇ the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s 
reforms are so welcome. Even a cursory examination reveals that the 
current Open Market Option is, at best, a shop window – with no means of 
buying the end product or assurance that the shop window is correctly 
representing the product on offer. Furthermore, many savers lack the 
awareness or confidence to make the most of the Open Market Option. We 
would like to see more tools developed to easily compare annuity products. 
Theƌe is a Đleaƌ ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶt foƌ ĐƌeatioŶ of a fuŶĐtioŶiŶg ŶoŶ‐adǀised 
market, and indeed a more liberal regulatory framework foƌ ďƌokeƌ‐
souƌĐed iŶĐoŵe pƌoduĐts.͟ 
One suggestion for how this could be achieved was as follows: 
͞;Consultant) There has to be a fully open market where all types of 
longevity protection (lifetime annuities, deferred, etc.) can be compared 
side by side with a common method of evaluating them. All purchases 
11 
 
should be through a competitive infrastructure e.g. a portal, comparison 
site etc. to ensure the client is fully aware of the competition before 
purchasing. 
Alternatively, a reverse auction facility could be established with a 
standard application form, common underwriting such as the Common 
Quote Request Form (CQRF) where providers then bid for a number of days 
based on the data & the client can then easily fulfil their choice without 
having to go thƌough fuƌtheƌ appliĐatioŶ stages.͟ 
SUMMARY: A quarter of respondents suggested explicitly that it would be necessary to have 
a combination of approaches to ensure that individuals who choose to buy annuities  get 
value for money and purchase appropriate products.  The range of suggestions from other 
respondents also suggested that no single option would be adequate. So to help individuals 
get best value from annuities, they would need a mixture of nudges, better education, 
better market provision and better advice/guidance. 
3. (c) If individuals do not purchase lifetime annuities, how does an individual hedge 
their longevity risk in retirement? 
There were twenty responses to what do to without an annuity. One view was that without 
an annuity there are few options available and that there was likely to be under-
consumption: 
͞;Lawyer) The member could attempt to under consume his retirement 
savings by living off the income and not the capital of his retirement 
savings (e.g. his dividends and interest income). Alternatively however the 
member could choose to buy an irredeemable bond, where available, 
which would provide a nominal level of income which would continue for 
the ŵeŵďeƌ͛s life ;aŶd ďeǇoŶdͿ ďut ǁould ďe suďjeĐt to the iŵpaĐt of 
inflation. Such an irredeemable bond could be passed on to the deceased 
iŶdiǀidual͛s suƌǀiǀoƌs/heiƌs.͟ 
͞;Pension provider) There are few options for hedging longevity risk in 
retirement without using a lifetime annuity. The most straightforward is to 
draw an income at a level designed to last beyond maximum life 
expectancy. This could lead to a potentially lower standard of living than 
that which could have been obtained from an annuity as well as not 
eliŵiŶatiŶg iŶǀestŵeŶt ƌisk.͟ 
In the absence of annuity purchase, several responses suggested that there could be new 
products. Most of these were variations on deferred annuities, although it was also 
suggested that savers could insure against living beyond their life expectancy or presumed 
date of death. Many responses noted that, in the absence of this, the remaining possibility 
was to rely upon the family. One response noted that this was not an issue for sufficiently 
rich individuals. 
SUMMARY: Most respondents suggested that new products, typically some form of 
deferred annuity, would be necessary to help individuals hedge longevity risk if those 
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individuals chose not to buy a conventional annuity at retirement. Without some form of 
annuity product, the main alternatives suggested were additional saving (and hence under-
consumption) and/or reliance on family support.  
4. (a) Where annuities are purchased later in retirement, what are the most effective 
and efficient products for providing income in the period between retirement and 
the age at which the longevity insurance comes into effect? 
(b) Should such products have a maximum recommended level of income 
withdrawal? 
(c) If so, how should that level of income be determined?  
Of the eighteen responses to this question, 67 per cent explicitly mentioned drawdown 
products and most of the remainder describe investment strategies similar to drawdown, 
but emphasising flexibility (for example: bond-laddering). Many responses referred to the 
advantages of drawdown, in particular guaranteed drawdown: 
͞(Consultant) …as guaƌaŶteed dƌaǁdoǁŶ pƌoduĐts ĐoŵďiŶe fleǆiďilitǇ aŶd 
longevity insurance, they are far more adaptable to different 
circumstances than conventional annuities.͟ 
͞;Consultant) Income drawdown products will be the best way of dealing 
with retirement income and the point at which longevity insurance needs 
to kick in.  The criteria for when it should kick in should be a base level of 
assets against an assessment of health and family history. ...   
An alternative approach - whiĐh goes ďaĐk to the ĐoŶĐept of ͚ďig 
goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛  is to create a DB equivalent of NEST which guarantees a 
basic defined benefit with additional contributions working in the form of 
the old AVC͛s ǁhiĐh foƌŵed a sepaƌate pot. ... 
DB NEST would be able to insure against such risks if that was the route 
chosen or the government might choose to provide a floor for those that 
have gone down the NEST route.  There would need to be some rules for 
good behaviour in this respect.͟ 
Several emphasised that members might need guidance or information on drawdown 
products and several suggested that drawdown products should or could have guarantees. 
Only 17 per cent of responses mentioned term-certain annuities. 
Sixty-one per cent of the responses also agreed that there should be a recommended 
maximum withdrawal (in one case it was suggested that there should be a recommended 
withdrawal limit instead of a maximum): there was near unanimity that there should not be 
a compulsory maximum. Two alternatives were either that schemes should provide 
warnings if funds began to deplete too quickly or that there should be repeated guidance to 
help pensioners decide. One response noted that it would be difficult for an individual 
scheme to suggest a limit if a pensioner had more than one pension. Only two responses 
wanted limits: one wanted relatively high maxima with additional discretion from an actuary 
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to draw lump sums and one wanted funds to remain in place to ensure that a minimum 
level of income was reached (after taking into account the state pension).  
 
There were fewer suggestions on how to calculate the maximum, ranging from use of GAD 
limits to rules of thumb. Some responses thought that the recommended maxima should 
depend on a variety of factors and thus be more personalised: 
͞;Lawyer) ... a starting point could be the tables which the Government 
AĐtuaƌǇ͛s Department has published in connection with the pre-Budget 
ϮϬϭϰ iŶĐoŵe dƌaǁdoǁŶ ƌegiŵe.͟ 
SUMMARY: There was considerable agreement that drawdown was appropriate in the early 
period of retirement, with two-thirds saying this explicitly and the remainder suggesting 
approaches very similar to drawdown. Several suggested that drawdown products should or 
could have guarantees. There was also strong support for recommendations or guidance on 
the maximum that should be drawn down each year. Very few responses provided 
suggestions for how to calculate this maximum. There was little support for a compulsory 
maximum level of income drawdown. 
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5. What are the advantages and disadvantages of scheme drawdown (i.e., where the 
scheme provides an income to the retired member prior to the purchase of an 
annuity)? 
There were eighteen responses to this question and the answers were generally long and 
quite varied; many of the responses discussed individual drawdown as well.  
A half of the responses referred to economies of scale or to lower costs benefitting the 
members: 
͞;Consultant) Scale (for investments and fees), and a prudently managed 
pƌe‐defiŶed pƌoĐess iŶstead of poteŶtial ad‐hoc decisions seem to be the 
adǀaŶtages.͟ 
However, some responses noted that this would not necessarily be the case for small 
schemes, which would not benefit from economies of scale and might struggle to administer 
drawdown effectively, especially if they needed to provide different options to individuals 
with diverse needs. 
Another possibility was that scheme drawdown could allow individuals who wished to 
remain invested to do so: 
͞;Insurance company) It seems unlikely that Trustees will take on the 
ŵaŶageŵeŶt of iŶdiǀidual ĐlieŶts͛ dƌaǁdoǁŶ poƌtfolios ďeĐause of the ƌisk, 
so scheme drawdown may appeal (to a limited extent). This is particularly 
the case if an individual plans to remain invested for a prolonged period of 
tiŵe.͟ 
The importance of being able to remain invested was partly due to the ability to avoid 
annuitisation risk (i.e., having to purchase an annuity when annuity rates were low – an 
issue raised by seventeen per cent of responses) and partly do defer annuitisation: 
 ͞(Lawyer) The main advantage, in the current marketplace, is to give the 
member the option of not purchasing an annuity at a time when the effect 
of quantitative easing is to ͚ƌig͛ the gilts market. Investors should, in 
general, be wary of purchasing assets in a rigged market. [See, for 
example, Daines, Joyce and Tong (2012)
7
 as to the impact of quantitative 
easing on the yield on long-dated gilts.] 
Another advantage would be to give the member the option to live off, for 
example, the income from his retirement savings until he attains the age 
(e.g. 75) where the pooling of longevity provides a material uplift in the 
appliĐatioŶ of the ŵeŵďeƌ͛s ƌetiƌeŵeŶt saǀiŶgs ďǇ ǁaǇ of a siŶgle 
premium to purchase an income stream for the remainder of the 
iŶdiǀidual͛s life.͟ 
                                                     
 
7
 MaƌtiŶ DaiŶes, MiĐhael A “ JoǇĐe aŶd Mattheǁ ToŶg ͞QE aŶd the gilt ŵaƌket; a disaggƌegated aŶalǇsis͟ BaŶk 
of England Working Paper 466, October, 2012. 
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However, this flexibility was not seen as being without risk: 
͞;Insurance company) Scheme drawdown has the potential to reduce costs 
and help manage risk over individual drawdown in the early part of 
retirement. However, for those with limited to average pension pots, the 
risks on how much will be left in a pot that can be used to purchase an 
annuity, are more significant. We therefore believe that any scheme 
solution should contain active measures to manage the annuitisation risk 
including cohort investment strategies, phased annuitisation and deferred 
aŶŶuitǇ puƌĐhase as appƌopƌiate.͟ 
A second area of advantage was that individuals would be in a scheme overseen by trustees 
and therefore might benefit from better governance of the scheme (raised by 28 per cent of 
responses). However, some of these responses noted that this shifted more responsibility 
on to the trustees and questioned how much additional responsibility trustees could 
realistically take on. A further concomitant disadvantage was whether the scheme͛s aĐtioŶs 
could be construed as advice. 
The following respondent raised the issue of whether appropriate advice would be available 
and continued: 
͞;Insurance company) Schemes may offer a version on drawdown direct 
from the scheme (i.e. UFPLS) which has not been specifically designed for 
the retirement income market and may not be regulated by the FCA. These 
run the risk of individuals making poor and potentially short sighted 
decisions which they live to regret. 
Trustees may be unwilling to offer drawdown direct from the scheme (i.e. 
UFPLS style), as it brings additional cost and liabilities. DC members will 
therefore have to transfer to a provider which offers this facility or other 
income drawdown facilities.͟ 
Another response worried not only about the regulatory issue, but how this would fit with 
the proposed approach to members with more than one pot (also discussed in questions 20 
and 21): 
͞;Insurance company) Currently the FCA regulates drawdown but does not 
regulate schemes, therefore there would have to be a new regulatory 
framework to govern this. ... 
[Scheme drawdown] does not sit well with the proposed aggregator 
framework. If the member is in a scheme at retirement but has other pots 
within an aggregated pot would the latter also provide drawdown? If this 
is the case there would have to be infrastructure built for a decumulation 
faĐilitǇ ǁithiŶ eaĐh aggƌegatoƌ sĐheŵe.͟ 
SUMMARY: There were a variety of responses to this question and very few respondents 
were certain whether the advantages outweighed the disadvantages. Respondents were 
clear that scheme drawdown might have the advantages of lowering costs through 
economies of scale and providing better governance. However, economies of scale might be 
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absent for small schemes which would find it difficult to cater for the diverse needs of 
different members. While improved governance would be an advantage for members, some 
schemes might struggle to take on the additional responsibility of looking after funds in the 
drawdown phase, and so this was potentially a disadvantage for the trustees, especially 
since the regulatory framework for this is not sufficiently clear. 
6. (a) Should decumulation default products provided by, say, large-scale master trusts, 
be subject to the same trustee-based governance and quality standards that apply to 
the accumulation default fund?  
(b) Where decumulation products are offered by contract-based schemes, should 
they be included in the requirements for the new Independent Governance 
Committees to provide governance and quality standards and to assess value for 
money? 
 
 
There were seventeen responses to the first part of this question and 82 per cent agreed 
that there should be the same standards.  
͞;Consultant) Decumulation products need the same protections as for the 
default accumulation funds, otherwise they will become the next area for 
mis-selling and abuse.  There is also a wider policy issue because not all 
current DC scheme rules would allow for decumulation - with members 
having to consider moving their pots - there needs to be greater policy 
thought given to this area.͟ 
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Some responses rejected the premise of the question that there should be a default. One 
view was that removing defaults was an important way to improve engagement and hence 
outcomes. 
͞;Pension provider) When it comes to decumulation, the individual should 
be effectively forced to make an active decision to receive retirement 
income. The failure of the OMO to date has, in part, been down to inertia 
aŶd default.͟ 
Alternatively, two responses were less critical of the principle of a default, but felt that it 
might prove impossible to devise an appropriate default. 
 
Of the seventeen responses to the second part of the question, 76 per cent agreed that 
governance from the Independence Governance Committees (IGCs) were appropriate.  
͞;AGE UKͿ All peŶsioŶ pƌoduĐts should ďe suďjeĐt to high goǀeƌŶaŶĐe 
standards. In our response to the FCA consultation on IGCs, we argued that 
incorporating decumulation, in particular income drawdown, products 
uŶdeƌ IŶdepeŶdeŶt GoǀeƌŶaŶĐe Coŵŵittees͛ ƌeŵits ǁill help eŶsuƌe that 
such products are managed and delivered to a higher standard. 
We are pleased that the Financial Conduct Authority has agreed to 
consider extending the IGCs remits in future – this consideration should be 
ĐhaŶged iŶto a fiƌŵ ĐoŵŵitŵeŶt to do so.͟ 
The remaining 24 per cent thought that Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) rules were 
sufficient or that it was inappropriate or unhelpful to involve IGCs. 
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SUMMARY: Eighty-two per cent of responses accepted the principle of a default 
decumulation product, while 76 per cent thought that the decumulation phase should be 
governed by the same governance standards in master trusts that apply to the accumulation 
default fund and should be overseen by IGCs in contract-based schemes. But a significant 
minority were unhappy with defaults, despite the fact that people were free to opt out of a 
default, and thought that IGCs were not appropriate, preferring instead to rely on existing 
FCA rules. 
7. (a) What could be the typical total expense ratio (TER) for a default drawdown 
product provided by a large-scale master trust?  
(b) How might this TER compare with individual drawdown products sold in the retail 
market?  
(c) Can you give any examples of TERs for retail drawdown products? 
There were seven responses to this question and some said explicitly that it was difficult to 
say since these products are still under development. Only two numerical figures were given 
for a default drawdown product: (i) accumulation plus 0.25 per cent; or (ii) less than or 
equal to 0.5 per cent One respondent was aware of TERs as high as 2-4.5 per cent for some 
retail drawdown products. It was generally agreed that default products would be cheaper 
than retail products, mainly due to the issue of advisory costs to retail products. 
SUMMARY: Very few respondents were prepared to say what a typical total expense ratio 
(TER) should be for a default drawdown product. However, one respondent suggested that 
the TER should be no more than than 0.5 per cent, while another suggested it should be 
equal to accumulation TER plus 0.25 per cent. The small number of responses to this 
question noted that it is difficult to answer while new products are still being developed. 
Default products should be cheaper than retail products, but retail products, it was noted, 
can be expensive. 
8. (a) Should scheme default drawdown products be subject to the charge cap?  
(b) Should this be the same as for accumulation (i.e. 0.75%) or is there a case for a 
higher cap?  If higher please explain why and what the difference might be? 
There were sixteen responses to this question. As with the responses to question 6, not all 
responses agreed with the concept of a default drawdown product. Of those that accepted 
a default, a half were against caps.  
Two responses observed that it was difficult to set the cap because the market is immature 
and so it is difficult to find a benchmark. As one response said 
͞;Insurance company) Once all costs and charges have been identified, 
some sort of overall cost measure may be the best way of ensuring good 
value. In the meantime, the FCA needs to be tracking costs on new 
products as they arise, and acting quickly if products are launched with 
charge structures or levels that are not transparent and fair.͟ 
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Others took the view that caps could inhibit the development of the market or that 
governance rules were sufficient. However, some responses thought that a charge cap could 
be beneficial 
͞;AGE UKͿ We ďelieǀe theƌe is a stƌoŶg Đase foƌ ĐoŶtƌols oŶ the Đosts of 
drawdown and other alternatives to an annuity. Consideration should also 
be given to how charges – and other costs – are levied against drawdown 
products. However, this is not straightforward because of the very wide 
range of charges that may be levied. ... Once all costs and charges have 
been identified, some sort of overall cost measure may be the best way of 
ensuring good value. In the meantime, the FCA needs to be tracking costs 
on new products as they arise, and acting quickly if products are launched 
ǁith Đhaƌge stƌuĐtuƌes oƌ leǀels that aƌe Ŷot tƌaŶspaƌeŶt aŶd faiƌ.͟ 
 
SUMMARY: Sixty-three per cent of responses were against a charge cap on scheme default 
drawdown products, at least in the short run. 
9. Retail drawdown products will be sold via regulated advice and they will be 
purchased via non-advice (execution-only). Is there a case for:  
(a) Higher quality controls and consumer protection in relation to risk and costs? 
Explain.  
(b) Making retail products subject to a charge cap? Explain. 
Of fourteen responses, 65 per cent thought that there should be higher quality controls, 
albeit one thought this should be voluntary.  
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None of the twelve responses to the second part of the question were enthusiastic about 
charge caps on retail products and 67 per cent were unambiguously against.  
This was partly because active purchase was seen to be different: 
͞;PeŶsioŶ pƌoǀideƌͿ … the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt adopted the pƌiŶĐiple that it should 
only apply in default funds and not where the individual has made an 
active choice. This is a sound principle and we see no reason for charge 
capping to be extended to products where the consumer has made an 
aĐtiǀe seleĐtioŶ.͟ 
As with the responses to question 6, responses were concerned about stifling innovation 
and many also pointed out that charge caps were a blunt instrument if they did not improve 
outcomes. 
͞;IFoAͿ While ǁe ǁelĐoŵe the foĐus oŶ Đhaƌges, the ŵaiŶ iŵpaĐt of aŶǇ 
legislative change should be to obtain good outcomes for scheme 
members. This is particularly important for complex products such as retail 
drawdown, as there is a risk to the quality of information and / or advice 
provided to the customer. We suggest the market for these products will 
ďeĐoŵe ŵoƌe Đoŵpetitiǀe uŶdeƌ the Ŷeǁ fƌeedoŵs.͟ 
͞;Consultant) All retail drawdown products should be subject to consumer 
protection and regulatory protection otherwise we create the next mis-
selling scandal.  But provided there is proper transparency on costs I would 
veer away from a cap.  It interferes with the market producing products 
which have benefit for consumer and provider.͟ 
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One response did suggest that charge caps could be treated similarly to the accumulation 
phase: 
͞;Lawyer) A similar approach could be applied in this area to that which 
applies during the accumulation phase (see, for example, in the 
occupational pension scheme world, the Occupational Pension Schemes 
(Charges and Governance) Regulations 2015 and the corresponding 
provisions in the personal pension scheme world).͟ 
SUMMARY: Overwhelmingly, there was support for higher quality controls on sales of retail 
drawdown products, with 65 per cent of responses favouring this. However, there was 
virtually no support for a charge cap on retail drawdown products, on the grounds that it 
would stifle innovation, with two-thirds being explicitly against a cap. 
10.  What is the optimal investment strategy in scheme drawdown prior to the 
introduction of longevity insurance? 
There were fourteen responses to this and there were two main themes. Forty-three 
percent of responses emphasised that while the investment strategy should aim for growth, 
it should follow a low-risk strategy, and in three cases the responses explicitly mentioned 
protecting the capital.  The other common response - from 29 per cent of respondents - 
emphasised the importance of recognising the different needs of different members.   
22 
 
 
The idea that there was no single strategy was driven by the fact that individuals have 
different needs: 
͞;Insurance company) We do not believe that there is one particular asset 
strategy, but any strategy has to take into account the circumstances, the 
risk tolerance of the individual, and the size of the pension pot. This will 
broadly apply to annuities, equities, bonds and cash.͟ 
Where risk needed to be controlled it depended upon the likely annuitisation strategy: 
͞;Consultant) My strategy would be relatively cautious here, aiming for 
real value preservation (real zero return as a minimum). The drawdown 
period is short, typically lasting a few years only, therefore the usual loŶg‐
teƌŵ optiŵisatioŶ stƌategies of the aĐĐuŵulatioŶ phase ǁith suffiĐieŶt ƌisk‐
taking are not valid here. Capital loss in a few unlucky years may have a 
serious impact on annuity levels. This does not have to apply to amounts to 
be left for inheritance, but that should be handled separately. Additionally, 
the investment strategy should minimise annuitisation risk as much as 
possible, by purchasing batches of deferred annuities and by matching the 
duration of the portfolio to that of the annuity product.͟ 
Another response felt there were some options to reduce volatility of returns: 
͞;Insurance company) Optimal investment strategies can vary significantly, 
depending on individual circumstances. However, recent innovative 
investment strategies seek to respond to market conditions by controlling 
volatility while smoothing investment returns.͟ 
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One response felt that managers needed flexibility to take into account changing 
investment opportunities: 
͞;Pension provider) In one word, flexibility. Over recent years the returns 
delivered by bonds and gilts have outweighed those from equities, but this 
is not historically typical. Therefore any investment strategy must be 
effectively unconstrained within parameters set by the manager, to enable 
it to continue to provide an income whilst relatively unaffected by macro 
factors. This need for actively controlled flexibility is again a reason why we 
do not consider a price cap to be appropriate ...͟ 
Finally, another response suggested that the question was not really valid, as drawdown 
could include longevity insurance: 
͞;Consultant) I think the question is probably invalid as longevity 
protection can be introduced in drawdown using the new propositions, 
that then frees up the remaining fund to expose itself to a greater risk & 
reward strategy. Therefore a drawdown plan without longevity protection 
is a greater risk than one with it. If the investment element of the portfolio 
benefits from guarantees then this is especially the case.͟ 
SUMMARY: The strongest theme from responses to this question was that the investment 
strategy in scheme drawdown prior to the purchase of longevity insurance should be fairly 
cautious, namely to provide growth of the fund while reducing risk, with 43 per cent 
explicitly naming this as the appropriate strategy. However, 29 per cent of respondents 
noted that individuals have different needs and so there was no single strategy that would 
be appropriate for all individuals. 
11.  What are the advantages and disadvantages of institutional annuitisation (i.e., 
where annuities are provided on a bulk basis either by the scheme (self 
annuitisation) or by an insurance company, rather on a retail basis as currently)? 
There were twelve responses to this question. Many recognised the benefits of economies 
of scale and possibly lower distribution costs. In one case, this was because it was felt that 
individual purchase was itself problematic: 
͞;TUCͿ A competitive annuity market shaped by informed consumers 
shopping around to find the best deal has been shown to be little more 
than a theoretical ideal. Consumers struggle to understand the differences 
between financial products, give insufficient weight to factors such as 
indexation, and tend to favour poor value products from existing providers. 
Providers have proved happy to accept the extra profits provided by this 
near-captive market. Institutional purchasing would move some pricing 
power away from the providers.͟ 
But there were concerns that this is really making a DC scheme more like a DB scheme and 
hence not really appropriate.   
͞;Consultant) Institutional solutions always provide scale and help to lower 
prices. On its own, from a risk pooling perspective, a large pool of 
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annuitants brought to an insurance company should not lead to different 
rates than when the individual requests quotes, as the pool should be 
available for the insurance company anyway (in the lack of that – or 
reinsurance – it should not provide annuities). If perfect competition, 
transparency and financial literacy prevailed in general, then the two 
solutions ought to lead to equal results. However, as these conditions do 
not apply, institutional annuitisation may help, due to professionalism and 
better negotiating power on behalf of scheme trustees.͟ 
͞(Insurance company) ... There are also risks associated with scheme 
annuities; for example that the scheme is now taking on risk (in estimating 
future investment returns and longevity) and so becomes rather like a DB 
scheme. This can be contrasted with this most existing DC schemes that 
haǀe ǁell‐ŵatĐhed assets aŶd liaďilities ǁith ǀeƌǇ little ƌisk otheƌ thaŶ 
operational error or fraud. Hence the schemes would need to acquire the 
infrastructure and costs relating to risk management, similar to DB 
schemes ... This also raises the question of who is holding the ultimate 
liability if things go wrong ... Could DC aĐĐuŵulatioŶ ŵeŵďeƌs͛ fuŶds also 
be at risk? If so this will need to be made clear to them. If not, a backer of 
last resort is needed (e.g. the employer, PPF or state). Who would be 
willing to take this risk on?͟ 
Since many schemes are quite small, the economies of scale from bulk purchase would not 
be large and there are corresponding disadvantages for members who would be better 
opting out to get enhanced annuities through medical underwriting: 
͞;Consultant) Institutional annuitisation is mainly disadvantageous & 
ƌaƌelǇ deliǀeƌs ͚positiǀe ĐlieŶt outĐoŵes͛ as the client hardly ever gets best 
ǀalue foƌ ŵoŶeǇ iŶ ďulk deals ďeĐause theǇ doŶ͛t take iŶdiǀidual client life 
expectancy in to account.͟ 
However, it should be noted that several responses to question 12 below explicitly said that 
this need not be a problem. 
SUMMARY: Institutional annuitisation has the obvious advantage of scale and potentially 
the disadvantage of not being suitable for the individual, if not individually underwritten.  
Another disadvantage was that the scheme would be creating DB-like liabilities and the 
question was raised about who would ultimately underwrite these liabilities (employer, PPF 
or state) if the scheme underestimated the longevity and investment risks. Some 
respondents were uncertain whether the advantages outweighed the disadvantages and 
overall there was no clear majority one way or the other. 
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12.  Could institutional annuitisation deal with the individual underwriting of annuities 
and still encourage competition from providers in the open market to maximise 
consumer outcomes (e.g. in the case where a retired member has a medical 
condition which reduces their life expectancy)? 
There were eight responses to this question and only one response thought that this would 
be difficult. Half of the responses were very confident that this was possible and some said 
that they had experience of combining the two. One respondent linked this to the idea of a 
reverse auction: 
͞;Consultant) Yes, using the reverse auction process outlined above [in 
response to question 3]. In this scenario, the scheme would only pay the 
annuity to the member once they & their spouse (if they have one) had 
been underwritten. The annuity provided would be sourced for them by the 
sĐheŵe ďut ŵaǇ ďe pƌoǀided ďǇ a ƌaŶge of diffeƌeŶt pƌoǀideƌs.͟ 
Some responses noted that individuals need to be given the possibility to opt out which 
could result in the highest mortality individuals leaving anyway. 
SUMMARY: The overwhelming majority of responses thought that institutional annuitisation 
could deal with individual underwriting and still encourage competition from providers. 
13.  (a) Would a market for advanced life deferred annuities be viable? 
(b) What is the likely demand for advanced life deferred annuities? 
Of fifteen responses, 60 per cent thought that there would or possibly could be a market, 
but others thought that there would be problems with supply (due to capital requirements 
making the products expensive) or demand (due to the long-run nature of the product and 
possibility of death before payout). Responses referred to the market in the USA both to 
argue that there would and there would not be a market for deferred annuities. Demand 
was expected to be low, unless possibly the product was part of a default. One particular 
concern was that EU regulations requiring unisex pricing would be an obstacle such 
products 
͞(Consultant) a market for longevity-insurance [i.e. deferred] annuities is 
not viable in the UK because they are offered only on a unisex basis.  The 
difference in life expectancy by gender at older ages makes these annuities 
unfavourable to males, so in principle they would only be offered based on 
female mortality rates. To my knowledge, nowhere in the world is there a 
viable unisex longevity-insurance market.͟ 
Alternatively, one suggestion was that the market for deferred annuities could increase if 
linked to long-term care products. Two responses suggested that deferred annuities would 
benefit by being sold as multi-premium policies, with premiums being paid out of a 
drawdown product until a given age (e.g. from age 65 to age 80) at which point the deferred 
annuity would come into payment. 
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SUMMARY: Sixty per cent of respondents thought that there could be a market for 
advanced life deferred annuities, but it is clear that there would be significant problems to 
be overcome to achieve this. To make the product more attractive, some respondents 
suggested it could be paid for in instalments.  
14.  Is there likely to be demand for inflation protection? 
There was almost unanimity from the seventeen responses that individuals want inflation 
protection but are not prepared to pay for it at current prices.  
͞;Consultant) There seems to be a dichotomy here, as surveys show that 
people are aware that a lifetime real value protection of pension payouts 
would be desiƌaďle, ďut theǇ still doŶ͛t faǀouƌ ƌeal aŶŶuities – probably due 
to higher prices. More demand for inflation protection could be created by 
better communication, explaining why a level annuity leads to difficulties 
in later years, and including such products in the default provision.͟ 
There was a little confusion over whether this question referred to immediate or (advanced-
life) deferred annuities (i.e. a follow-up to question 13) and one respondent noted that 
deferred annuities without inflation protection would not be very valuable by the time of 
payment. Several responses noted that inflation is currently low. 
SUMMARY: There was virtually unanimous support for the idea of inflation protection, but 
respondents doubted whether individuals would pay the high price needed to buy it. 
15.  What are your views on the proposals by HM Treasury to allow annuities to have 
more flexible payment terms by: 
(a) allowing lifetime annuities to decrease  
(b) allowing lump sums to be taken from lifetime annuities 
(c) removing the ten-year guarantee period for guaranteed annuities  
(d) allowing payments from guaranteed annuities to be paid to beneficiaries as a 
lump sum, where they are under £30,000? 
There were nineteen responses to this question and 68 per cent were supportive of all or 
some of these possibilities. For example: 
͞(Insurance company) The above [list of annuity options] appears to be 
reasonable, allowing a level regulatory playing field between flexible 
aŶŶuities aŶd iŶĐoŵe dƌaǁdoǁŶ.͟ 
However, one response thought that deferred annuities would be a superior method and 
eight thought that the complexity of so many products would create problems.   
(Consultant) ͞I think annuity products do have a place and it is right that 
there are commercial advantages to providers offering them - so we 
should not water these down as products͟ 
Some respondents were positive, but still thought that the complexity would create 
problems which might be addressed by advice or just accepted. 
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͞;Pension provider) We are generally supportive of the proposals, although 
such freedoms are prone to be misused or misunderstood by a few.͟ 
͞;Consultant) Without the speĐifiĐs, iŶ geŶeƌal ŵoƌe fleǆiďilitǇ ;͚fƌeedoŵ͚Ϳ 
in annuities potentially leads to a bigger number of customers making 
decisions regretted later and to longevity risk managed more poorly. As a 
minimum, default solutions should not include such elements which hurt 
the principle of lifetime real value protection.͟ 
One response suggested that these products were only suitable for a minority of the 
market: 
͞;Consultant) All of these proposals provide welcome options in principle. 
However, they are generally not appropriate for members with small pots 
and little or no other household wealth or income other than the state 
pension. That group currently comprises a large majority of DC scheme 
members, and as the number of members with legacy DB to augment their 
DC pots falls, the proportion will increase. Without a substantial increase in 
contributions to DC schemes over a long time, that position will not 
improve. Consequently, in practice these options may confer limited 
benefit for most members – and possibly cause problems by raising 
expectations that cannot be met.͟ 
SUMMARY: There was a clear majority in favour of some or all of these options to increase 
the fleǆiďilitǇ of aŶŶuities͛ paǇŵeŶt teƌŵs, with 68 per cent of responses supporting at least 
one of the options. But many respondents also raised significant concerns that such 
products would increase complexity and potentially confuse customers: in addition to this, 
many of the suggested products would only be suitable for a small component of the 
market. So, at best, one would say that there was qualified support. 
16.  What are your views on U-shaped or J-shaped annuities? 
There was less enthusiasm for these annuity products than those in the previous question: 
of sixteen responses, only half were enthusiastic. As well as a concern about complexity, 
some responses suggested that it would be difficult to know wheƌe the ŵiŶiŵuŵ of the ͞U͟ 
should be and hence difficult to design appropriate products. Alternatively, these more 
complicated income streams could be achieved by more straightforward mixtures of 
drawdown and annuitisation. 
͞;AGE UKͿ At present, there is a lack of knowledge about consumer 
spending in retirement. While a U-shaped spending curve is intuitive, and 
may be correct, there has not yet been a sufficient analysis of longitudinal 
spending data to confirm this.  
Also, as ŵost people͛s eǆpeŶdituƌe has to date been restricted to taking a 
tax-free lump sum and the subsequent purchase of a level or index-linked 
annuity, this may have led people to spend in a particular way that may 
not have met their needs.͟ 
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SUMMARY: There were mixed views on the provision of U- or J-shaped annuities, with 
responses fairly evenly divided between those for and those against. A particular issued 
ƌaised ǁas ǁheƌe the ŵiŶiŵuŵ of the ͞U͟ should ďe. It ǁas also suggested that these ŵoƌe 
complicated income streams could be achieved by more straightforward mixtures of 
drawdown and annuitisation. 
17.  Should DC retirement products and decumulation strategies be linked to the single 
tier state pension? If so, how? 
The seventeen responses to this were mixed. Some emphasised that the state pension itself 
was too complex or uncertain to link in to DC pensions; others worried about the 
uncertainty of the DC pension until relatively near retirement. Thirteen responses were 
generally enthusiastic or enthusiastic in principle, but the emphasis was on providing 
information to help individuals deal with their individual circumstances. 
͞(Consultant) it is hard to see how this would be helpful on a universal 
basis, given the complexity around decumulation strategies and the 
difference between iŶdiǀidual ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes.͟ 
͞;AGE UKͿ IŶ plaŶŶiŶg foƌ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt it is iŵpoƌtaŶt that all souƌĐes of 
retirement income are accounted for, including state pensions. 
In some circumstances, deferring your state pension or buying additional 
state pension can provide more income than buying an annuity. People 
approaching retirement and who are at or near state pension age should 
consider how to maximise income from all sources, and this should be 
reflected in default strategies. 
This raises two further issues for public policy: 
(a) How individuals can look across all their expected pensions income, 
puďliĐ aŶd pƌiǀate. We ǁould like to see a siŶgle ͚dashďoaƌd͛ ĐoǀeƌiŶg 
all pensions. The possibility of a single pension forecast has been 
explored in the past, and should be re-visited ... 
(b) The need for certainty in the state pension system. Any changes need 
to be introduced with sufficient time and publicity for people to be able 
to plan ahead. In particular, we would like to see the triple lock 
enshrined in legislation ...͟ 
͞;Consultant) Yes, they definitely should – and payouts from different 
saving schemes should also be combined. For instance, if there exists a 
floor and a cap for strongly recommended annuitisation (for very low levels 
not feasible, for high levels not necessary), these should take all sources 
into account. Cooperation on behalf of state and private pension providers 
is required to do this, and presumably one entity should be made 
ƌespoŶsiďle to ŵaŶage the eǆeƌĐise ;DWP, TP‘, FCA, NE“T?Ϳ.͟ 
SUMMARY: Respondents disagreed on whether retirement products should be linked to the 
state pension. While many thought that it was a good idea in principle, there were issues 
about complexity of pensions in practice, which might make linking the two infeasible. 
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18.  What other retirement products do you expect to become available? Please provide 
details if possible. 
There were fifteen responses to this question. The range of products mentioned included: 
development of guaranteed drawdown products, term-certain annuities, flexible annuities 
and mixtures of products. All of these products have been mentioned at some point in this 
paper (usually in earlier questions). 
Several responses were keen that a range of products should be purchased together rather 
than individuals having to buy different stand-alone products separately. One combination 
suggested was a drawdown product with ceiling and floor to payout combined with an 
(advanced-life) deferred annuity. There were several suggestions that products would 
combine with long-term care assurance, payment of which would be conditional on 
activities of daily living. 
SUMMARY: A range of products were suggested, including new (flexible) annuity products 
and new (guaranteed) drawdown products. Products which combined more basic products 
were also suggested, such as those combining drawdown and annuities. Several responses 
suggested products involving long-term care assurance.  
19.  Is theƌe a Đase foƌ desigŶatiŶg ĐeƌtaiŶ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt pƌoduĐts as ͚safe haƌďouƌ͛ 
products? Explain. 
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This question resulted in strong views on both sides. Of sixteen responses, 31 per cent 
aƌgued ͞Ŷo͟ oƌ ǁeƌe ǀeƌǇ uŶeŶthusiastiĐ aŶd half aƌgued ͞Ǉes͟. The ƌeŵaiŶdeƌ suggested 
that in practice it was not clear what was really meant by a safe harbour product or how to 
defiŶe it ;espeĐiallǇ if ĐoŶsuŵeƌs ŵisuŶdeƌstood ǁhat ǁas ŵeaŶt ďǇ ͞safe͟Ϳ aŶd that it 
might inhibit market innovation.  
One response felt that all products should be regulated equally. If a safe harbour product 
were inappropriate for many individuals who were defaulted into it, then it would make 
things worse. Some responses thought that all products should be subject to approval and 
that that was sufficient.  
Three responses thought that the government might provide a basic product or that private 
firms might provide products defined by regulators or the government (to prevent claims of 
mis-selling). One response suggested that in an increasingly complicated world, having a 
safe harbour product would enable individuals who were confused to have a minimum. 
 ͞;Lawyer) No. It is, however, to be hoped that the Financial Conduct 
AuthoƌitǇ͛s appƌoaĐh to applǇiŶg behavioural finance theory and to look at 
the outturns from new financial services products on a thematic basis will 
lead to members not ending up with drawdown products which provide an 
ostensibly higher level of income but which carry the associated higher 
leǀel of ƌisk ;e.g. ͚precipice bonds͛).͟ 
͞;Consultant) Yes, it might even make sense to have simple, low-cost 
government sponsored products (a public option) that the private 
providers would have to compete with.͟ 
SUMMARY: There was a small majority of respondents in favour of designating retirement 
pƌoduĐts as ͞safe harbour͟ products, but there were strong views both for and against. 
20.  Following the impact of the Budget 2014 tax changes on annuity providers, do you 
have any concerns about supply-side contraction or other developments in the 
annuity market that might make it less competitive?  
Of the ten responses to this, there was unanimity that the market might get smaller and 
that this might result in less competition. 
͞;Consultant) It is essential that annuity products remain attractive 
commercially for providers otherwise it will spell the end of the offerings - 
what we need are products that are more balanced in terms of commercial 
attractiveness for providers and for savers with more being done for 
investors who do not understand the issues.͟ 
SUMMARY: Respondents were unanimous that the market would probably get smaller and 
less competitive as a result of the 2014 Budget changes. 
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21. (a) What is the best way to deal with stranded pots? Explain. 
(b) Two approaches have been put forward to date: ͚aggregator͛ and ͚pot-follows-
member͛. Do you have preference for one over the other? Explain. 
;ĐͿ Would ͚sĐheŵe-follows-ŵeŵďeƌ͛ ďe feasiďle? EǆplaiŶ 
Only two responses thought that ͞sĐheŵe-folloǁs͟ ŵeŵďeƌ ǁas feasiďle aŶd eǀeŶ these 
thought that there would be costs to employers: the remainder thought that the issue of 
costs to employers was so great that it was infeasible. One response said that given the 
recent changes it is too late to be considering this. 
Four responses preferred aggregation (with a limited number of aggregators), but the 
ŵajoƌitǇ ǁeƌe iŶ faǀouƌ of ͞pot-follows-ŵeŵďeƌ͟. AŶ alteƌŶatiǀe ǁas a ĐeŶtƌal ĐleaƌiŶg 
house or virtual or notional aggregation via a central database: 
͞;Consultant) A notional aggregator approach – through a central 
database – might be preferred by some parties, including members, 
although the actual pots do not move.͟ 
 
Several responses said here and elsewhere that it is important to engage members (and 
aǀoid defaultsͿ aŶd that ͞pot-follows-ŵeŵďeƌ͟ eŶĐouƌages this: 
͞(Lawyer) The member can see in one place all of his retirement savings 
which, we would suggest, is likely to encourage a greater sense of 
awareness, ownership and involvement.͟ 
͞;NAPFͿ The proliferation of small, stranded pots is a problem that the 
NAPF recognises needs to be addressed over the short to medium term and 
which needs to be done in a way that protects members and keeps 
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implementation and ongoing costs to a minimum. The NAPF has a number 
of stƌoŶg ĐoŶĐeƌŶs aďout ǁhetheƌ the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s poliĐǇ of pot‐folloǁs‐
members automatic transfers does enough on either of these fronts. This 
policy was developed by Government three years ago, before the new 
charge cap, rules on transaction costs, before automatic enrolment had 
even begun and before the freedom and choice reforms were developed. 
These developments are changing the pensions landscape rapidly and alter 
the assumptions on which the policy is based – for instance that most 
people will want to consolidate pots to buy an annuity. Therefore the next 
GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt should ƌeǀieǁ the Đase foƌ auto‐tƌaŶsfeƌs, aŶd deǀelop an 
approach that fits with the new reforms and the new landscape, which is 
likely to be dominated (particularly when considering smaller pots) by a 
sŵall Ŷuŵďeƌ of laƌge‐sĐale loǁ‐Đost ŵasteƌ tƌusts.͟ 
A final suggestion was to have a single clearing house for pension pots: 
͞(Insurance Company) An alternative approach may be that pensions are 
taken out of the workplace with each individual having their own pot. 
Employers would have the obligation to make contributions and collect 
contributions for their employees. This would then be fed into one clearing 
house ǁhiĐh ǁould theŶ distƌiďute the ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶs to eaĐh iŶdiǀidual͛s 
own scheme. This would be a particularly large infrastructure build and 
would move away form the potential to educate and engage people 
thƌough theiƌ ǁoƌkplaĐe.͟ 
͞;Consultant) This is very difficult - I would argue scheme follows member 
could be a form of deferred membership depending on employer 
involvement  - and the evidence suggests that deferreds become the 
͚forgotten members͛.   Pot follows member might result in assets being 
crystallised at entirely the wrong moment.  On balance, I prefer the 
existence of centralised schemes for DC provision where the scheme is not 
employer dependent - i.e. the DC member in effect remains active 
throughout the accumulation period  (like NEST up to a point).  I think 
there needs to be statutory responsibility to deal with all ... stranded pots 
so that it should not matter where an asset has been left.͟ 
SUMMARY: The majority of responses were in favour of pot-follows-member to deal with 
stranded pots, although 25 per cent favoured aggregation (with a limited number of 
aggregators). An alternative was a central clearing house or virtual or notional aggregation 
via a central database. There ǁas little suppoƌt foƌ ͞sĐheŵe-folloǁs͟ ŵeŵďeƌ: a Ŷuŵďeƌ of 
respondents said the issue of costs to employers was believed to be so great that it was 
considered infeasible, while another said that given the recent changes it is too late to be 
considering this. 
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2. Supporting savers to make the right choice at retirement for them and 
their family and how to build on the lessons of auto-enrolment 
This section of the consultation document investigated whether it is possible to design a 
good default option at retirement which will be suitable for most savers, in the same way 
that a good default investment strategy in the accumulation phase can be designed. The 
introduction to this section emphasised that savers exhibited greater heterogeneity in 
retirement than in the accumulation phase and asked how nudges or defaults (perhaps 
similar to auto-eŶƌolŵeŶt iŶ the aĐĐuŵulatioŶ phaseͿ, ĐoŵďiŶed ǁith the ͞guidaŶĐe 
guaƌaŶtee͟ aŶd otheƌ faĐtoƌs Đould help saǀeƌs Ŷaǀigate thƌough the Đoŵpleǆ deĐisioŶs 
needed in the distribution phase. 
22. It is now recognised that many people face a number of behavioural barriers which 
prevent them behaving optimally. When it comes to decumulation, what are the key 
barriers? 
There were 22 responses to this question and many barriers were suggested. The term 
͞ďehaǀiouƌal͟ ǁas iŶteƌpƌeted ďoth iŶ the Ŷaƌƌoǁ seŶse used ǁithiŶ aĐadeŵia ;i.e., 
potentially irrational behaviour) and also to refer to problems that consumers might have 
accessing or processing information.  
 
Not all responses were happy with the premise of the question as evidenced by the 
following comment: 
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͞(Consultant) we are uŶsuƌe that the use of teƌŵs suĐh as ͞ďehaǀiouƌal 
ďaƌƌieƌs͟ aƌe helpful as they seem to blame consumers rather than 
identifying the imbalance of knowledge which makes it difficult for 
consumers to make informed decisions ... ͞ 
The frequency of the most commonly reported behavioural barriers is illustrated in the 
following figure: 
The most common response related to consumers lacking understanding or the ability to 
make financial decisions. Many responses made clear that this was not due to the 
consumers alone but also the amount and complexity of information that consumers were 
given and the way in which it was presented. For example, one response suggested that the 
problem was down to 
͞(Consultant) Incomprehensible illustrations without any use of common 
language that the average member can easily understand, full of risk 
warnings that terrify most of the public.͟ 
There was disagreement about whether this problem could easily be resolved. On the more 
positive side there were responses such as  
͞(Insurance company) ... Both such risks can best be mitigated by clear 
advice and guidance prior and during decumulation so that savers choose 
the products that are most appropriate for them.͟ 
while on the other side it was suggested that 
͞(Consultant) The reforms announced in the 2014 Budget have been 
ĐoŶsisteŶtlǇ fƌaŵed iŶ teƌŵs of ͚fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͛, ďut if people do not 
have the skills and motivation to think about their money and make 
informed decisions about their retirement choices, then giving people 
information about their options will not suffiĐe.͟ 
EŵploǇeƌs also haǀe sigŶifiĐaŶt ĐoŶĐeƌŶs aďout eŵploǇees͛ peŶsion saving:  
͞(Insurance company) The CBI/Standard Life 2013 pensions survey 
illustrated that more than two-thirds (68%) of businesses report that they 
are either very concerned or concerned about employees either opting out 
or failing to take full advantage of their scheme. This is reinforced by data 
from the same survey that indicates only 36% of employees are currently 
taking advantage of their eŵploǇeƌ͛s highest ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ ƌate. GettiŶg 
better outcomes for savers must encompass maximising what is available 
first and foremost, and this must take precedence over raising costs for 
employers.͟ 
SUMMARY: A wide range of behavioural barriers were mentioned by the different 
respondents. The barrier to optimal behaviour that was most commonly mentioned was the 
lack of financial literacy. Other behavioural barriers included poor understanding of 
longevity risk, lack of engagement, short termism, framing effects, procrastination and 
over/under confidence. 
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23. We need to recognise that retirees: have different expenditure needs during 
different phases of their retirement; need to pace their spending throughout 
retirement in order to optimise the use of their lifetime assets and income and their 
ability to make intended bequests; and need a choice architecture that reflects the 
market segment to which they belong. 
  (a) What is your understanding of the regulatory consumer market segmentation 
and is this appropriate in relation to the needs of DC retirees? 
(b) What nudges and choice architecture do people need to deal with these issues 
and overcome the behavioural barriers they face? 
There were eight responses to part (a) and most agreed with the three-fold division of (i) 
mass market; (ii) the mass affluent market; (iii) and the high net worth market. Only one 
response thought that it was important to have a more sophisticated model. 
Of the twelve responses to part (b) only 25 per cent evinced any enthusiasm or confidence 
in defaults or nudges and one of these felt that defaults needed to be conditional on a much 
more detailed classification of consumers. However, in answers to other questions another 
four respondents suggested that defaults could play a role for at least part of the market 
(see comments on question 24), which in total suggests a substantial minority in favour. 
The most common theme was the need to provide a better combination of information, 
guidance and advice, preferably in a way to encourage more engagement of consumers so 
that they could take their own decisions. However, several noted that this could not 
guarantee optimal outcomes, for example, the comment that 
͞(Insurance Company) the greater freedom that will soon be offered to 
retirees comes with greater responsibility. We believe that clear advice and 
guidance prior and during decumulation is the optimal way to encourage 
retirees to choose the products best suited to their needs. 
There was also a common theme that the process should not be unnecessarily complicated: 
͞(Consultant) People need simple options they can set up at retirement and 
then run with, without a lot of management needed after retirement.͟ 
SUMMARY: There was general agreement on the characterisation of market segmentation 
into mass market, mass-affluent market and high net worth. A substantial minority of 
responses were enthusiastic about nudges, but more thought that it was more important to 
provide better information. 
24. (a) What lessons from auto-enrolment in the accumulation phase can be brought to 
the decumulation phase?  
There were fifteen responses to this question. Several noted the apparent contradiction 
between auto-enrolment in the accumulation phase (implying that individuals could not be 
trusted fully to take the correct decision) with freedom in the decumulation phase. 
Conversely, others thought the distinction useful because encouraging all individuals to save 
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was appropriate (as nearly all individuals need to save), while heterogeneity in retirement 
ŵeaŶt that theƌe ǁas Ŷo ͞oŶe-size-fits-all͟ solutioŶ foƌ deĐuŵulatioŶ. 
͞(Pension provider) The need to save for later life is a certainty, the manner 
in which this saving is utilised is precisely the opposite.͟ 
One possible way of combining the default principle with allowance for heterogeneity of 
pensioners was for a limited number of choices: 
͞;Lawyer) We think the better approach would be to offer the member a 
͚default menu͛ with a limited number of ͚default choices͛.͟ 
There was widespread agreement that the experience of auto-enrolment suggested that 
inertia could be harnessed to encourage more saving. But not all responses saw this to be 
without disadvantages since  
͞(Consultant) Inertia is an effective tool to retain people in a given 
strategy; however it does not substantially increase member 
engagement.͟ 
and many respondents thought that engagement was key to getting drawdown to work 
effectively. A further concern was that it would be inappropriate to default a consumer into 
a product such as an annuity, because the latter is irreversible and such decisions should be 
made consciously. There was also some disagreement over what a default is for. Several 
responses suggested that there should be a menu of defaults to allow for heterogeneity of 
consumers and some suggested explicitly that this was to prevent downside risk 
͞(Pension provider) The key role for defaults is to avoid the worst possible 
outcomes.͟ 
But three responses thought that the purpose of defaults was to provide products for 
consumers who did not really want to engage with the process. 
͞(Consultant) Many people want to be told what to do and provided they 
see sense and it is pretty well done for them they will go along with it.͟ 
͞;Consultant) The success of the paternalistic approach in the 
accumulation period is clearly in contradiction with the new libertarian 
͚fƌeedoŵ͛ iŶ the paǇout phase. The faĐt that aƌouŶd ϭϬ ŵillioŶ fiƌst‐tiŵe 
savers may be included in the new system in a country so liberal and 
ŵaƌket‐oƌieŶted as the UK seems to suggest that these very same people 
will need a lot of guidance at retirement – which raises even more complex 
questions than the accumulation period. Behavioural factors are being 
pƌoǀeŶ iŶ the auto‐eŶƌolŵeŶt eǆeƌĐise, aŶd that iŵplies that ǁithout 
properly designed default elements, the payout phase may bring ... 
suboptimal and/or expensive solutions to many customers. Just as saving is 
not mandatory (unlike in many other jurisdictions) but strongly motivated 
and supported, annuitisation – which is the most adequate tool leading to 
pensions – should at least be strongly proposed as the automatic way. The 
degree, timing and other details of annuitisation must be well designed, 
but some form should be a part of the default option.͟ 
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SUMMARY: Responses to this were very mixed. Respondents agreed that inertia had 
provided benefits in the accumulation phase of pension saving, but not all thought that this 
could be used in the decumulation phase: one reason for this was the greater diversity of 
needs in the decumulation phase, which makes it much harder to provide appropriate 
defaults. There were also differing views on whether defaults were needed to address the 
issue of inertia or whether they discouraged engagement with the process and made 
matters worse. Several responses suggested having a menu with a limited number of default 
choices. 
24. (b) Given the importance of income security for the elderly and the existence of 
longevity risk, is there a case for  defaulting people into buying longevity insurance 
via auto-enrolment (i.e., drawdown with longevity insurance becomes the default 
retirement strategy)? Consider the advantages and disadvantages of such a 
strategy.  
There were seventeen responses to this question: 30 per cent were unambiguously against 
having such a default, at least in the short term, and 35 per cent were predominantly in 
favour. 
 
While soŵe felt that suĐh a poliĐǇ ǁas iŶappƌopƌiate giǀeŶ the poliĐǇ ĐhaŶge to ͞fƌeedoŵ 
aŶd ĐhoiĐe͟, the gƌeateƌ ĐoŶĐeƌŶ ǁas hoǁ to pƌoǀide aŶ appƌopƌiate ƌaŶge of optioŶs foƌ 
heterogeneous pensioners with different needs. 
͞;CBIͿ ... creating default routes into an income product for savers at 
retirement should not be a priority for the next government. The saving 
positions of people at retirement will be vast as the result of auto-
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enrolment, and therefore there will be no one-size-fits-all route that will 
suit most individuals. A default income route risks putting an individual 
into a product that does not suit their circumstances ... ͞ 
 Among those in favour, most suggested that the defaults should be contingent on at least 
some of the circumstances of the consumer 
͞(SPP) We would be cautious about making drawdown a default.  We think 
drawdown works best when individuals are engaged and make conscious 
decisions about the specific aims, which they wish to meet through 
drawdown.  For default options, it might be better to concentrate on 
paying the whole pot as a lump sum if it is below a certain level or simply 
buying an annuity if it is not.͟ 
A few of the suggestions for defaults were phrased within more detailed suggestions for the 
whole process. For example, 
͞(TUC) A system of limited – no more than three - retirement pathways 
would strike the balance between harnessing inertia and providing options 
for consumer to consider. These would provide a starting point for 
conversations with guidance advisers too. This reconciles the idea of 
freedom while making it more manageable for consumers than being 
presented with a blank sheet of paper and asked to plan for what could be 
several decades in retirement. Each broad retirement pathway could 
contain a default route plus some variations from it appropriate for 
different circumstances. 
Given the importance of managing longevity risk, there is a strong case for 
longevity insurance being part of the key pathway offered to consumers.͟ 
Alternatively, the longevity insurance need not be a single-premium policy: 
͞;Lawyer) It would be helpful to establish whether there is any advantage 
in purchasing longevity insurance ďǇ iŶstalŵeŶts oǀeƌ the ŵeŵďeƌ͛s 
accumulation period as distinct from purchasing the longevity insurance 
with a lump sum at the time the member decides to start drawing-down 
his retirement savings.)  
The most enthusiastic response to a default noted that people could always opt out: 
͞;Consultant) I do not see real disadǀaŶtages of suĐh aŶ ͚auto‐eŶƌolŵeŶt͛ 
strategy in the payout phase, if the most appropriate type of annuity (and 
the age of annuitisation) is well defined. Those who do not want it will opt 
out (and there will be enough communication to do exactly that by 
interested parties) and the solution would serve the interest of the majority 
in helping to manage longevity risk. Individual needs (e.g., debt 
repayment, requirement of an enhanced annuity, etc.) may be handled 
even in such a default environment – just as you do not have to save in the 
auto enrolment system or do not have to stay in the default portfolio. 
Reconciliation with the freedom of selecting a pension product is not a 
problem. Every retiree is free to select whatever product. They are just not 
left alone.͟ 
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SUMMARY: Responses were equally divided on whether or not there should be defaults into 
longevity insurance. OppoŶeŶts said that suĐh a poliĐǇ ǁas iŶĐoŶsisteŶt ǁith ͞fƌeedoŵ aŶd 
ĐhoiĐe͟ aŶd that it would be hard to select an appropriate range of options for 
heterogeneous pensioners with different needs.  The most enthusiastic supporters said that 
people could always opt out. 
24. (c) What would be the likely annualised cost of such products for individuals? 
There were six responses to this part of the question and most noted that the cost 
depended on too many circumstances to be able to give an answer. Two responses 
suggested that a deferred annuity starting payment at age 85 would not cost much if 
purchased at age 60. 
SUMMARY: Responses suggested that the cost of default longevity products depends on too 
many factors to provide a simple answer. 
24. (d) How could the default principle, upon which the success of auto-enrolment is 
predicated, be best reconciled with the individual freedoms for DC decumulation 
introduced in the 2014 Budget? 
There were ten explicit responses to this part of the question. The variety of views about 
defaults expressed earlier translated into different views on this question. Some felt that 
there was no problem: 
͞(Consultant) [regarding default or encouraged annuity option] 
Reconciliation with the freedom of selecting a pension product is not a 
problem. Every retiree is free to select whatever product. They are just not 
left alone.͟ 
Others suggested that defaults could help consumers to start the process 
͞(Consultant) Defaults can be very helpful in eliminating confusion and 
setting participants on a good course if the right products are chosen.͟ 
especially where consumers would be under-confident in making decisions: 
͞(Consultant) … lots of people who do want to engage but are not 
comfortable making extremely complex decisions about their retirement 
will simply want an answer to the ƋuestioŶ ͞What should I do?͟, aŶd the 
guidance guarantee as currently constituted will not answer this. To 
accommodate people who fall into the above category and who are not 
catered for by the regulated financial advice market industry should 
deǀelop a ͚default ƌeĐoŵŵeŶdatioŶ͛ that is likely to be appropriate for 
most people in their general circumstances (for example health, family 
status, pot size). This could then be provided as part of the guidance 
guarantee.͟ 
Alternatively it was suggested that individuals who wanted to take advantage of the new 
freedoms would need advice: 
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͞(Consultant) If members wish to take full advantage of the individual 
freedoms they will have to make decisions from a wide range of options, 
which may include leaving the scheme(s) in which the DC pot accumulated. 
To do so effectively, they will need to engage with the process, and may 
need help. 
They may feel that they are happy to make some of their own decisions 
(e.g. short-term ones) but are uncomfortable with, for example, assuming 
the full risk of getting things seriously wrong and running out of money. 
For those retirees, a default strategy that sits below the full drawdown 
options and acts as a safety net, but uses a part only of the accrued DC pot 
to secure an income to supplement any earned income and/or state or 
other workplace pension, leaving the balance to be drawn down according 
to the ƌetiƌee͛s disĐƌetioŶ, ĐaŶ Đoeǆist ǁith the Budget 2014 freedoms. This, 
of course, will require a DC pot and/or other discretionary income of 
sufficient size ... .͟ 
Finally one respondent, already quoted above, suggested that the issue needed more 
analysis: 
͞(Consultant) The default nature of auto-enrolment (which recognises that 
individuals do not always make considered choices about their finances) is 
at odds with the individual freedoms for DC decumulation (which assumes 
that individuals are best able to make decisions about their money). We do 
not believe these are entirely irreconcilable, but far greater policy attention 
needs to be given to their interaction.͟ 
SUMMARY: Responses were very divided on whether or how defaults into longevity 
products could be reconciled with choice and there was no agreed position. Supporters of 
defaults thought there was no real problem of reconciliation: defaults were useful in 
eliminating confusion and helped those who wanted to be told what to do, while everyone 
was free to opt out.  Opponents said individuals needed advice to take full advantage of the 
individual freedoms. 
25. What are the implications of the ChaŶĐelloƌ͛s aŶŶouŶĐeŵeŶt iŶ Septeŵďeƌ ϮϬϭ4 
effectively ending the 55% tax rate on inherited pension pots? 
A third of the fifteen responses thought that this would increase the attractiveness of 
savings and increase pension savings. 
͞(Insurance Company) The abolition of the 55% tax rate on inherited 
pension pots should encourage individuals to save, as it will allow them to 
pass on any retirement savings in their entirety to their loved ones. 
A few responses thought that this made inheritance situation easier, although this 
depended on how the pension wealth was put into drawdown. Most of the remaining 
responses discussed the effect on post-retirement behaviour, realising that this might 
encourage more bequests, but that the issue was moot for consumers with small pots: 
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͞(Consultant) In theory this could encourage more people to draw down 
less from their pots in early years, because they would be able to pass on 
any amounts remaining at their death to a relative, without it incurring 
punitive tax. ... In practice, however, this latter type of estate planning is 
likely to be rare, due to the small size of most pots – a factor which is 
unlikely to change significantly for many years, if at all.͟  
Another response suggested that it might create another behavioural barrier: 
͞;Insurance company) The prospect of a tax free legacy may have another 
behavioural effect, in further undermining the purchase of an annuity. 
Prospective annuitants may be discouraged from securing a guaranteed 
income by underestimating both their income requirements and their 
longevity. As a result, they feel that they may be depriving beneficiaries of 
a lump sum, when the reality for many is that their fund will be 
extinguished in their lifetime.͟ 
As with the previous question, it was noted that the effect would depend on the position of 
the saver. 
͞(TUC) This risks having the twin effect of allowing very wealthy savers a 
route around inheritance tax, while leaving low and middle income people 
restricting their spending and quality of life in retirement because they feel 
an obligation to pass on some limited wealth to their beneficiaries.͟ 
Three responses were critical of the change, typical of which was: 
͞(Consultant) Pension saving tax rules should penalise bequest behaviour – 
bequests have no part in pension tax policy.͟ 
SUMMARY: A third of respondents thought that ending the 55 per cent tax rate on inherited 
pension pots would encourage more pension savings. Others thought people might feel 
obliged to use their pension pot for inheritance, rather than spend it during their own 
retirement. Most recognised that the issue was irrelevant for people with small pension 
pots. 
26. What are your views on the guidance guarantee and how effective it will be? 
Of the 21 responses, 19 per cent thought that it was too soon to say and some raised issues 
concerning costs and whether it would be able to meet its existing remit. 
͞(Consultant) It is too early to say. It seems that it will be more costly and 
complicated than what the first statements of the government indicated. It 
is still possible that the 400,000 retirees expected to need the guidance 
may receive an acceptable service, but even to monitor that process and 
handle complaints may turn out to be a gigantic job.͟ 
Four thought that it would be inadequate, although only one was sufficiently emphatic to 
say  
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͞(Consultant) It sounds like an absolute disaster! People want to be told 
what to do, they don't want someone telling them, ͚Here are a bunch of 
options to consider, but I can't tell you what you should do.͛ ͟ 
Whether positive or negative, responses often worried that recipients of guidance would 
not be sure what they were getting: 
͞(Consultant) We believe that the guidance guarantee (now branded 
Pension Wise) will be of limited effectiveness. In our view, the distinction 
ďetǁeeŶ ͞guidaŶĐe͟ aŶd ͞adǀiĐe͟ is aŶ eŶtiƌelǇ arbitrary one understood 
solely by the financial services industry, and completely alien to others. 
Consequently, lay people turning to Pension Wise for help will be 
disappointed that they are not given advice, or anything approaching it.͟ 
The most common views were that it provided a floor to what consumers would receive and 
would, in the best case, help consumers decide whether or not they needed advice. 
͞(Consultant) For most individuals, this is unlikely to provide sufficient 
information to make the best decision, but may prevent some from making 
poor ones.͟ 
͞;Pension provider) We think Pension Wise has the potential to address 
some of the most significant shortfalls in the pensions market, including 
the weakness of the buyer side. However, it is impossible to know whether 
it will be effective until it is launched in April 2015.͟ 
͞(ACA) The guidance guarantee does not provide anything like all the help 
needed by consumers and will be too late to really affect outcomes for 
many people. It could also be difficult to provide the promised guidance if 
demand is high. That said, we welcome the guidance guarantee as a useful 
step in the right direction.͟ 
͞(Pension provider) The Pension Wise service provides a useful generic 
͚seŶse ĐheĐk͛ foƌ iŶǀestoƌs appƌoaĐhiŶg retirement.͟ 
SUMMARY: Many responses thought that it was too soon to tell whether the guidance 
guarantee would be effective and many had concerns that it would be insufficient, 
especially for those who wanted to be told what to do. 
27. (a) Will other forms of guidance and advice be needed?  
There were nineteen responses to this question and 95 per cent of these said that more 
support would be needed by some or all parts of the market. The remaining response also 
felt that guidance would be inadequate, but the focus on advice was wrong: 
͞(TUC) The focus should be on providing robust income pathways rather 
than seeking to educate or advise consumers in the hope that they can 
become effective market actors in their own right. This latter aspect is, at 
best, a long-term aim.͟ 
So, with this caveat, there was unanimity that the current guidance will be inadequate. 
There were various responses to the issue of advice. One provider felt it was essential 
43 
 
͞(Insurance Company) given the complexity of the current market, [our 
company] does not accept business from individuals unless they have 
sought advice.͟ 
A further suggestion, found by 26 per cent of responses, was that there needed to be a level 
of support between guidance and advice: 
͞;Insurance company) However, we also know that the price of advice is 
off‐puttiŶg to soŵe Đustoŵeƌs. [We] would like to see the development of 
a mass‐ŵaƌket foƌ adǀiĐe. ... something between full advice and guidance, 
with a fixed fee. However the regulatory regime would need to be changed 
to enable this. [We] believe that the FCA͛s ƌeĐeŶt FiŶalised GuidaŶĐe oŶ 
Retail Investment Advice will not lead to a market for simplified advice as 
the regulator intends.͟ 
SUMMARY: There was a very strong view that more support would be needed than the  
guidance guarantee alone. A quarter of responses thought that there needed to be a level of 
support between guidance and advice. 
27. (b) For DC savers who prefer to make their own decisions, what is the best way to 
build on the guidance guarantee to help individuals avoid buying retail products that 
are inappropriate (e.g., in relation to risk) and/or poor value (e.g., in relation to 
price)? 
Of the fifteen responses to this question, 27 per cent mentioned advice or guidance and one 
mentioned nudges. The most common response was to provide better information, 
frequently by making it more accessible and more comparable. One response noted that the 
guidance guarantee should explicitly explain the difference between regulated and non-
regulated investments. Twenty per cent of responses suggested providing more online tools 
to help consumers: 
͞(Consultant) Risk rating questionnaires and cash flow modelling tools 
would help DIY DC savers to check for suitability. These are widely 
available to advisers but less so for individuals. Similarly, consumer 
comparison engines do not cater well for retirement income products.͟ 
͞;Lawyer) Just as independent advice must be obtained before a member 
transfers a defined benefit pension into a defined contribution retirement 
savings arrangement (leaving to one side amounts with a value of £30,000 
or less), the same should apply to the decumulation of the ŵeŵďeƌ͛s 
retirement savings. If necessary, it could be made mandatory, for example, 
that the ŵeŵďeƌ͛s ƌetiƌeŵeŶt saǀiŶgs should ďe Đƌeated ǁith aŶ ͚eǆpeŶse 
ƌeseƌǀe͛ for the provision of independent advice built into it.͟ 
SUMMARY: Most responses thought that better information needed to be provided to build 
on the guidance guarantee, possibly via online resources. Only a minority referred to advice 
or nudges. 
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28. (a) What specific risks should regulatory safeguards aim to address in relation to 
financial decisions made at retirement? 
The fifteen responses to this question can be divided into three roughly equal groups. In the 
first group, respondents suggested that regulation should ensure that products should be 
approved, that consumers would be sold items with a suitable risk rating, and that basic 
questions should be asked to identify, for example, that married individuals had suitable 
products. 
͞(AGE UK) For example, developing minimum quality standards for 
products; looking into appropriate defaults; and ensuring that standards 
aƌe iŶ plaĐe to goǀeƌŶ leŶdeƌs͛ ďehaǀiouƌ iŶ ƌelatioŶ to deďtoƌs͛ peŶsioŶ 
pots.͟ 
͞(Pension provider) It should also aim to identify vulnerable individuals 
ǁho aƌe uŶaďle to ŵake aŶ iŶfoƌŵed deĐisioŶ.͟ 
The second group identified financial risks, such as investment risk, and longevity risk. The 
final group were concerned about scams and mis-selling. 
Among the responses, some respondents raised the issue of risk to the state: 
͞(ACA) The ŵost oďǀious keǇ ƌisk is deliďeƌate depƌiǀatioŶ ‐ speŶdiŶg 
assets before falling back on the State. If consumers otherwise bear the 
consequences of their own decisions, then arguably this is the natural 
ƌesult of the Fƌeedoŵ aŶd ChoiĐe ƌefoƌŵs.͟ 
͞;Consultant) This depends on what policy decision is made on the nature 
of a floor for a saver where the capital for whatever reason has run out - is 
the state a provider of last resort?  Should there, for example, be a NEST 
equivalent that introduces a form of DB provision in the form of certain 
floors and ceilings in the provision at decumulation stage based on 
accumulation history. There would be issues of State Aid to be resolved - 
particularly in relation to the EU 4% capital requirement and whether the 
government could fund that or be a guarantor for that on a pay as you go 
basis.  Theƌe is a ƌeal Đase to ĐoŶsideƌ a ͚ƌegulated oǁŶ fuŶd͛ tǇpe of 
provision - DB NEST - that would then drive the regulatory framework and 
protections that would be needed and would determine when the State 
would step in to look after an individual when the products designed for 
theiƌ Ŷeeds ͚fail͛.͟ 
SUMMARY: Respondents identified three main risks of decision-making at retirement that 
need to be addressed by regulation: the risk that individuals purchased inappropriate 
products (e.g., a married person buying a single life annuity); the investment risks faced by 
individuals; and the risk of scams and mis-selling. 
28. (b) At what point does individual choice cease to be a regulatory 
concern/responsibility? 
There were twelve responses to this question and 42 per cent noted that the point of the 
recent reforms was to provide choice and that this would inevitably mean that at some 
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point consumers should be free to make mistakes and hence not the concern of the 
regulator: 
͞;Pension provider) Products should be approved, but the government has 
brought in legislation to provide complete flexibility to members and has 
stated that individuals should be trusted – responsibility for policing should 
therefore not be a burden on the industry who were not consulted over 
these changes.͟ 
͞;Insurance company) Providers cannot be responsible for the individual 
who, in full possession of the facts, makes a decision based upon 
something they waŶt, ƌatheƌ thaŶ theiƌ Ŷeeds.͟ 
In some cases, theƌe appeaƌed to ďe ĐǇŶiĐisŵ aďout the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s ǀieǁ of this issue: 
͞(Consultant) GiǀeŶ the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s appaƌeŶt ŶoŶĐhalaŶĐe aƌouŶd the 
possibility of a retiree using up all their accrued DC pot before death and 
relying solely on the state basic pension, the risk of virtual penury from this 
route is unlikely to be the focus of regulatoƌǇ ĐoŶĐeƌŶ.͟ 
At the other extreme, one response suggested that individual choice does not cease to be a 
concern and this is for the protection of both the consumer and the industry: 
͞(AGE UK) At no point should people cease to be a regulatory concern. If 
these reforms are not successful, the impact on public trust in financial 
services and financial regulation will be severe. The regulatory safeguards 
should aiŵ to ŵiŶiŵise the ƌisk of people takiŶg pooƌ deĐisioŶs ...͟ 
Within this spectrum, several responses suggested that the point at which regulation ceased 
to be concerned was when an individual secured an income for life (many response pointing 
out that firms always had to act within regulatory requirements when selling or providing 
any product). 
SUMMARY: Responses disagreed on when individual choice ceases to be a regulatory 
concern. On balance, responses suggested that it was when (or if) an individual secured an 
income for life.  A significant minority (42 per cent) said that the point of the recent reforms 
was to provide choice and that this would inevitably mean that at some point consumers 
should be free to make mistakes and hence not the concern of the regulator. 
29. Some DC customers might draw down all their pots in the early years of retirement, 
a decision they might subsequently regret. What is the most effective way of 
assisting DC customers to act in their best long-term interests? 
There were eighteen responses to this question and they were quite varied, largely 
reiterating previous responses. Some returned to the issues of defaults, some to incentives 
to secure an income (at varying points in retirement); others advocated education and 
information.  
͞;Consultant) The most obvious way is having at least partial annuitisation, 
at least from the age 75 or so, as part of a default strategy.͟ 
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͞;Pension provider) EduĐatioŶ. This Ŷeeds to ďe aŶ oŶ‐goiŶg pƌoĐess ǁhiĐh 
starts while in full time education and is continued, where possible, by the 
pension provider. 
Unless you prevent individuals from making their own decisions, it is not 
possible to prevent any bad decisions being made.͟ 
Responses reiterated that it is impossible to prevent poor decisions and that, in some cases, 
it is not always clear what constitutes a poor decision. However, several recognised that 
poor decision making could result in large problems later. 
͞(AGE UK) We are concerned about the potential scale of this problem and 
that it will mean considerably worse outcomes for many people in later 
life. It is, of course, unknown at present exactly how many people will be 
affected, and it may not become clear for several years.͟ 
͞(Consultant) It is also important – and ought to be an integral element of 
the Ŷeǁ appƌoaĐh of ͚fƌeedoŵ͛ – to make very clear that if the individual 
runs out of savings early due to lump sums and fast drawdown and the 
lack of proper longevity insurance, there is no specific state support in 
place. 
If the libertarian approach is preferred to the paternalistic one, then a free 
lunch financed by other pensioners, or the taxpayer in general, may not be 
allowed. Such moral hazard must be ruled out upfront.͟ 
SUMMARY: Respondents were divided on how to assist DC customers to act in their best 
long-term interests and not make decisions that they subsequently regret. Some responses 
Ŷoted that the poiŶt of ͞fƌeedoŵ aŶd ĐhoiĐe͟ is to alloǁ ĐhoiĐe aŶd that the possiďilitǇ of 
bad choices must be accepted as part of that. The responses to this question on how to 
avoid bad choices were varied and included defaults, better education and incentives to 
secure an income (at varying points in retirement). 
30. (a) What is the best way of ensuring that any DB-to-DC transferees only undertake 
such a transfer when it is in their best interests? 
Of the fifteen responses to this question, 73 per cent said explicitly that consumers should 
be given advice (perhaps excepting small pots) and one response raised the possibility that 
transfers should be banned unless advice for the transfer was positive. Where responses 
mentioned guidance, it was agreed that this was inadequate.  One response suggested that 
if individuals wanted to transfer out they should take advice at their own expense. 
The other responses largely suggested discouraging transfers and discussed conflicts of 
interest.  
͞(Consultant) We would therefore not propose going further than has been 
proposed by the government in respect of individual cases, in requiring 
that the member takes (but has the freedom not to follow) independent 
finaŶĐial adǀiĐe. We ǁould ŵake oŶe ĐhaŶge to the goǀeƌŶŵeŶt͛s 
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proposals however. The member should always be the party bearing the 
cost.͟ 
͞;Consultant) Transfers should have some anti-avoidance provisions so 
that the transfer to DC is not seen simply as a way of accessing the pot of 
capital.  There needs to be more regulatory thought in this area.͟ 
SUMMARY: The large majority of respondents thought that transfers from DB to DC should 
only be allowed after taking advice (with an exception for small pots).  Many accepted that 
the advice could be ignored, although one suggested that transfers should be banned if the 
advice was negative. One response suggested that if individuals wanted to transfer out they 
should take advice at their own expense. 
30. (b) What are your estimates of the number of DB-to-DC transferees (deferred and 
also active) and size of assets involved? 
There were very few responses to part (b) of the question. Two responses suggested that 
the proportion transferring might be ten per cent. 
͞(ACA) Anecdotal evidence suggests that only 10% of transfer offers 
reviewed by an independent financial adviser result in a recommendation 
to tƌaŶsfeƌ. Theƌe is hoǁeǀeƌ ĐleaƌlǇ sĐope foƌ a ŵassiǀe tƌaŶsfeƌ … the 
impact is likely to emerge gradually over the coming years as DB members 
ƌeaĐh ƌetiƌeŵeŶt age.͟ 
SUMMARY: Very few responses provided estimates of the number of DB-to-DC transferees. 
Those that did thought that about ten per cent would transfer. 
30. (c) Is the requirement for regulated independent advice for such transferees 
adequate? 
SUMMARY: The few responses to this question believed that the requirement for regulated 
independent advice for DB-to-DC transferees was adequate. 
30. (d) Can/will the guidance guarantee process cope with DB active/deferred members 
who seek help in considering their options? 
As mentioned above, guidance was considered inadequate. One response noted that IFAs 
cannot advise on this issue without specialist qualifications and permission.  
SUMMARY: Respondents thought that the guidance guarantee for DB members was 
inadequate. 
31. Are there other ways of supporting pension savers to make the right choice at 
retirement for them and their family? 
The twelve responses to this largely built on responses to previous questions, mentioning 
advice, nudges, incentives and information. Many noted that a combination of these would 
be necessary: 
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͞(AGE UK) Automatic enrolment has proven inertia to be a powerful force, 
and this need to be harnessed in the decumulation phase too. Default 
products and pathways are likely to play a role in ensuring people spend 
their money appropriately, while advice and guidance will also be 
important.͟ 
Some responses also took a longer term view of the issue and discussed education and 
financial literacy more broadly. 
͞(Pension provider) Many people are reticent to talk about their finances. 
As a result, couples rarely communicate about either their retirement 
savings or their retirement plans. Therefore we believe that some 
behavioural work needs to be undertaken towards normalising 
conversation about later life savings.͟ 
͞(ACA) Improved financial education from school and throughout working 
life will help consumers make better financial choices. In the short term, we 
hope employers and providers will give consumers guidance, information 
or even advice to supplement the basic guidance guarantee.͟ 
SUMMARY: Respondents suggested that a combination of approaches (including advice, 
nudges, incentives and information) would be needed to support pensioners to make the 
right choice at retirement. Some believed that better education and improved financial 
literacy were required in the longer term. 
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3. Helping savers to manage longevity risk  
The consultation document discussed two issues in the introduction to this section: the 
idiosyncratic longevity risk faced by an individual member; and the systematic or aggregate 
longevity risk faced by a scheme. The issues then follow about how to manage these risks 
when faced with two constraints: the first might be poorly understood by members and the 
second cannot be hedged by schemes. 
32. What evidence is there of iŶdiǀiduals͛ aďilitǇ to reliably estimate how long they are 
going to live? 
33. How easy is it for individuals to quantify longevity risk? What evidence is available 
on this question? 
There were twenty responses to question 32 and seventeen to question 33, but answers 
often overlapped.  
Responses were unanimous in reporting that consumers were poor at estimating life 
expectancy and tended to under-estimate it.  
In many cases, respondents implicitly or explicitly referred to a wider body of research than 
their own experience.  Of course, this merely confirmed the claim on page 11 of the 
ĐoŶsultatioŶ doĐuŵeŶt that ͞[r]esearch has found that most individuals underestimate how 
loŶg theǇ aƌe goiŶg to liǀe, ofteŶ ďǇ ŵaŶǇ Ǉeaƌs͟. 
One provider noted that its own experience was that consumers only under-estimated life 
expectancy a little and several noted that the problem got less severe as consumers 
approached retirement and started thinking about these issues. 
Most responses noted explicitly that point estimates of life expectancy were largely 
irrelevant, since what mattered was the uncertainty 
͞(TUC) There is little evidence of [being able to estimate life expectancy]. 
We would also question the value of such knowledge. While a saver might 
know average life expectancy, they will never know whether their own 
lifespan is going to be longer than this – or whether they will fall under a 
bus on the way home from their guidance session.͟ 
͞(NAPF) A recent report supported by NAPF found that men aged 50–60 
underestimate their life expectancy on average by around two years and 
women by four. Perhaps more significantly, people tend to make point 
estimates of their longevity and find it difficult to comprehend the range of 
possible outcomes.͟ 
͞(Insurance Company) It is almost impossible to accurately quantify 
longevity risk. While the new pension freedoms are to be welcomed, for 
those who choose not to buy a source of guaranteed income for life, it will 
mean that individuals will have to be a fortune teller, actuary and an 
investment manager.͟ 
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Several responses argued that once consumers had started to engage with the process, they 
were able to grasp the key issue of running out of money before death quite quickly: 
furthermore that online tools or appropriate graphs helped illustrate the scale of the 
problem.  
SUMMARY: Respondents were unanimous that individuals had problems estimating both 
life expectancy – with a tendency to under-estimate it – and longevity risk. A minority 
thought that these problems could be overcome with education or engagement. 
34. Is longevity risk a risk that individual savers are able – and should be expected – to 
manage themselves? 
Of twenty responses, only two suggested that individuals could manage longevity risk 
satisfactorily and 50 per cent said ͞Ŷo͟ unambiguously.  
 
However, some argued that the process could be managed, albeit not necessarily 
particularly well. For example 
͞(ACA) Savers will be able to manage longevity risk to some degree, 
especially if given the right help. However, given the complexity and high 
level of stochastic risk, we do not believe that the average consumer will 
be able to manage this optimally. This again highlights the benefits of 
longevity insurance/annuitisation.͟ 
Several responses noted that this was a natural corollary of the recent reforms: 
͞(NAPF) On the one hand, Freedom & Choice, and indeed earlier changes 
to pension policy, have allowed people to take this risk. Removing those 
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freedoms will be politically difficult. On the other hand, if the risks are not 
knowable simply informing people that they are now exposed to them may 
not prove adequate. The development of default pathways described 
above and that take account of other behavioural biases seems to strike a 
middle ground between extreme freedom and extreme paternalism.͟ 
Along the same lines, one argued that if consumers took their decisions carefully then it was 
impossible to gainsay their decision: 
͞(Pension provider) ... even fully informed individuals will behave 
differently to their own longevity risk. While some may choose annuity 
purchase, others may elect to eke out savings and still others may choose 
to spend their savings early on. Each of these routes may be appropriate 
for that individual, but it is only if they make an informed decision, having 
spoken to Pension Wise and/or having consulted an adviser ...͟ 
One response emphasised the need for some form of longevity protection in the absence of 
annuity purchase: 
͞(Insurance company) ... We further believe that widespread movement 
from annuity schemes to income drawdown could have invidious loŶg‐teƌŵ 
consequences. To guard against such consequences, individuals should be 
aware that hybrid products exist, such as guaranteed drawdown, which 
offer a degree of flexibility and access but also provide a guaranteed 
income for life.͟ 
SUMMARY: The majority of respondents thought that individuals could not manage 
longevity risk adequately, and pointed to solutions in the form of longevity insurance, 
annuities and guaranteed drawdown. A minority thought that individuals could manage 
longevity risk if they received some additional help. 
35. Where people receive tax incentives to save into pensions, should people be required 
to secure a minimum lifetime income in retirement? 
There were nineteen responses to this and they represented a variety of positions.  
Twenty-six per cent thought that a minimum income was a good idea, but some of these 
(ten per cent) belieǀed that it should ďe aĐhieǀed ǀia a ͞Ŷudge͟ ƌatheƌ thaŶ ďe ĐoŵpulsioŶ. 
Most respondents noted the need for an exemption for small pots. The reason for 
compulsion was linked back to the original rationale for a pension in the first place: 
͞;Lawyer) It is unclear why future taxpayers should have to pay for those 
who have over consumed their retirement savings and fall back on the 
State for support.͟ 
͞;Consultant) Yes, otherwise it may not really be pensions after all. People 
running out of savings early may have to rely on state support, which leads 
to costs paid twice by the taxpayer.͟ 
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However, others argued that the policy would have been effective anyway, since resources 
had been saved for retirement: 
͞(ACA) The tax incentive encourages retirement saving overall and this 
saving need not be drawn as a regular income. The public policy objective 
can be achieved even if the funds are used irregularly after retirement.͟ 
͞;Consultant) I doŶ͛t thiŶk Ǉou ĐaŶ eǆpeĐt theŵ to secure a minimum 
lifetime income if the products are solely dependent on market risk - but a 
NEST Type DB fund that required a minimum amount of capital saved to 
provide a DB type benefit may be more realistic, with shortfalls being 
underwritten by the government on an insured or pay as you go basis.  But 
as covered in question 2, this is where there may be a real case for a 
Pensions Commission so that these pots could not be dipped into by future 
governments.͟ 
Three responses noted that a requirement to buy a lifetime income might be a cause of low 
saving to start with, for example: 
͞(Pension provider) This leads to the risk of individual inaction induced by 
the scale of challenge. For example, a twenty year old on £20,000 a year 
may need pension contributions of over 20% a year for almost fifty year to 
achieve a retirement income of two–thirds of their final salary. If this is 
perceived as, or actually is, unrealistic there will be a strong temptation to 
not save at all. It is therefore important that the message that individuals 
are not saving enough for their retirement does not prevent them from 
saving anything.͟ 
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MaŶǇ ƌespoŶses did Ŷot pƌoǀide aŶ uŶaŵďiguous ͞Ǉes͟ oƌ ͞Ŷo͟, but suggested that the 
whole issue needed to be considered within a re-evaluation of tax reliefs. For example, 
pensions saving could be combined with (or become a long-term savings vehicle): 
͞(Consultant) ... These changes, reinforced by the freedom and choice 
agenda, indicate a possible change of purpose for tax relief, effectively 
turning it instead into a long-term general savings incentive. If that is seen 
as a socially desirable objective, then the relief may survive. However, if it 
is not judged to be worth the expense, then continuation of pension tax 
relief is more doubtful – particularly in an age of austerity.͟ 
Alternatively the tax incentives might be withdrawn or deployed elsewhere: 
͞(Insurance company) There could be potential to use tax incentives to 
incentivise in the decumulation phase instead. For example, awarding tax 
relief on longevity insurance premiums or applying a more favourable tax 
rate on the receipt of guaranteed income. This would provide incentives to 
secure income payments in retirement and would have the effect of 
boosting income paymeŶts.͟ 
Finally, it was noted that the tax incentives failed to reach savers on low or modest incomes 
anyway and that this was a much more significant problem. 
SUMMARY: Respondents were split on whether people who had received tax incentives 
should secure an income in retirement or not. Just oǀeƌ a Ƌuaƌteƌ said ͞Ǉes͟, ǁhile just oǀeƌ 
a thiƌd said ͞Ŷo͟. Otheƌs thought that taǆ ƌelief Đould ďe used to eŶĐouƌage people to ďuǇ 
longevity insurance after retirement. Some thought that the use of tax relief in pensions 
should be reviewed, especially since it did not benefit those on low or modest incomes. 
36. (a) Do you believe that the DC retirement income market could benefit from the 
introduction of a market in longevity bonds? Explain. 
(b) Do you believe that a market in longevity bonds is viable (in the sense of having 
sufficient demand to justify its introduction)? Explain. 
37. Do you have a preferred design for a longevity bond?  
38. Is there a case for the government to issue longevity bonds? Explain. 
These questions received between eleven and two responses, although not all respondents 
answered all questions. I consider these three questions together because the questions 
were interpreted in two quite different ways: some responses assumed longevity bonds 
referred to wholesale financial products sold to life assurers to allow them to hedge their 
longevity risk, while other responses interpreted longevity bonds to be retail products.  
I start by considering the interpretation that a longevity bond is a product purchased by a 
life assurer to hedge cohort mortality risk. Some responses were negative, arguing that 
longevity bonds had been unsuccessful hitherto and such products would have to be 
supplied by the government. It was suggested that the government might use its resources 
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better to support the state pension. Another response thought that they were very 
important to support life assurers. 
͞;Consultant) Longevity bonds – issued by the government – would be 
essential for insurance companies to hedge their risks when providing 
defeƌƌed aŶŶuities.͟ 
A total of eight respondents interpreted a longevity bond in this way and 63 per cent 
thought that government should issue such products. 
 
The alternative interpretation was that longevity bonds referred to retail products sold by 
the Post Office or National Savings, i.e. a form of deferred annuity. Several respondents 
thought this a good idea, for example: 
͞;Pension provider) As discussed above, we believe that there is a strong 
case for longevity bonds that pay regular income over a fixed or indefinite 
period, especially if tax free transfers from pension funds were permitted. 
The Government has been hesitant to issue longevity bonds, but NS&I 
holds less than one tenth of government debt and this option could be 
Đheapeƌ foƌ the GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt thaŶ issuiŶg deďt oŶ the gilt ŵaƌkets.͟ 
͞;Consultant) A [deferred annuity] would be a very useful ingredient of a 
decumulation strategy as it has risk smoothing and other beneficial 
characteristics. However, unlike the US, the UK does not have these 
instruments which, given its dominant role in annuities globally, is an 
anomaly. One of the main reasons is exactly the lack of such longevity 
bonds.  
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I expect that many stakeholders will realise that annuities should still be a 
basic element of a souŶd ƌetiƌeŵeŶt stƌategǇ, ďut that ŵoƌe useƌ‐fƌieŶdlǇ 
versions have to be developed. Since deferred annuities are exactly one of 
those potential solutions, I think there would indeed be a demand for 
longevity bonds. 
Yes, the government is best positioned to issue such instruments, due to 
scale, a need to finance government debt by identifying new buyers, and 
because the government may in fact have a natural hedge here.͟ 
One respondent went further than this and thought that there could be a secondary market 
in such products and that this would encourage purchase in the first place: 
͞;Consultant) If an individual purchased longevity protection in their SIPP & 
it͛s ǀalue iŶĐƌeased the closer they got to vesting date and they could then 
choose to realise this value by selling it to someone else in the market who 
wanted to purchase it for a discount vs the new business purchase price, 
then it would encourage retirees to purchase the cover yet give them the 
comfort of knowing that if theiƌ situatioŶ ĐhaŶged theǇ ǁeƌeŶ͛t loosiŶg out 
on the purchase price.͟ 
SUMMARY: There were two interpretations of these questions on longevity bonds. Where 
longevity bonds were interpreted as products issued by the government to allow insurance 
companies to hedge mortality risk, a majority were in favour of government issuance, 
although a minority did not believe they would work. Where longevity bonds were 
interpreted as retail products (i.e., a form of deferred annuity) purchased by individuals 
(perhaps from the Post Office or National Savings and Investments), many respondents 
thought that this would be a good idea. 
39. Are there alternatives to longevity bonds to hedge systematic longevity risk? 
Explain. 
Where this question was interpreted as referring to wholesale products for life assurers to 
hedge their risk, there were only two answers. One said no, but the other was a little more 
positive:  
͞;Consultant) It should be possible to introduce hedging structures but the 
economics would need to be worked out and the options may be quite 
expensive.͟ 
SUMMARY: There were only two replies to whether there are alternatives to longevity 
bonds to hedge systematic longevity risk, oŶe saǇiŶg ͞Ŷo͟ aŶd the otheƌ saǇiŶg ͞Ǉes, ďut it 
ǁould pƌoďaďlǇ ďe eǆpeŶsiǀe.͟ 
40. Are there other ways of helping savers to manage longevity risk? 
There were nine very varied responses to this question, several referring to previously 
mentioned products such as annuities or guaranteed drawdown. Most responses did not 
think that other products were available: 
56 
 
͞(Consultant) Savers are not in a position to manage idiosyncratic 
longevity risk without longevity insurance (annuity) and providers can not 
perfectly handle systemic longevity risk in other ways than described above 
;loŶgeǀitǇ ďoŶds oƌ sǁapsͿ.͟ 
Forty-four per cent of responses argued that more could be achieved with better education, 
communication and positive and encouraging engagement. For example, 
͞(SPP) We suggest that part of the means of helping savers to manage 
longevity risk is to place a more positive emphasis on the process.  
Individuals are perhaps more likely to respond to encouragement, say, to 
ensure that they have sufficient savings left to support possible long term 
care needs or to provide an inheritance for their survivors, than they are to 
specifically addressing longevity risk. 
We also would note here that work has been, and is being done, by the 
Pensions Policy Institute, using qualitative research methods, into how to 
develop default products and strategies for individuals approaching 
retirement ... and suggest that this material should be referenced in your 
aŶalǇsis.͟ 
The final response suggested the government provide an additional pension from age 85 or 
90 to provide longevity insurance for the very old. 
SUMMARY: Most responses thought that savers could not manage longevity risk without 
some form of annuity or guaranteed drawdown. A significant minority thought that better 
education and engagement would improve the chances of individuals dealing with longevity 
risk.  
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4. The role of the National Employment Savings Trust (NEST) in helping 
savers to access good quality retirement products 
The consultation document noted that NEST has radically transformed the accumulation 
phase of DC pensions: thereafter, in the distribution phase, members have to purchase 
retail products on the open market. This section asks what institutional standards could be 
brought to the retirement income space and what role NEST could play.  
41. Should NEST provide retirement income products to its members? 
There were twenty responses to this question and fifty per cent thought this to be a good – 
or even excellent – idea.  
 
Supporters emphasised the ability of NEST to use inertia, its economies of scale and the links 
between accumulation and decumulation. 
͞(Consultant) Yes. NE“T͛s iŶǀestŵeŶt stƌategǇ should keep oŶ ĐoŶŶeĐtiŶg 
the accumulation and payout phases, and they are in the process of 
reconsidering their options without mandatory annuitisation. Decoupled 
accumulation and decumulation phases lead to suboptimal pensions. 
Given the success of the paternalistic approach in the savings phase, it is 
likelǇ that aŶ easǇ‐to‐use ƌetiƌement product provider for the same 
customers would make sense. Scale, efficiency and comfort for clients 
suppoƌt the idea of NE“T pƌoǀidiŶg ;defaultͿ peŶsioŶ pƌoduĐts. ATP͛s 
experience in Denmark could also be investigated in this regard. 
Alternatively, a strategic partnership with one, or more, reliable external 
pƌoǀideƌ;sͿ Đould ďe deǀeloped, ǁheƌe NE“T͛s sĐale ǁould aĐhieǀe loǁ Đost 
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aŶd good ǀalue seƌǀiĐes fƌoŵ the paƌtŶeƌ;sͿ to NE“T͛s Đustoŵeƌs. JudgiŶg 
the benefits and possible disadvantages of these two options requires 
ŵoƌe thiŶkiŶg.͟ 
͞(Lawyer) NEST has shown that it is able to design good quality default and 
otheƌ optioŶs iŶ a stƌoŶg goǀeƌŶaŶĐe fƌaŵeǁoƌk.͟ 
͞(AGE UK) We are concerned that the mass market may fail to deliver high 
quality and good value products to consumers with smaller DC funds, and 
ďelieǀe that NE“T oƌ a ͚sisteƌ͛ oƌgaŶisatioŶ Đould plaǇ aŶ iŵpoƌtaŶt ƌole iŶ 
dƌiǀiŶg iŶŶoǀatioŶ aŶd ĐoŵpetitioŶ.͟ 
͞(Consultant) It also holds the statutory duty of default provider in the 
event that an employer makes no active choice. Particularly in the new 
world of freedom and choice, where the distinction between work and 
retirement is blurred, it is advantageous for members with DC provision to 
have the opportunity of a holistic lifetime approach to retirement income 
provision. That is less likely to be achieved if there are enforced distinct and 
separate pre and post retirement phases, with the latter requiring the 
transfer of an accrued pot to another arrangement. 
We do not consider that allowing NEST to extend its remit in this way 
presents an unfair threat to other providers that did not have the benefit of 
government-ďaĐked loaŶs to fiŶaŶĐe theiƌ staƌt up.͟ 
Another response suggested that it would promote competition: 
͞;Consultant) This would be an excellent idea—to set a public option 
standard that private companies would have to compete against.͟ 
Hoǁeǀeƌ, soŵe ǁeƌe ĐoŶĐeƌŶed that this ǁould diǀeƌt atteŶtioŶ fƌoŵ NE“T͛s core mission, 
especially when it has not yet finished sorting out the issues of auto-enrolment. 
͞(CBI) It ǁould also ďe pƌeŵatuƌe to ŵake ĐhaŶges to NE“T͛s fƌaŵeǁoƌk if 
there is no evidence that there is a gap in the market for it to fill. NEST has 
an important role to play, through its public service obligation, to underpin 
the workplace pensions market as part of the auto-enrolment regime. It 
should not seek to nationalise the private savings market by competing in 
more fields, unless there is logic behind government intervention. A lack of 
focus on its core goals is the biggest risk to NEST fulfilling its statutory duty 
to meet the needs of its target market.͟ 
Seven responses were against NEST being involved in providing retirement products. In 
some cases, this was because it was felt that there was no clear need or that the case for 
NEST being involved had not yet been made and required further debate. For example: 
͞;Insurance company) We consider it is premature to debate the relative 
merits of NEST as a potential decumulation provider. NEST was originally 
introduced as a result of an extensive piece of research and analysis by the 
Pensions Commission to address a very specific issue; namely, the apparent 
lack of availability / appetite for large-scale pension provision under 
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autoŵatiĐ eŶƌolŵeŶt. NE“T͛s ƌelated PuďliĐ “eƌǀiĐe OďligatioŶ ǀeƌǇ ŵuĐh 
reflects this. 
It is too eaƌlǇ to applǇ this ƌatioŶale to the ͚at ƌetiƌeŵeŶt͛ ŵaƌket, ǁheŶ 
the new reforms have not even been introduced. We simply do not know at 
this stage exactly how consumers will behave in the new environment and 
how the market will respond to this. It therefore seems premature to 
conclude (a) that there is a market failure in the decumulation space and 
(b) that this should be addressed through creating a more prominent role 
foƌ NE“T.͟ 
Two felt that NEST should promote members to shop around and one of these explicitly 
worried that provision by NEST would reinforce an undesirable tendency for members not 
to engage with the process. One was concerned that the offer of a product by NEST might 
be interpreted as tacit support or advice. 
A quarter of responses felt that NEST was set up to be a retirement savings vehicle with a 
clear mandate to overcome a clearly identified market failure. This alone provided the 
justification for government support and enabled it to be set up within EU rules on state aid. 
The most explicit statement of this position is as follows: 
͞(Insurance company) NEST was put in place to deal with a recognised 
potential maƌket failuƌe attaĐhed to auto‐eŶƌolŵeŶt, ǁhiĐh is that soŵe 
employers ;paƌtiĐulaƌlǇ sŵall aŶd ǁith loǁ‐paid, high‐tuƌŶoǀeƌ ǁoƌkfoƌĐesͿ 
would be unattractive or uneconomic for the private sector to serve for AE. 
HeŶĐe a ͚pƌoǀideƌ of last ƌesoƌt͛ ǁas Ŷeeded to serve those parts of the 
market that the private sector was unlikely to reach – and it was on that 
basis that EU state aid approval for NEST was received. There can be no 
equivalent evidence that a market failure exists in the decumulation 
market, because that market has just been radically transformed by the 
new rules from the 2014 Budget (including the increase in triviality limits to 
£30,000, as well as the greater flexibility above that level). If it emerges 
over time that (for example) customers with small pots are not being well 
served by the new private market for decumulation, and that other 
regulatory intervention is not appropriate or sufficient, then there could 
possibly be a case for NEST to become involved in this market. However, 
until this evidence emerges we do not believe it would be appropriate for 
NEST to act in this way.͟ 
SUMMARY: Half of the respondents (a majority of those that had a clear view on the matter) 
thought that NEST should provide retirement income products, citing NE“T͛s ability to use 
its economies of scale, the links between accumulation and decumulation, and pensioner 
inertia in seeking out good products. However, a significant minority – 35 per cent – were 
against the idea, mainly on the grounds that there was not yet any evidence of market 
failure in the provision of retirement income products and that this would also involve NEST 
operating beyond its original remit. 
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42. (a) Should NEST provide a default decumulation product (e.g., scheme drawdown or 
annuitisation)? (b) If so, what quality standards should apply (e.g., in terms of 
charge caps, governance)? 
Excluding responses that had said that NEST should not provide retirement income products 
at all in the previous question, there were fourteen responses to this question. 
 
A total of 43 per cent agreed with some sort of default, although in one case this would be a 
short menu of different default options rather than a single default. For example: 
͞;Consultant) NEST should provide a default decumulation solution. The 
basic ingredient of a default peŶsioŶ pƌoduĐt Đould ďe aŶ iŶflatioŶ‐iŶdeǆed 
annuity from the age of approximately 75, when a few years of ͚free 
spending͛ by the member have already occurred, the tippiŶg‐poiŶt of good 
ǀalue puƌĐhase of aŶ aŶŶuitǇ has aƌƌiǀed ďut diŵiŶished old‐age deĐisioŶ‐
making capability is not dominant yet. Such an annuity purchase may be 
phased‐iŶ, aŶd/oƌ ĐoŵďiŶed ǁith ŵoŶeǇ‐ďaĐk oƌ joiŶt‐life ĐhaƌaĐteƌistiĐs. 
As a rule of thumb, allocating the present 75% of savings for such an 
annuity seems reasonable, though more thought will have to be given to 
details.͟ 
Many responses felt that it was not clear whether or not NEST should provide a default or, 
at least, that it was unclear at the moment. 
͞;Consultant) In my view they still need to sort out the accumulation 
products before moving to decumulation - but yes eventually that is what 
they should do and there should be quality standards around charges 
governance etc.͟ 
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The few respondents that answered the question about standards generally thought that 
existing quality standards would be appropriate, although one was against charge caps. 
SUMMARY: Of the respondents who were happy for NEST to provide retirement income 
products, 43 per cent agreed that there should be a default or a menu of default opinions, 
28 per cent were against, and the rest were unclear.  Most thought existing quality 
standards would be appropriate. 
43. Are there any other ways in which NEST can help savers to access good quality 
retirement products? 
The eleven responses to this question focused on NEST being able to give better guidance or 
even advice and to signpost appropriate products. One response emphasised that engaging 
savers with pensions was a long on-going process and that lessons could be learned from 
successes abroad: 
͞;CoŶsultaŶtͿ Meŵďeƌs Ŷeed suďstaŶtial, easǇ‐to‐uŶdeƌstaŶd, iŶteƌaĐtiǀe 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ fƌoŵ ƌelatiǀelǇ ǇouŶg ages ;ϯϬ‐ϯϱͿ aŶd Ŷot oŶlǇ 
approaching retirement. If deferred annuities were made a part of the 
investment portfolio from the beginning, meaningful communication in 
fact should start immediately after joining. These are complex questions 
where customers require more than one simple letter. At the same time, 
customers do not read long and complex documents. 
NE“T͛s ǁaǇ to ĐoŵŵuŶiĐate ǁith ŵeŵďeƌs, its GoldeŶ ‘ules of 
communication, the vocabulary used and the Phrasebook provide a very 
good basis for further developing such a discussion with members. It 
should be simple (as simple as possible when discussing such complex 
subjects as annuities, and the link between optimising the accumulation 
and payout phases), interesting and interactive. 
Most of NE“T͛s Đustoŵeƌs ǁill Ŷot ďe aďle to affoƌd ĐostlǇ adǀiĐe, aŶd the 
new regulations promise free guidance. NEST should be involved when 
developing the exact details, which should include easily understandable 
instructions that most likely prompt adequate action. 
While the context is somewhat different, the experience of the Chilean 
Supervisor (Superintendencia de Pensiones) in communicating with 
ŵeŵďeƌs iŶ a useƌ‐fƌieŶdlǇ aŶd iŶteƌaĐtiǀe ǁaǇ aŶd pƌoŵptiŶg theŵ to 
make important decisions (such as saving more or working longer) may be 
useful to studǇ. “iŵilaƌlǇ, TIAA‐C‘EF͛s Đlose aŶd Đost‐efficient 
ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ ǁith its ŵeŵďeƌs ŵaǇ offeƌ soŵe ideas.͟ 
One response suggested an annuity shopping service. 
͞;Consultant) Perhaps offering an annuity shopping service similar to 
Income Solutions(R) in the U.S.͟ 
SUMMARY: Most respondents suggested that NEST could provide guidance, advice or 
something in between, and also signpost customers to appropriate products. One 
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respondent suggested the importance of engaging with pension savers on an on-going basis. 
There was also a suggestion that NEST might provide an annuity shopping service. 
44. In an aggregator model for stranded pots: 
(a) Would it be desirable for NEST to act as one of the aggregators?  
(b) Which other schemes could act as aggregators? 
There were eleven responses to this question. Twenty-seven per cent said ͞no͟ and while 
the other 73 per cent said that NEST could be an aggregator, no one wanted NEST to be the 
only aggregator. To act as an aggregator, a scheme would need to be fairly large and have 
good governance and low charges.  
SUMMARY: The vast majority – 73 per cent – of respondents thought that NEST could be an 
aggregator for stranded pots, but this did not imply that NEST should take on this role. A 
minority of respondents thought that it was inappropriate for NEST to be an aggregator. All 
respondents agreed that NEST should not be the only aggregator, but there were relatively 
few responses to the second part of the question. 
45. Could NEST do more in decumulation for the self-employed and workers excluded 
from auto-enrolment?  
There were eleven responses to this question. Only one was unambiguously positive and 
one unambiguously negative. Five responses doubted that it was something important for 
NEST or that the self employed needed (given that the self-employed could join NEST or 
pursue other options). 
SUMMARY: The overwhelming majority of responses expressed no strong view on whether 
NEST could or should do more in decumulation for the self-employed and workers excluded 
from auto-enrolment. 
46. (a) Could NEST become a collective pension scheme? Explain. 
(b) Should NEST become a collective pension scheme? Explain. 
There were only eight responses to this question, consistent with relatively few responses to 
all of the questions on CDC in the next section. Thirty-eight per cent were against, arguing 
that it was not the role of NEST to get involved (two of these thought that NEST should not 
be involved in any decumulation products). One rationale for this is that there is more 
heterogeneity among pensioners in the decumulation phase than in the accumulation phase 
͞(Insurance company) We do not believe that NEST should become a 
collective pension scheme. ... decumulation is complex and individuals have 
different needs in retirement. We believe these differing needs should be 
respected, so we would agaiŶ adǀoĐate agaiŶst a oŶe‐size‐fits‐all 
approach.͟ 
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A further issue is what changes would be needed to become a collective pension scheme: 
͞;Consultant) [NEST could not become a collective pension scheme] unless 
the rules surrounding participating employers changed or it converted to a 
Regulatory Own Fund. To us, a CDC scheme needs to be accessible to all 
and NEST is not such a scheme. 
There is no reason why NEST should not continue in its current role. We 
would guard against mission creep, even though this means that NEST 
does not pay back its loan any time soon. NEST should be used by those 
into which it auto-enrols as a DC scheme, it can have collective elements in 
retirement, but it needs to remain competitive with other DC schemes and 
not be accorded special status because of its special ownership (and 
special debt).͟ 
On the other hand 38 per cent of respondents thought that this would be a good idea for 
NEST, for example: 
͞(Consultant) A key issue for any CDC scheme is that members need to 
have trust that the scheme is operated in their interests. For NEST to run a 
CDC option successfully, it will need to retain the confidence of its 
members. As the national DC scheme, it seems ideally placed to be the 
trusted scheme of choice.͟ 
SUMMARY: Respondents were equally divided on whether or not NEST should become a 
collective pension scheme, with strong views on both sides. 
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5. The role of collective pension schemes and how these could be 
introduced in the UK  
The analysis of the risks outlined in the consultation document suggested that there might 
be a need for new types of risk pooling. Collective DC (CDC) pension schemes that pool and 
share risks were not allowed in the UK prior to the 2015 Pension Schemes Act. However, 
this is enabling legislation only, does not include the full regulatory details, and says nothing 
specific about CDC regulation. Good regulation for CDC schemes is essential because the 
property rights of members are less clearly defined. This section asks a series of questions 
about CDC schemes. 
There were fewer responses to the questions in this section, with only sixteen respondents 
answering any of the questions. 
47. What should ͚ĐolleĐtiǀe͛ mean in the UK context (e.g., collective in terms of scale and 
governance, and collective in terms of risk-sharing)? 
There were only ten responses to this question and they were unanimous in referring 
implicitly or explicitly to the importance of risk sharing for collective DC schemes (often 
referred to as risk pooling). However, as shall become apparent from the discussion below, 
there was disagreement about which groups were pooling risk (inter-generational or intra-
generational). Of the ten or so respondents who did not answer this question but did 
answer other questions in this section, four seemed to suggest that risk sharing was not the 
primary purpose of collective schemes.  
Five responses also referred to the additional benefit of economies of scale and two 
referred to issues of governance. One response suggested that these issues should not be 
confused: 
͞(Pension provider) We suggest that the use of terms should not be 
ĐoŶfused. IŶ the ĐuƌƌeŶt eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶt, ͚ĐolleĐtiǀe͛ has come to refer to risk 
sharing. It does not, and should not, be confused with scale and 
governance.͟ 
One more-detailed response referred to the Institute of Actuaries Sleepwalking into 
‘etiƌeŵeŶt WoƌkiŶg PaƌtǇ ;ϮϬϭϱͿ ƌepoƌt ͞Why DC desperately needs actuaries͟. “taƌtiŶg 
from a position of DC pensions, this had suggested alternative interpretations of collective, 
including: (i) DC in a with-profits fund; (ii) deferred annuities; (iii) managed DC; (iv) DC with 
insured capital guarantees; (v) split retirement into term annuity plus (mutualised) later life 
annuity; or (vi) an employer smoothing fund. 
SUMMARY: The vast majority of responses suggested that risk sharing of some form or 
another was the defining feature of a collective DC scheme. However, there was 
disagreement about which groups should be pooling risk. 
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48. What are the main benefits of CDC schemes over individual DC schemes? 
There were nineteen responses to this question, displaying considerable variety due to 
respondents having different ideas of the aims of CDC schemes. Three responses thought 
that there were no real benefits of CDC over individual DC, for example: 
͞(Consultant) None. All the investment & risk sharing models available to 
CDC are already available to individuals via collective investments and 
loŶgeǀitǇ pƌoteĐtioŶ pƌoduĐts.͟ 
A further response used this question to raise the issue of whether CDC could really work: 
͞;Consultant) CDC in my view does not work because it is really no more 
than a smoothing mechanism in the same way that with profits products 
were and potentially open to the same sort of abuses that they suffered 
from. ... although I know the Dutch have been more successful on the face 
of it with this.͟ 
(In responses to other questions, two other respondents raised the issue of the similarity of 
CDC to with-profits products.) 
Five responses mentioned economies of scale. The other advantages on the investment side 
of a CDC product were the ability to invest in a wider range of illiquid long-term investments 
to obtain a liquidity premium (five responses) and the ability to avoid issues about linking 
the accumulation and decumulation phases of the pension via locking in to annuities (four 
responses). 
͞;Consultant) A CDC scheme has no need to buy annuities at retirement. 
The investment strategy post retirement is not constrained to investments 
of low return. The severe outcome volatility generated by annuity purchase 
is avoided. Managing a CDC scheme is mainly a matter of cash flow 
management, balancing contribution and asset income with benefit outgo, 
making market value volatility rather less important. Therefore a CDC 
scheme can be expected to deliver, on average, higher benefit outcomes 
(due to the unconstrained post retirement investment policy) with lower 
volatility (due to the absence of switching of investments into an annuity) 
thaŶ a ŵoŶeǇ puƌĐhase DC sĐheŵe.͟ 
Other responses carefully outlined the advantages of being in a CDC scheme compared with 
being in a DC scheme and having to buy an annuity: 
͞(Consultant) ... the Government Actuary͛s Department calculates that 
profit and reserving, (and perhaps adverse selection?) take 20-25% of an 
inflation linked annuity. Further, in order for annuities to be safe, they need 
fixed contractual terms, in turn underpinned by triple-A bonds. This 
conservative investment pattern also has a cost. Finally, there is a big 
timing risk since the annuity is purchased on a particular day. CDC 
addresses these problems, albeit that CDC needs a degree of flexibility, and 
therefore to achieve best value from CDC the precise nominal payment is 
ŵoƌe diffiĐult to pƌediĐt thaŶ ǁith aŶ aŶŶuitǇ.͟ 
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͞(ACA) Individual DC schemes must purchase annuities to give a reliable 
income for life, effectively requiring investment in cautious investments 
throughout the whole period of retirement. A CDC scheme has no such 
need to buy annuities at retirement and the investment strategy is 
therefore not constrained to low returning investments ...͟ 
SUMMARY: There were a variety of responses and there was no dominant view on the main 
benefits of collective versus individual DC schemes. Twenty-one per cent of responses either 
did not think that collective DC schemes were better than individual DC schemes or did not 
think that they could work.  Among those responses that were more positive, economies of 
scale were mentioned by 26 per cent of responses and risk sharing by another 26 per cent.  
On the investment side, it was mentioned that CDC – in contrast to an individual DC scheme 
– had the ability to invest in a wider range of illiquid long-term investments to obtain a 
liquidity premium as well as the ability to avoid the separation between the accumulation 
and decumulation phases. 
49. What are the main disadvantages of CDC schemes over individual DC schemes? 
There were seventeen responses to this question. Eleven of these referred to the problem 
of how to share returns between individual savers. Risk-sharing was seen to be potentially 
problematic. Several reasons were cited for this. First, individual members might struggle to 
understand risk sharing. One response referred to the 
͞(Insurance company) [c]hallenges of explaining to members how the 
scheme works and what this means to each of them. Most people find it 
hard to understand the theory of pooled risk, as has been shown in the 
aŶŶuitǇ aŶd ǁith‐pƌofits ŵaƌkets.  
 Another noted the problem in managing expectations and distribution decisions: 
͞(Insurance company) History suggests that where pooling and risk sharing 
applies ďetǁeeŶ iŶdiǀiduals ;e.g. ǁith‐pƌofitsͿ, disputes over fairness and 
the need for transparency will lead to a continual regulatory intervention 
in how benefits are apportioned, a process that it is not possible to model 
effectively. The idea that future income is a target and not a guarantee 
could also potentially put trustees in a difficult position. We believe that it 
would be dangerous for CDC sĐheŵes to pƌoŵote ͚soft guaƌaŶtees͛ to 
pension savers such as a target amount expressed in the form of a defined 
benefit. Confidence and trust will be rapidly eroded when the inevitable 
tiŵe Đoŵes ǁheŶ these ͚taƌgets͛ aƌe Ŷot ŵet.͟ 
Three responses also observed that the inter-generational risk sharing meant that it might 
be difficult to sustain a CDC scheme: 
͞(Insurance company) CDC schemes largely rely on continuous growth for 
their success. If a scheme is contracting at a time when investments are 
low it could get into serious difficulties.͟ 
͞;Pension provider) ... a bad funded plan (high underfunding) may be 
unattractive for new entrants; also a fat funded plan (high overfunding) 
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may be attractive to be closed to divide surplus over participating 
members.͟ 
Five responses also cited reduced flexibility for members compared to DC. Finally, three 
responses noted that the income generated was itself uncertain (these respondents tending 
to be those who thought a pension should provide a stable income). 
SUMMARY: Sixty-four per cent of respondents thought that the main disadvantage of CDC 
over individual DC schemes was how to share risks between individual savers, particularly in 
a contracting CDC scheme. Some thought that this made the long-term sustainability of CDC 
doubtful. Many raised the issue of explaining risk sharing to members who might struggle to 
understand it, especially the notion that the actual pension might be lower than the target 
pension. Twenty-nine per cent pointed to the reduced flexibility for members compared to 
individual DC. 
50. CDC schemes may be able to generate incomes that are higher than individual DC 
schemes as the latter are currently operated.   
 (a) Are there reasons why an individual DC scheme could not follow the same 
investment or decumulation strategy as a CDC scheme?  
 (b) Would trustees of an individual CDC scheme be willing to accommodate the 
greater investment risk, given the need to enable members to transfer out and to 
take their pension pot with them? 
There were fourteen responses to part (a). Four of these thought that CDC could not 
generate higher returns than DC. For example: 
͞(Consultant) There is no generic reason why a CDC would generate higher 
incomes than best practice individual DC schemes. Investment strategy, 
scale and fees may all be handled without CDC, and purchasing best value 
annuities does not require this new format either. It is true that smaller 
schemes might be disadvantaged, but that is not about CDC but 
consolidation. I have found declarations about collective schemes 
providing 30% better performance than individual DC schemes somewhat 
ŵisleadiŶg.͟ 
Half of the respondents thought that CDC could out-perform individual DC, but different 
reasons were given for this. One referred to economies of scale 
͞(Insurance company) An individual DC scheme would not have the same 
economies of a scale as a CDC scheme, so it would be unable to follow 
exactly the same investment or decumulation strategy as a CDC scheme. 
Hoǁeǀeƌ, CDC sĐheŵes, ďǇ theiƌ Ŷatuƌe, offeƌ a oŶe‐size‐fits‐all solutioŶ, so 
the group is being protected to the possible detriment of the individual. As 
we state above, research indicates that individuals broadly welcome the 
increased flexibility introduced by recent reforms in the retirement market 
so they may find the CDC approach ƌeǀisioŶist.͟ 
Others mentioned that because risk could be reduced by sharing (within or between) 
generations, it was possible for the fund to invest in higher-risk, higher-return assets: 
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͞;Pension provider) ... risk sharing can be set up between existing accrued 
pension capital and new pension capital to be accrued in the nearby 
future. This form of risk sharing cannot be replicated in an individual plan 
as this plan cannot share risk with some future individual or future accrual 
...͟ 
Another response noted that the purpose of CDC was to provide some degree of insurance 
and that this enabled investment in higher-risk and higher-return products: 
͞;Lawyer) In theory there is no reason why an individual DC scheme could 
not follow the same investment or decumulation strategy as a CDC 
scheme. Whether it would be sensible for the member to do so will depend 
oŶ the ŵeŵďeƌ͛s aďilitǇ to ďeaƌ the iŶĐƌeased ǀolatilitǇ iŶ the outtuƌŶs 
without the smoothing that the pooling of risk, both intra-generation and 
across geŶeƌatioŶ, eŶaďles.͟ 
Also noted was the fact that traditional DC schemes use a de-risking glide path and move 
towards less risky products as a member approaches retirement and this would not need to 
be the case in CDC: 
͞(TUC) Even with the pension income reforms, many traditional DC 
schemes are likely to de-risk as a member approaches state retirement 
age, thus ƌeduĐiŶg the likelǇ iŶǀestŵeŶt ƌetuƌŶs.͟ 
There were eight responses to part (b). Several responses questioned whether the greater 
investment opportunities would be utilised by trustees in practice 
͞(IFoA) Trustees are likely to accept different levels of risk within their 
schemes. Risk appetite will determine a range of outcomes that will reflect 
the freedom within the overall legislative framework. Experience of with-
profit funds should be considered when understanding the range of 
outcomes. It is worth noting that CDC schemes in the Netherlands do not 
take the degree of investment risk that some of the UK proponents of the 
design are recommending.͟ 
Two noted the problems for CDC schemes if transfers were allowed: 
͞(Consultant) It is difficult to see how a CDC scheme can be run effectively 
in respect of its attempts to invest to spread risk across a membership with 
diverse age and other characteristics, if any or all of a cohort of members 
may without notice effectively withdraw any or all of their accrued monies. 
Although this is, in effect, possible now pre-retirement, where the member 
wishes to exercise their statutory right to transfer their accrued funds to 
another scheme of their choosing, the facility to do so post-retirement is a 
new complication for those schemes that will offer drawdown, and it is 
also anticipated that the take-up rate of cash withdrawal will be greater 
than in the past.͟ 
͞(Consultant) CDC also has an advantage of permanence, and hence ability 
to invest in illiquid projects. This advantage can be lessened in the event of 
ungated transfers in and out.͟ 
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SUMMARY: Half of the respondents thought that CDC could out-perform individual DC, due 
to economies of scale, risk sharing (within or between) generations – enabling investment in 
higher-risk, higher-return assets – and the avoidance of a de-risking glide path which moves 
towards less risky products as a member approaches retirement.  However, 30 per cent of 
respondents thought that CDC could not generate higher returns than individual DC and 
that the claims that they could were misleading. In terms of trustee attitudes, most 
respondents thought that trustees would be unwilling to take on greater investment risk 
due to the issues of transfers out of the scheme (such transfers were seen as problematic). 
51. (a) Would a CDC scheme have any additional risk-sharing advantages over a large 
master trust DC scheme which followed the same investment and decumulation 
strategies where possible? 
(b) Can the benefits from any additional sources of risk sharing available to CDC 
schemes be quantified? 
There were ten responses to part (a). Forty per cent of these thought that a CDC might have 
no or few advantages over a large master trust DC scheme, although the respondents 
emphasised that this depended upon the size of the master trust and other assumptions. 
One response said that a CDC would have an advantage since it would be bigger. The 
remaining responses to part (a) emphasised the different investment strategies of CDC and 
DC schemes. 
There were five responses to part (b), one saying that the advantage could not be quantified 
and the other four saying that it could, often referring to published research. For example: 
͞;Pension provider) de Haan, Lekniute and Ponds (2015)8 sets up a leǀel‐
plaǇiŶg‐field framework for IDC and CDC plans. Within the used 
framework, the paper finds risk sharing between generations results in a 
better pension benefit. By constructing an equal median replacement rate, 
the downside risk of a contact with risk sharing is much lower: a collective 
ĐoŶtƌaĐt ǁith a sŵoothiŶg peƌiod of ϭϬ‐Ǉeaƌs tiŵe pƌoǀides a Ϯϱ% higher 
replacement rate for the downside sĐeŶaƌio͛s.͟ 
SUMMARY: Forty per cent of responses thought that CDC would not have any additional risk 
sharing advantages over a large master trust DC scheme, although other responses noted 
that the two types of scheme would follow different investment strategies. The small 
number of respondents who answered the second part of the question about quantifying 
the additional benefits thought that it was possible to do so through appropriate modelling. 
 
 
                                                     
 
8
 Pension contracts and risk sharing – a level playing field comparison, APG, Netherlands, February 2015. 
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52. (a) What is your preferred design for a CDC scheme, in terms of targeted benefits? 
(e.g., a CDC scheme that is intended to replace a DB scheme and hence would be 
earnings-related (specify accrual rate, earnings measure, pre-retirement indexation 
rule, post-retirement indexation rule); or a CDC scheme that is intended to replace an 
individual DC scheme and hence would be with-profit and a target return, unit-linked 
and a target return, etc.). (b) Explain why. 
There were nine responses to part (a) this question, eliciting several possible designs: 
several respondents suggested that there were a range of possibilities and some were 
agnostic about the best solution. 
͞;ACAͿ We ďelieǀe that the ƌegulatoƌǇ fƌaŵeǁoƌk should alloǁ foƌ a ƌaŶge 
of possible designs, giving the industry flexibility to establish different 
schemes to fit differing needs and circumstances. 
In our view, CDC regulation needs to allow for different CDC schemes that 
are more similar to DC schemes (perhaps aggregating DC funds over a 
ŵeŵďeƌ͛s ǁoƌkiŶg life aŶd/or as a decumulation vehicle, converting pots 
into benefits on a specific transaction date) and DB schemes (where the 
target benefits allow for a higher degree of cross subsidy, justified by the 
level of employer contributions such that all members can reasonably 
expect to get out more than they put in). 
Forty-four per cent of the responses suggested that there should be a target pension, for 
example: 
͞(TUC) CDC in the UK context is best seen as a means of improving DC 
provision. It is potentially a way of boosting outcomes for low and middle 
income savers without putting the sorts of additional burdens or risks on 
employers that would prevent such schemes being launched. This suggests 
that aiming for a target return would be most appropriate.͟ 
One way to achieve this would be to have a system where members had explicit claims on 
variable annuities (whether deferred or in payment), but the precise returns would be 
smoothed across generations according to some pre-determined rule. One response 
referred to the paper by de Haan, Lekniute & Ponds (2015) which describes explicit 
smoothing rules as follows: 
͞;Pension provider) The valuation of new and already accrued annuities is 
based on fair valuation principles. The annuities all are risk bearing 
;͚ǀaƌiaďle aŶŶuities͛Ϳ ďǇ ŵeaŶs of aŶ opeŶ ĐoŶtƌaĐt ďǇ ǁhiĐh aŶǇ deǀiatioŶ 
of the funding ratio from a pivot funding ratio is smoothed out over a 10- 
year period. So a funding ratio of 110% and a pivot funding ratio of 100% 
leads to an adjustment of the annuities with +1%. The next year this 
process is repeated. In case the funding ratio falls to 95%, then the 
iŶdeǆatioŶ that Ǉeaƌ ǁill ďe ‐ 0.5%.͟ 
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An alternative proposal suggested describing the pension asset in terms of income: 
͞;Lawyer) In each scheme year a contributing member will purchase a 
͚ƌetiƌeŵeŶt iŶĐoŵe ďƌiĐk͛. That brick will comprise: 
(i) a nominal target retirement pension for life from a target 
retirement date, 
(ii) an allowance for inflation proofing in the period prior to the 
target retirement date, and 
(iii) an allowance for inflation proofing after the target retirement 
date. 
Note: None of these amounts would be guaranteed and would be subject 
to adjustment as ŶeĐessaƌǇ to ŵake the ͞ďooks ďalaŶĐe͟ oŶ aŶ aŶŶual 
basis (more frequently in extreme circumstances). 
The main differences between the proposals were the differences in the degree of risk 
sharing across generations. Some responses thought that there should be little inter-
generational risk sharing and one suggested that it would be easier to have inter-
generational risk sharing if some of the contributions were explicitly from the employer 
rather than the employee. Three responses explicitly or implicitly pointed out that a CDC 
scheme with some employer support could be closer to a superior form of DC pension (DC-
plus) or an inferior version of a DB pension (DB-minus). One response suggested that the 
DB-minus view of pensions was closer to what DB pensions used to look like before 
protections were added: 
͞(Consultant) CDC is, of course, a ǀeƌsioŶ of ǁhat the UK͛s old DB plaŶs 
used to look like. The gold plating of DB made them unsustainable. DC 
gives flexibility but at a cost of poorer and/or less predictable pensions. 
There is room for all three.͟ 
There were four responses to part (b). Two preferred DC-plus on the grounds that it was 
cheaper than DB-minus and hence likely to be more widely provided. One suggested that it 
would be better that there should be a range of options. Finally, the respondent who had 
suggested that CDC pensions be ďased oŶ ͞ďƌiĐks͟ of ƌetiƌeŵeŶt iŶĐoŵe Ŷoted that it ǁas 
better to describe the pension in terms of income because: 
͞;Lawyer) If the starting presumption is that what an individual is looking 
for in retirement is a relatively predictable form of retirement income, then 
expressing the target benefit in retirement income terms ties in with this 
aspiration. It also avoids the perception of mismatch between: 
;iͿ ǁhat appeaƌs to ďe a ͚small͛ amount of retirement income, and 
(ii) the ͚perceived large͛ capital value of that target retirement 
income. In other words a member with what appears to be a 
substantial level of retirement savings in a DC ͚pot͛ may misjudge the 
level of retirement income that can be provided from that DC pot.͟ 
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SUMMARY: There was considerable variety in the responses about the appropriate design of 
a CDC scheme and many respondents were agnostic or unsure themselves, suggesting that 
there is no consensus view on the target benefits. The most common response (by forty-
four per cent of respondents) was that there should be some form of a target pension 
(essentially a DB-minus view of pensions). The main differences between the proposals 
were the differences in the acceptable degree of risk sharing across generations. Some said 
there should be little inter-generational risk sharing, with one suggesting that it would be 
easier to have inter-generational risk sharing if some of the contributions were explicitly 
from the employer. One response suggested that the DB-minus view of pensions was closer 
to what DB pensions used to look like before protections were added.  Nevertheless, two 
respondents preferred DC-plus on the grounds that it was cheaper than DB-minus and 
hence likely to be more widely provided. 
53. (a) What is the best estimate contribution rate to achieve the target benefit? 
(b) How should the contribution rate be shared between employer and member? 
There were eight responses to this question. None of these provided explicit numerical 
figures to answer part (a), pointing out that this depended on a variety of factors and 
needed actuarial expertise. Three of the responses noted that the higher the share of the 
contribution from the employer the greater the scope for inter-generational risk sharing. 
SUMMARY: Respondents did not provide numerical figures on the best estimate of the 
contribution rate because of the variety of factors needed to be taken into account. A 
number of respondents noted that the higher the share of the contribution from the 
employer the greater the scope for inter-generational risk sharing. 
54. (a) Can a CDC scheme work with a planned contribution rate that is fixed 
iŶdepeŶdeŶt of a ŵeŵďeƌ͛s age oƌ is aŶ age-dependent member contribution rate 
required? (b) If the latter, is a change to equality legislation required? 
There were six responses to this question. One view was that either the contribution must 
vary to meet the target or vice versa. Subsidies across ages were perceived as problematic: 
͞;Lawyer) If you have higher employer contribution rates for older 
employees, the younger employees can claim that the older employees are 
being paid more for the same work. Conversely, if you have a uniform 
contribution rate, the younger employees can claim that the older 
employees are being provided with a more valuable target benefit than the 
younger employees.͟ 
And, because of this, three of the respondents explicitly said that there needed to be 
employer contributions to allow cross-subsidy: 
͞(ACA) The ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ ƌate ĐaŶ ďe fiǆed iŶdepeŶdeŶt of a ŵeŵďeƌ͛s age if 
there is an employer contribution that means the target benefit value is 
higheƌ thaŶ the ŵeŵďeƌ͛s ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ foƌ eǀeƌǇ age. If the CDC 
membership is unconnected, ... contributions should be converted into 
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target benefits having regard to the characteristics of each individual 
;iŶĐludiŶg ageͿ.͟ 
Two respondents referred to existing legislation, one arguing for each type of contribution 
to be possible: 
͞(Consultant) [a fixed contribution rate works] for example at ATP in 
Denmark, which is covered by the same equality legislation as the UK. 
͞(ACA) We ďelieǀe that aŶ age‐depeŶdeŶt ƌate is alƌeadǇ alloǁaďle.͟ 
But one response suggested that it might be worth strengthening this: 
͞;Lawyer) Irrespective of how the contribution rate is set, …ǁe ǁould 
recommend aŶ eǆpƌess eǆeŵptioŶ iŶ the eƋualitǇ legislatioŶ … . What the 
employer will wish to avoid is a situation where its contribution rate ends 
up ǁith aŶ age disĐƌiŵiŶatioŶ Đlaiŵ.͟ 
SUMMARY: Most respondents suggested that either the contribution rate or the target 
benefit had to be fixed but not both. However, it was recognised that, while it was possible 
to fix both, this would involve cross-generational subsidies, which really required (possibly 
variable) contributions from employers to be feasible.  In the case where a scheme wishes 
to operate with age-related contributions, one respondent said that there should be an 
express exemption from equality legislation. 
55. What investment strategy would be appropriate for CDC schemes: (a) in 
accumulation and (b) near retirement and (c) in decumulation? 
There were six responses to this question and four noted that the investment strategy 
depended partly on the composition of the scheme membership:  
͞(Consultant) A CDC scheme would typically have a single investment 
strategy for all (like a DB plan), however, if it is started as an accumulation 
scheme and matures to decumulate over time, it would be sensible for the 
investment strategy to be dynamic moving from a growth to a more 
balanced fund over time.͟ 
But the general principle was that a CDC scheme would not be constrained by its liabilities 
͞(Consultant) The short answer would be high expected return assets held 
in a well-diversified portfolio at all times. CDC schemes do not provide 
guaranteed liabilities requiring investments to be constrained to liability 
ŵatĐhiŶg iŶǀestŵeŶts, theƌe is Ŷot a guaƌaŶteed liaďilitǇ to ŵatĐh.͟ 
 ͞(Consultant) The question of appropriate investment for CDC is a long 
one; however it would probably look more like a DB scheme without costly 
ALM.͟ 
SUMMARY: Respondents suggested that the investment strategy would not be constrained 
by its liabilities, but would probably look like a DB scheme without costly asset-liability 
management – consistent with the target pension view of what CDC was trying to achieve - 
although the optimal strategy would depend on the composition of scheme membership. 
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56. What are the main benefits of a CDC scheme in terms of intra-generational risk 
pooling? 
There were five explicit responses to this question, and three said that the main benefit was 
the sharing of longevity risk within the pool (some respondents had implicitly addressed this 
issue in earlier questions). One response made the caveat that transfers in or out should be 
medically underwritten to preserve the risk sharing. In response to both this question and 
the next, one respondent noted that the redistribution would mean some people were 
worse off: 
͞(Insurance company) Some people, probably those who joined the scheme 
early, and continued to be a member until retirement, will do well out of 
the scheme. Others will do less well, depending on how the makeup of the 
sĐheŵe ĐhaŶged.͟ 
SUMMARY: Respondents suggested that the main intra-generational benefit of a CDC 
scheme would be sharing of longevity risk within the pool.  One response made the caveat 
that transfers in or out should be medically underwritten to preserve the risk sharing. 
57. What are the main benefits of a CDC scheme in terms of inter-generational risk 
sharing? 
There were seven explicit responses to this question, of which four noted that risk sharing 
across generations could lead to greater smoothing of investment returns, albeit with the 
caveat noted in the previous question. 
͞(IFoA) Intergenerational risk sharing can smooth volatility over many 
generations as the indexation on pensions is much smoother than the 
market returns and also highly correlated. This is a desirable feature in a 
pension system, as it will provide time for individuals to smooth their 
consumption levels. However, this should be balanced against the level of 
risk for younger and future generations and appropriate safeguards to 
ŵitigate this Đould ďe ďeŶefiĐial.͟ 
One respondent – in line with responses to earlier questions – also suggested that this risk 
pooling increased the ability to invest in higher-risk assets and obtain a higher expected 
return. Alongside hedging investment return risk, only one response to this question 
referred explicitly to inflation risk and longevity risk. So most of the responses to question 
56 (intra-generational) referred to longevity risk and most of the responses to question 57 
(inter-generational) referred to investment risk: however, one cannot make too direct a 
comparison since not every respondent answered both questions. 
The final point raised for this question was the fact that there was a wider social benefit of 
having intergenerational risk sharing as it increased the chances that people would have 
sufficient pensions to enable retirement and this might have labour-market benefits for 
younger generations. 
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SUMMARY: Most respondents suggested that the main inter-generational benefit of a CDC 
scheme would be smoothing of investment returns.  One respondent also suggested that 
this risk pooling increased the ability to invest in higher-risk assets and obtain a higher 
expected return. Only one respondent referred explicitly to inflation risk and longevity risk. 
58. (a) Over how many generations should risk be shared?  
(b) Explain why this is optimal. 
There were six responses to this question, but one merely reiterated the belief that there 
should not be inter-generational risk sharing. Of the remaining five answers, the possibilities 
were: (i) all generations, including those not yet in the workforce; (ii) all generations in the 
scheme; (iii) for a long period, ǁithout a Đleaƌ defiŶitioŶ of ͞loŶg͟; and (iv) ten years (two 
responses). The most detailed comment was that: 
͞;Pension provider) The poteŶtial ǁelfaƌe‐iŵpƌoǀeŵeŶt is higheƌ the 
longer the smoothing period, and hence the more future generations (age‐
cohorts) [that] are included. However, too long a smoothing period (for 
example 30 years) could imply periods with deep underfunding and high 
overfunding, which may cause the breaking up of the plan. So discontinuity 
risk puts limit on the length of the smoothing period. The discussion in the 
Netherlands tends to a smoothing period of 10 years.͟ 
Where given, the rationale for this being optimal was that a long period was needed to get 
smoothing (one response to the previous question noted that investment returns were 
serially correlated). One response noted that some people would be better in an individual 
scheme: 
͞(Consultant) [inter-generational risk sharing] may be optimal for some 
(who like to see solidarity across generations); it may be sub-optimal for 
otheƌs ;ǁho doŶ͛tͿ. Those ǁho doŶ͛t like ƌisk shaƌiŶg ǁould ďe ďetteƌ off iŶ 
an individual arrangement. 
SUMMARY: There were relatively few responses to the issue of how many generations 
should share the risk in a CDC scheme, but, of those who did respond, there were widely 
divergent answers, ranging from risk-sharing between all generations (including those not 
even in the workforce) to risk sharing over a 10-year period (as in the Netherlands). 
59. How should the risk-sharing rules in a CDC scheme be defined? 
There were seven responses to this question and these all used language saying that rules 
should be clear and transparent (as with previous questions, one respondent was against 
risk sharing). Only one response came up with explicit rules, citing de Haan, Lekniute and 
Ponds (2015), which have already been reported in the response to question 52. 
SUMMARY: All respondents suggested that the most important issue was that the risk-
sharing rules be clear and transparent. 
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60. Hoǁ ŵuĐh disĐƌetioŶ should a CDC sĐheŵe͛s ŵaŶageƌs haǀe ǁheŶ it Đoŵes to 
smoothing or adjusting benefits to target benefits, or should the rules be fully 
transparent? 
Of the seǀeŶ ƌespoŶses to this ƋuestioŶ: thƌee aƌgued foƌ ͞ǁide͟ oƌ ͞high͟ disĐƌetioŶ; oŶe 
for some discretion and three for virtually no discretion. An argument against discretion was 
as follows: 
͞;Lawyer) Virtually [no discretion]. There should be a clear policy explained 
at inception on a fully transparent basis as to how target benefits are to be 
adjusted. 
Otheƌǁise, theƌe ǁill ďe iŶheƌeŶt ƌisk iŶ the ͞good tiŵes͟ of oǀeƌ 
distributing to those whose pensions are in payment and in the ͞ďad 
tiŵes͟ Ŷot ƌeduĐiŶg ǁith suffiĐieŶt speed the ďeŶefits ǁhiĐh aƌe iŶ 
payment. 
In other words, this is where the inter-generational risk arises and where it 
must be managed to avoid the older generations benefiting at the expense 
of the younger generations. 
It is iŵpoƌtaŶt to aǀoid the pƌoĐess of ͚tƌust ŵe I aŵ aŶ aĐtuaƌǇ͛ fƌoŵ 
deteƌŵiŶiŶg hoǁ the adjustŵeŶts should ďe deteƌŵiŶed.͟ 
One respondent suggested that the rules should be set by the regulator. On the other hand, 
some respondents thought that there would always be need for discretion: 
͞(Consultant) A CDC scheme cannot have benefit guarantees (otherwise it 
would fall within defined benefit scheme regulation). Ultimately, the 
benefits must always be discretionary. While it is desirable for there to be a 
Đleaƌ taƌget ďeŶefit poliĐǇ ;Ŷote, I haǀeŶ͛t used the possiďlǇ stƌoŶgeƌ ǁoƌd 
͞ƌule͟Ϳ ǁhiĐh iŶ the Ŷoƌŵal Đouƌse of eǀeŶts is folloǁed, it is not possible to 
foresee all future events and it must be expected that extreme events will 
arise in which trustees may reasonably want to diverge from the target 
ďeŶefit poliĐǇ.͟ 
This point was made with the proviso that there should be a policy on how and when 
discretion should be used. 
SUMMARY: With a relatively small number of responses to this question, there was an 
almost equal split between respondents arguing for CDC scheme managers having no 
discretion to them having very wide discretion. One respondent thought that there would 
always be need for discretion, while another respondent suggested that the rules should be 
set by the regulator. 
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61. (a) If the actual pension is above the target pension, when should adjustments be 
made? 
(b) How and in what order should the adjustments be made (consider adjustments to 
pension indexation, pension amount in payment, investment strategy, active 
member contribution rate, active member retirement age)? 
62. (a) If the actual pension is below the target pension, when should adjustments be 
made? 
(b) How and in what order should the adjustments be made (consider adjustments to 
pension indexation, pension amount in payment, investment strategy, active 
member contribution rate, active member retirement age)?   
There were only four responses to question 61 and six to question 62. One response to 
question 62 noted simply that members would be likely to resist cuts to benefits in 
payment: 
͞(SPP) Members would often find unacceptable a reduction to benefits 
once in payment. This is particularly so if the benefits are themselves low, 
which is likely to continue to be the case unless there is a significant 
increase in the level of contributions paid.͟ 
There was agreement that benefits should be reviewed annually, although one response 
countenanced the possibility of more frequent reviews in exceptional circumstances. 
(Consultant) Current deficits are generally adjusted through conditional 
indexation, then pension in payment, future liability by reducing 
expectations, or member payment. Retirement age can remain flexible. 
Respondents agreed that adjustments should be made first to indexation (sometimes 
ordering indexation of pensions not in payment before pensions in payment) and second to 
the level of the pension: this was the same for both increases and decreases. One response 
was explicit that contributions and investment strategies should not be altered.  
SUMMARY: Among the relatively small number of responses to Questions 61 and 62, most 
thought that adjustments should be made annually and they agreed that adjustments 
should be made first to indexation and second to the level of the pension. One respondent 
was explicit in saying that contributions and investment strategies should not be altered. 
63. What mechanisms are needed to ensure that no CDC scheme becomes insolvent? For 
example, a CDC scheme might try to use a high target return to attract more 
customers. 
Of the seven responses to this question, three noted explicitly that a CDC scheme could not 
technically become insolvent. However, it was recognised that there needed to be rules in 
place to stop CDC schemes over-promising to attract customers: 
͞;Lawyer) There will need to be appropriate regulation to address those 
schemes which market themselves as offering higher target benefits for 
the same contribution rate relative to schemes offering lower target 
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benefits at the same contribution rate. This is a variation on an old 
problem of actuaries going to finance directors and offering them ways of 
reducing pension costs by changing the assumptions made to calculate the 
contribution rates (if you go back sufficiently far in time). 
This should come out of the Regulations under the Pension Schemes Act 
2015 for collective benefit schemes, but the likely structure will be to have 
specified probability levels for achieving, on specified assumptions, 
particular levels of target benefits. 
There will then be some variation in this area which will be a function of 
the investment strategy adopted. That, in turn, will require some element 
of ͞ƌisk ƌatiŶg͟ oƌ ͞ǀolatilitǇ ƌatiŶg͟ to ďe giǀeŶ to the taƌget ďeŶefit 
schemes to take account of the volatility of the investment strategy. This 
ǁould haǀe to ďe speĐified iŶ ƌegulatioŶ.͟ 
Four responses mentioned actuarial reviews and the other issues mentioned were 
regulation, transparent rules and good trusteeship. For example: 
͞(Consultant) A CDC scheme has no benefit guarantees and therefore there 
is no concept of insolvency. ... Is the question really trying to ask about the 
risk of deliberate overestimation of the likely return on the investments in 
the actuarial planning of the CDC scheme? 
The trustees must be able to demonstrate that their target benefits can be 
realistically provided for by the assets and contributions. Their plans must 
be published for all members to see ... and lodged with a supervisory body 
(be it TPR, FCA or whoever), not to mention accessible to financial 
journalists and self-promoting consultants. 
An actuarial plan which is over-optimistic will pay out too much initially 
until the plan is corrected. ... some members could be said to ͚lose out͛ at 
the expense of others. ... this emphasises the need for good trusteeship ... 
the position of a trustee in a CDC scheme is far more onerous that in a pure 
ŵoŶeǇ puƌĐhase sĐheŵe aŶd peƌhaps eǀeŶ thaŶ iŶ a DB sĐheŵe.͟ 
SUMMARY: Forty-three per cent of respondents noted that CDC schemes could not 
technically be insolvent, but that they could over-promise (and hence under-deliver) to their 
members. Mechanisms needed to be put in place to deal with this and suggestions included 
actuarial reviews, regulation, transparent rules and good trusteeship. 
64. Is it necessary for a CDC scheme to start with or build up a reserve fund to give it 
credibility? 
There were nine responses to this question and only two unambiguously stated that there 
was a need for a reserve fund. On the other hand, only one thought that there was no need 
at all. The intermediate positions were mostly based on setting up of a scheme: a reserve 
fund would cover set-up costs and provide scale and credibility at the beginning. Further on 
in the scheme, a small buffer to cover contingencies would be helpful and might enable a 
with-profits form of CDC fund. For example: 
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͞(Consultant) Reserves in CDC are needed to ensure its long term 
continuation, but not beyond.͟ 
SUMMARY: Seventy-eight per cent of respondents thought that there was no need for a 
reserve fund, while the rest said that there was such a need. However, many responses 
thought that a reserve fund might be helpful, especially initially, to cover set-up costs and 
provide scale and credibility. 
65. CDC schemes in other countries (e.g., Holland) have virtually no flexibility with 
respect to member choice (e.g. contribution rate, investment strategy, retirement 
date, form of decumulation (i.e., pension). Do the freedoms and flexibilities 
introduced by the 2014 Budget render CDC schemes unfeasible or more risky in the 
UK? Explain why not or, alternatively, how freedom and flexibility would need to be 
tailored in the context of CDC schemes?      
One response to this question was that CDCs are incompatible with the new pension 
freedoms. Four responses suggested that too much flexibility would make it hard to run a 
CDC scheme and that such flexibility was inappropriate and not really wanted anyway (since 
pensioners who wanted more flexibility had other options). On the other hand two 
responses suggested that flexibility was possible, even if not desirable: 
͞(Consultant) It is perfectly possible, (though not always desirable) to 
introduce flexibility—so for example the Shell Pension in Holland gives DC-
like stateŵeŶts duƌiŶg aĐĐuŵulatioŶ. DutĐh peŶsioŶ fuŶds alloǁ tƌaŶsfeƌ.͟  
One of the responses envisaged that there would be the possibility of transfer, involving the 
possibility of transfer during the accumulation period and something like the Open Market 
Option at the point of retirement. However, for practical purposes and to prevent gaming, it 
was suggested that the transfer opportunity would only be available in a short window after 
the annual valuation. 
SUMMARY: Responses were fairly equally divided on whether member choice was 
compatible with CDC schemes, some believing it was possible if not desirable, while most 
thought that too much flexibility would make it hard to run a CDC scheme, or that such 
flexibility was inappropriate and not really wanted anyway (since pensioners who wanted 
more flexibility had other options). 
66. One of the biggest growth areas prior to the 2014 Budget was the medical 
underwriting of annuities and the growth of enhanced annuities. But in a standard 
CDC scheme, everyone gets the same pension irrespective of health status.  
(a) Would it be feasible in a CDC scheme to medically underwrite the pension in 
retirement? 
(b) Would it be desirable to do this? 
Of the eight responses, five replied unambiguously that it would be feasible, although not 
necessarily desirable. One responses suggested that a competitive equilibrium would drive 
providers to do this: 
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͞(ACA) The more underwriting there is in a market, the more the rest of the 
market needs to follow suit. It might limit this area of CDC scheme 
provision to providers with underwriting skills. 
However, three responses noted that medical underwriting was not really feasible before 
the age of 50 and the need for medical underwriting was partly dependent on the aims of 
the scheme: an employer-sponsored scheme aiming to provide a pension to all employees 
could cross-subsidise and avoid adverse selection (which one respondent thought could be 
managed anyway).  
SUMMARY: Sixty-three per cent of responses suggested that medical underwriting of the 
pension in retirement was feasible for a CDC scheme, although some noted that such 
underwriting was not really feasible before the age of 50. 
67. How should a CDC scheme best be organised: (a) on a company-wide basis, (b) an 
industry-wide basis, or (c) a nation-wide basis? 
There were seven responses to this. Two thought that it should be done on the largest scale 
possible, i.e. nationally and possibly via NEST. The remaining five thought it could be done 
on any of the three bases and some suggested that a variety would be optimal. 
SUMMARY: Seventy-one per cent of responses thought that a CDC scheme could be 
operated on any of the three bases suggested, while a minority thought that it should be 
done on the largest scale possible. 
68. What is the minimum number of members in a CDC scheme to make it viable? 
Explain this figure. 
There were five very different responses to this question. One said forty (one per 
generation); two said a few hundred; one said 5,000 and the last said that it could be done 
with 1,000, but 10,000 would be optimal. One of the responses advocating a few hundred 
thought that there was a mis-perception in this area based on the issue of annuitisation: 
͞(Consultant) You should ignore the often repeated allegation that a CDC 
scheme needs to be large deriving from the work by GAD for the DWP.
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GAD͛s ŵodelliŶg of a CDC sĐheŵe ďought aŶŶuities oŶ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt aŶd, iŶ 
some closed-to-new-entrants scenarios, their model ran out of money. The 
DWP concluded from this that CDC schemes needed to be large and multi-
employer so they would never close to new entrants and so never be at risk 
of running out of money. A model which runs out of money is a flawed 
                                                     
 
9
 DepaƌtŵeŶt foƌ Woƌk aŶd PeŶsioŶs ;ϮϬϬ9aͿ ͚ColleĐtiǀe DefiŶed CoŶtƌiďutioŶ “Đheŵes: AŶ assessŵeŶt of 
ǁhetheƌ aŶd hoǁ ĐolleĐtiǀe defiŶed ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ sĐheŵes ŵight opeƌate iŶ the UK͛, DeĐeŵďeƌ 
(www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/collective-defined-contribution-schemes-dec09.pdf); Department for Work and 
PeŶsioŶs ;ϮϬϬ9ďͿ ͚ModelliŶg ColleĐtiǀe DefiŶed CoŶtƌiďutioŶ “Đheŵes: A suŵŵaƌǇ of The GoǀeƌŶŵeŶt 
AĐtuaƌǇ͛s DepaƌtŵeŶt ŵodelliŶg of ĐolleĐtiǀe defiŶed ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ sĐheŵes͛, DeĐeŵďeƌ 
(www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/modelling-collective-defined-contribution-schemes-dec09.pdf). 
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model. In the real world, a process of reviewing the funding plan (perhaps 
annually) and adjusting benefits to keep the scheme on track could not 
possiďlǇ ƌuŶ out of ŵoŶeǇ.͟ 
SUMMARY: There was no consensus answer to this question. The small number of 
responses gave widely differing views on the minimum number of members in a CDC 
scheme, ranging from forty (one per generation) to 10,000. 
69. Effective regulation, governance and quality standards will be crucial, given the 
absence of member property rights (which apply in standard DC schemes) and also 
the absence of a sponsoring employer that guarantees benefits (which applies in 
DB).  
(a) What regulation is ƌeƋuiƌed to pƌoteĐt ŵeŵďeƌs͛ ďeŶefits?  
(b) What governance mechanisms and quality standards are needed in CDC schemes, 
especially to ensure inter-generational equity? 
There were eight responses to this question and they tended to emphasise different issues. 
Three responses noted that CDCs created property rights, which might be based on 
contributions or with actuarially set surrender values. Two responses stressed that all 
member types (pensioners, actives, deferreds) should be treated equally. Two responses 
said that regulation should be under trust law resulting in strong trustees. 
Nearly all responses to (b) agreed that valuation should be on a best-valuation basis to 
ensure inter-generational equity. However, one response suggested that a new Act would 
be needed with an independent adjudicator to ensure that CDC did not evolve towards DB.  
SUMMARY: No clear conclusion emerged from the varied responses to the first part of the 
question ĐoŶĐeƌŶiŶg ǁhat ƌegulatioŶ is Ŷeeded to pƌoteĐt ŵeŵďeƌs͛ ďeŶefits: 38 per cent 
noted that CDCs did create property rights (which might be based on contributions or with 
actuarially set surrender values), some stressed that all member types (pensioners, actives, 
deferreds) should be treated equally, while some said that regulation should be under trust 
law resulting in strong trustees. The vast majority of responses to part (b) agreed that 
valuation should be on a best-valuation basis for CDC schemes to ensure inter-generational 
equity. 
70. Could CDC schemes operate both on a trust basis and a contract basis? Explain. 
There were seven responses to this question and at least three thought that either basis was 
possible. Two noted that they would be regulated differently, with contract-based schemes 
regulated as life assurers and trust-based schemes needing an employer sponsor (it was 
suggested that this could be amended in regulation). Six of the responses preferred a trust-
based scheme: 
͞(TUC) It is very hard to envisage CDC working on a contract basis due to 
the lack of robust governance. ... Fiduciary duty is key but is absent from 
contract based arrangements. 
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The introduction of independent governance committees may be a step 
forward for DC if not our ideal, but we cannot back them for CDC schemes 
where only trust-based fiduciary governance is good enough. An IGC would 
be insufficient due to the strong influence that providers have over 
appointments of committee members and the complete absence of powers 
the Đoŵŵittee has to Đoŵpel the pƌoǀideƌ to aĐt iŶ a ĐeƌtaiŶ ǁaǇ.͟ 
SUMMARY: Eighty-six per cent of responses preferred a trust-based scheme, although many 
thought that either a trust or contract basis would be possible. 
71. Could a ͚foƌ pƌofit͛ oƌgaŶisatioŶ ƌuŶ a CDC sĐheŵe? EǆplaiŶ. 
The seven responses to this question gave very different views. Thƌee thought that a ͚foƌ 
pƌofit͛ oƌgaŶisatioŶ Đould ƌuŶ a CDC scheme, so long as it was appropriately capitalised, and 
one thought that the idea was worth exploring. However, two responses were concerned 
that governance issues meant a trust-based scheme would be better. One response was 
unambiguously negative: 
͞(TUC) The scandals around with-profits funds and endowment mortgages 
in the early years of this century show that the conflicts of interest are too 
stark at for-profit organisations for them to run CDC sĐheŵes.͟ 
SUMMARY: Responses were divided as to whether or not a CDC scheme could be run ͚foƌ 
pƌofit͛: 43 per cent said ͞Ǉes͟ so loŶg as it ǁas appƌopƌiatelǇ Đapitalised, 28 per cent thought 
a trust-based scheme would be better thaŶ a ͚foƌ pƌofit͛ sĐheŵe, and one response was 
uŶaŵďiguous that ͚foƌ pƌofit͛ CDC sĐheŵes ǁould ďe iŶappƌopƌiate. 
72. What communication strategy would be appropriate for CDC schemes (a) in 
accumulation and (b) near retirement and (c) in decumulation? 
There were five responses to this question. Four of these were very similar, saying that 
there should be an annual report which described the financial position clearly and helpfully 
and reminded members that they only had a target, not a guaranteed, pension. The fifth 
response thought that the communication strategy should be used to promote more 
member engagement and personal responsibility. 
SUMMARY: Eighty per cent of responses thought the appropriate communication strategy 
for a CDC scheme would be an annual report. 
73. What measures should the government take to make CDC attractive to: (a) potential 
sponsors, and (b) potential members? 
There were four responses to this question. Two responses emphasised the fact that 
sponsors should not be providing a guaranteed pension and require appropriate regulation. 
It was also suggested that sponsors would fear being a first mover and that government 
involvement via NEST might help get things started. The two responses to part (b) reiterated 
that pensioners need alternative decumulation products to annuities and transparent 
information. 
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SUMMARY: The small number of responses emphasised that sponsors need appropriate 
regulation. Government involvement via NEST might also help things get started. 
74. How should transfer values be treated in CDC schemes, both in and out? 
There were five responses to this question. Two emphasised that the sum of (potential) 
transfer values had to equal the available assets and a further one suggested that this could 
be achieved by a points-based system. Such transfers should only be for bona fide reasons 
to avoid gaming. One respondent suggested that there should be medical underwriting and 
a limited period after the annual report for transfers (as in the response to question 65). 
SUMMARY: Most respondents suggested that transfers in or out of CDC schemes had to be 
for bona fide reasons to avoid gaming. 
75. Is it possible for a CDC scheme to work within a charge cap of 0.75%? 
There were six responses to this question. All thought that 0.75 per cent was possible (one 
response also suggested a cap of 1 per cent). One response thought a cap undesirable. 
Another response thought that 0.75 per cent was possible but that there might be issues 
with set-up costs: 
͞;Lawyer) Leaving to one side to establishment costs and the initial period 
while the CDC scheme grows in membership and size, if the CDC scheme is 
to deliver the benefits promised, it will need to keep its running costs low 
and so, in practice, operate within a charge cap of 0.75%. 
... once the CDC scheme has become established, then it should be feasible 
foƌ the Đhaƌge Đap to applǇ.͟ 
SUMMARY: All respondents thought that a 0.75 per cent charge cap was feasible, although 
not all thought that it was necessarily desirable. 
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6. Other issues 
76. With the remit in mind, please tell us if there is anything else you think we should be 
considering that is not covered in the sections and questions above. 
There were eleven responses to this question, some of which raised issues about previous 
questions and are not discussed here. 
Three of these responses emphasised that the most important thing was to let existing 
reforms bed in: 
͞(CBI) ... the best way to achieve good outcomes for savers is by the next 
government not regulating for every possible outcome but it giving the 
current wave of pension reforms a chance to succeed, keeping employers 
engaged in pensions by keeping costs manageable, and ensuring it pays to 
save ...͟ 
͞(Insurance Company) Given the scale of [the recent] changes, it seems 
reasonable to advocate that a period of reflection and impact analysis is 
required before any further, radical policies are pursued. 
This would help ensure the reforms already underway are given time to 
͚ďed doǁŶ͛ aŶd eŶaďle a pƌopeƌ assessŵeŶt of theiƌ effeĐtiǀeŶess to take 
place before determining what further changes, if any, are required to 
iŵpƌoǀe ĐoŶsuŵeƌ outĐoŵes.͟ 
In one case, this was cited as a risk to employer involvement: 
͞(100 Group) We also ďelieǀe that shoƌt‐teƌŵ politiĐal deĐisioŶ‐ŵakiŶg is 
not helping the stability of pensions provision. The frequency of change, 
and the accompanying costs of advice and implementation, are also 
faĐtoƌs affeĐtiŶg eŵploǇeƌs͛ ǁilliŶgŶess to pƌoǀide DC schemes above the 
statutoƌǇ ŵiŶiŵuŵ.͟ 
One response noted that the distinction between long-run savings and pensions was now 
ďluƌƌed. AŶotheƌ ƌaised the ĐoŶĐeƌŶ that aŶǇ Ŷeǁ pƌoduĐts Đould ďeĐoŵe ͞gold-plated͟ ďǇ 
either the UK or the EU in the way that DB pensions were and hence become too expensive 
to provide. 
A final consideration is a point raised at the outset by one respondent about the 
independence of the review: 
͞(Insurance Company) We͛ƌe uŶĐeƌtaiŶ ǁhetheƌ the ƌeǀieǁ is tƌulǇ 
independent. FirstlǇ as it͛s ďeeŶ ĐoŵŵissioŶed ďǇ the Laďouƌ PaƌtǇ aŶd it 
explores many of its policy views. And secondarily because the authors 
appear, based on public appearances, to have preconceived ideas on how 
pension policy should develop, for example, in respect of a default 
retirement income policy, rather than waiting on the outcome of the 
ƌeǀieǁ.͟ 
I have discussed some of the issues of independence in the Introduction. 
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IŶdepeŶdeŶt Яeǀieǁ of RetireŵeŶt IŶcoŵe 
  Consultation Paper 
Background  
On 29 May 2014, Rachel Reeves MP, the Shadow Work and Pensions Secretary, launched an 
Independent Review of Retirement Income to look at how to boost defined contribution 
;DCͿ saǀeƌs͛ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt iŶĐoŵe. “he iŶǀited Pƌofessoƌ Daǀid Blake, DiƌeĐtoƌ of the PeŶsioŶs 
Institute, to lead the review, with Professor Debbie Harrison of the Pensions Institute as a 
senior consultant.  
The teƌŵs of ƌefeƌeŶĐe aƌe as folloǁs. ͞The Independent Review of Retirement Income will 
consider how to support a pensions market that works for all, retaining flexibility and choice 
on how savings are accessed and drawn down, while ensuring all savers, including those on 
low and modest incomes, are able to secure a decent and reliable retirement income. 
Specifically, this will include:  
 How to ensure that the workplace pension retirement products available to people 
are those best suited to ensure they have security and confidence in retirement  The support savers need to make the right choice at retirement for them and their 
family and how to build on the lessons of auto-enrolment  How savers can be helped to manage longevity risk  The role of the National Employment Savings Trust (NEST) in helping savers to access 
good quality retirement products  The role of collective pension schemes and how these could be introduced in the 
UK" 
The Review will consult widely, drawing on the advice and input of senior experts in relevant 
fields and is working closely with the CBI and the TUC to ensure that employers and 
employees are engaged and their perspectives represented.  
The Review team are members of the Pensions Institute.  The Pensions Institute is an 
independent academic research centre.  We believe that the subject of this Review is crucial 
to the long-term success of auto-enrolment, a policy objective which has cross-party 
support. We are interested in generating good consumer outcomes in the face of the 
significant structural and social challenges facing people at retirement. 
Consultation Process 
As part of the consultation process, we have prepared a consultation paper (CP).  In this CP, 
we raise a series of questions that will help us address the above remit. We welcome 
responses from all interested stakeholders, including practitioners in the market (e.g., 
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scheme and product providers, advisers, consultants, lawyers, trustees, Independent 
Governance Committees), trade unions, employers, think-tanks, regulators, and consumer 
organisations. We stress that respondents should feel free to be selective in the questions 
chosen for comment. Key questions are in bold; the rest are intended principally for 
specialists. We also welcome responses from consumer research organisations (which have 
collected evidence on the issues we have raised) and from organisations from other 
countries (which are in a position to share international experience on the issues we have 
raised).  
The CP is posted on the Pensions Institute website, together with a template for comments 
contained in a word document (www.pensions-institute.org).  Please use only this template 
for replies which should be emailed to:  
Marilyn Parris-Bell (Marilyn.Parris-Bell.1@city.ac.uk) 
Secretary to the Independent Review of Retirement Income  
106 Bunhill Row 
London  
United Kingdom 
EC1Y 8TZ 
 
If you have any queries about the CP please email them to Marilyn. The closing date for 
submissions is 20 February 2015.  The Review team will report in summer 2015. 
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Introduction 
͚Good͛ defiŶed ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶ ;DCͿ peŶsioŶ sĐheŵes pƌoduĐe pƌediĐtaďle, although Ŷot 
guaranteed, lifeloŶg ƌetiƌeŵeŶt iŶĐoŵes fƌoŵ ŵeŵďeƌs͛ ĐoŶtƌiďutioŶs. Good DC peŶsioŶ 
schemes also provide value for money for every pound saved in the scheme.  
The remit of the Independent Review of Retirement Income (IRRI) is to examine and 
evaluate the predictability and value for money of the lifelong retirement income produced 
for a given level of planned pension savings in DC pension schemes, the type of pension 
schemes that most workers in the private sector now have in the UK.
10
   
We seek to answer the following questions:  
(1) Can we design a pension system that produces lifelong retirement incomes that are 
more predictable than existing systems?, and  
(2) Can we generate the best possible value for every pound saved?  
If the answeƌ to ďoth these ƋuestioŶs is ͚Ǉes͛, theŶ theƌe is a thiƌd ƋuestioŶ to aŶsǁeƌ:  
(3) Can we ensure that the options that people are encouraged, nudged or defaulted into 
are both well designed and well regulated? 
We believe the answers to these questions lie in understanding the risks involved in the 
generation of retirement income from pension savings and then finding the most efficient 
ways of dealing with those risks. 
The most important risks are: 
 Contribution risk – the risk that pension contributions (and hence pension savings) 
are lower than planned, e.g., because the scheme member becomes unemployed,  is 
unable to work due to ill health, or is unable to pay off their debts.  Investment risk – the risk that investment performance is worse than expected or 
the risk that investments do not generate incomes in a way that matches the desired 
pattern of consumption in retirement.  Inflation risk – the risk that inflation is higher than anticipated. 
                                                     
 
10
 Adequate pensions require high levels of pension savings over long periods. It is generally not possible – due 
to the risks involved – to achieve this objective from low levels of pension savings that rely on unrealistically 
high real rates of investment return being realised over extended periods. The IRRI has not been asked to 
address the question of the adequacy of pensions or the adequacy of pension savings (which many 
commentators have said are inadequate in the UK). Nor will it address long-term care and the interaction of 
this with DC decumulation. 
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 Interest rate risk – the risk that interest rates are low at the point of annuity 
purchase.  Longevity risk – the risk that the individual savers live longer than their life 
expectancy (i.e., idiosyncratic longevity risk) and the risk that savers as a whole live 
longer than anticipated (i.e., systematic or aggregate longevity risk).  Cost risk – the risk that the total costs of running the pension scheme during 
accumulation and decumulation are higher than expected or understood.  Political risk – the risk that the government changes the rules in an adverse way (e.g., 
reduces the level of tax relief).  Regulatory risk – the risk that regulations change in an adverse way (e.g., the 
regulator increases regulatory capital requirements, which has the effect of reducing 
annuity rates).  Demographic/cultural risk – the risk that younger cohorts refuse or are unable to 
honour the implicit intergenerational contract that underlies many pension schemes. 
For example, the next generation of workers refuses – or is unable – to pay the 
pensions the retired generation expects to receive, because they are unwilling to 
honour the implicit contract or because there are too few of them in relation to the 
size of the retired population. Also, an arrangement that works in one culture (e.g., 
Holland) might not work in another (e.g., the UK).  Market conduct risk – the risk that those who provide services to the scheme act in a 
way that disadvantages scheme members (e.g., investment managers subject to a 
charge cap negate the effects of the charge cap by increasing portfolio turnover, or 
the benefits of eĐoŶoŵies of sĐale go to sĐheŵe pƌoǀideƌs͛ shaƌeholdeƌs ƌatheƌ thaŶ 
to members).  Behavioural risk – the risk that scheme members behave in a way that is not 
considered to be rational (i.e., not in their long term interests, since they make 
short-term decisions that they subsequently regret); included here would be the risk 
that members fail to understand the risks they face. 
There are a number of ways of dealing with such risks in general: 
 The ƌisks ĐaŶ ďe assuŵed oƌ ͚ƌuŶ͛ – this might be deliberate (e.g., in the case where a 
scheme member increases the level of investment risk in their pension fund in the 
hope of achieving a higher investment return and, hence, a higher pension) or 
unavoidable (e.g., in the case of contribution, political or regulatory risk).  The risks can be regulated against – effective regulation can reduce cost and market 
conduct risk, for example.  The risks can be educated against – by explaining behavioural biases and nudging 
people towards making optimal decisions.  
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 The risks can be reduced – by careful design of the scheme. For example, 
demographic risk can be reduced by ensuring inter-generational fairness, while by 
careful design of the investment strategy, investment risk can be reduced.  The risks can be pooled amongst members of a given cohort (known as intra-
generational risk pooling) – idiosyncratic longevity risk can be pooled and hence 
made more predictable, but this, in turn, requires scale (i.e., only large pension 
schemes can do this).  The risks can be shared between members of different cohorts (known as inter-
generational risk sharing) – investment returns can be smoothed across different 
cohorts using a smoothing fund.  The risks can be hedged if there are suitable hedging instruments – inflation and 
interest rate risk can be hedged using inflation and interest rate derivatives, but 
systematic longevity risk cannot currently be hedged due to the absence of longevity 
bonds.  The risks can be managed within a carefully designed default plan into which the 
members are auto-enrolled. When someone first starts work, this will be a default 
accumulation plan with a default contribution rate and investment strategy. When 
someone retires, this could be a default retirement expenditure plan.  Finally and most worryingly, the risks can be ignored. 
Question (3) above is probably the most difficult question to answer. It requires those 
saving in a pension scheme to understand that confronting and dealing with risks are 
unavoidable aspects of building up pension savings over a 40-year (or longer) working life 
and then running down those savings over a retirement period that could be 30 years or 
more.  But if people  can have confidence that those designing and regulating the pensions 
system have dealt with these risks in the most efficient and cost-effective ways possible, 
then it might be possible to nudge (or even default) savers into making the right choice at 
retirement for them and their family. To do this, we will need to build on the lessons of 
auto-enrolment and, in particular, the issue of having a well-designed default decumulation 
process at retirement.   
Finally, we note the different classes of DC savers and decumulators:  
1. Members of DC auto-enrolment schemes: active, deferred and pensioners. 
2. Defined benefit (DB) scheme members who transfer to the DC regime. Those who 
take advantage of the DB-to-DC transfer rules might use the DC scheme offered by 
their employer, if this includes a drawdown facility. In many cases, they will already 
be members for accumulation.  
3. The self-employed. 
4. Workers with employment contracts that do not qualify them for auto-enrolment. 
We will examine the characteristics and challenges presented by each group in relation to 
achieving good retirement outcomes. Our main emphasis will be on the first group, 
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although we will consider how DB-to-DC transferees, the self-employed and those with 
employment contracts that do not qualify them for auto-enrolment can also be helped. 
Consultation Questions 
The IRRI͛s ƌepoƌt ǁill foĐus on five key areas and we would welcome your responses to the 
following questions listed under each of the section headings.  We would like you to note 
that longevity risk is discussed in a number of these sections.  This is unavoidable, since it is 
a key risk iŶ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt aŶd Đuts aĐƌoss pƌoduĐts, the deĐisioŶs saǀeƌs ŵake, saǀeƌs͛ 
uŶdeƌstaŶdiŶg of this ƌisk, aŶd pƌoǀideƌs͛ ĐapaĐitǇ to ďeaƌ it.   
1. How to ensure that savers can get the best products in retirement  
Until now, most members of DC pension schemes were required to buy a lifetime annuity at 
retirement. The 2014 Budget has changed that requirement as well as opened up the 
possibility that new types of retirement products will become available. Not all of these will 
be suitable, especially if they can lead to people spending all their pension savings before 
they die.  We will examine the new products to see which are most suitable, given the new 
pension flexibilities, and whether there is a case for extending the governance and quality 
standards developed for the accumulation stage into (some) of the decumulation options.  
We ǁill also  ĐoŶsideƌ hoǁ ͚loŶgeǀitǇ iŶsuƌaŶĐe͛ ;e.g., a defeƌƌed oƌ iŵŵediate lifetiŵe 
aŶŶuitǇͿ ĐaŶ ďe ĐoŵďiŶed ǁith ͚sĐheŵe dƌaǁdoǁŶ͛ to pƌoǀide a Đost-effective retirement 
income product that allows for flexibility in spending during retirement while ensuring that 
savers do not run out of money before they die. 
Consultation questions: 
1. ;aͿ What should ďe the pƌiŵaƌǇ aiŵs of a ͚good͛ DC sĐheŵe? Please eǆplaiŶ.   
(b) If the provision of a pƌediĐtaďle iŶĐoŵe should ďe a pƌiŵaƌǇ aiŵ of a ͚good͛ DC 
scheme, how should this be defined?  
;ĐͿ If ǀalue foƌ ŵoŶeǇ should ďe a pƌiŵaƌǇ aiŵ of a ͚good͛ DC sĐheŵe, hoǁ should 
this be defined?  
2. (a) Do you agree with the breakdown of risks listed in the Introduction? 
(b) Are there any important risks we have not identified? 
(c) To deal with political risk, would it make sense to have an independent Pension 
Commission to set pension policy (similar to the independent Monetary Policy 
Committee)? 
3.  (a) Do you expect products with longevity insurance (e.g., a lifetime annuity) to 
remain an essential component of a well-designed retirement programme? 
(b) How should those individuals who continue to buy lifetime annuities be assisted 
to obtain the best value products for their circumstances?  
(c) If individuals do not purchase lifetime annuities, how does an individual hedge 
their longevity risk in retirement? 
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4. (a) Where annuities are purchased later in retirement, what are the most effective 
and efficient products for providing income in the period between retirement and 
the age at which the longevity insurance comes into effect? 
(b) Should such products have a maximum recommended level of income 
withdrawal? 
(c) If so, how should that level of income be determined?  
5. What are the advantages and disadvantages of scheme drawdown (i.e., where the 
scheme provides an income to the retired member prior to the purchase of an 
annuity)? 
6. (a) Should decumulation default products provided by, say, large-scale master 
trusts, be subject to the same trustee-based governance and quality standards that 
apply to the accumulation default fund?  
(b) Where decumulation products are offered by contract-based schemes, should 
they be included in the requirements for the new Independent Governance 
Committees to provide governance and quality standards and to assess value for 
money? 
7. (a) What could be the typical total expense ratio (TER) for a default drawdown 
product provided by a large-scale master trust?  
(b) How might this TER compare with individual drawdown products sold in the 
retail market?  
(c) Can you give any examples of TERs for retail drawdown products? 
8. (a) Should scheme default drawdown products be subject to the charge cap?  
(b) Should this be the same as for accumulation (i.e. 0.75%) or is there a case for a 
higher cap?  If higher please explain why and what the difference might be? 
9. Retail drawdown products will be sold via regulated advice and they will be 
purchased via non-advice (execution-only). Is there a case for:  
(a) Higher quality controls and consumer protection in relation to risk and costs? 
Explain.  
(b) Making retail products subject to a charge cap? Explain. 
10. What is the optimal investment strategy in scheme drawdown prior to the 
introduction of longevity insurance? 
11. What are the advantages and disadvantages of institutional annuitisation (i.e., 
where annuities are provided on a bulk basis either by the scheme (self 
annuitisation) or by an insurance company, rather on a retail basis as currently)? 
12. Could institutional annuitisation deal with the individual underwriting of annuities 
and still encourage competition from providers in the open market to maximise 
consumer outcomes (e.g. in the case where a retired member has a medical condition 
which reduces their life expectancy)? 
13. (a) Would a market for advanced life deferred annuities be viable? 
(b) What is the likely demand for advanced life deferred annuities? 
14. Is there likely to be demand for inflation protection? 
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15. What are your views on the proposals by HM Treasury to allow annuities to have 
more flexible payment terms by: 
(a) allowing lifetime annuities to decrease  
(b) allowing lump sums to be taken from lifetime annuities 
(c) removing the ten-year guarantee period for guaranteed annuities  
(d) allowing payments from guaranteed annuities to be paid to beneficiaries as a 
lump sum, where they are under £30,000? 
16. What are your views on U-shaped or J-shaped annuities? 
17. Should DC retirement products and decumulation strategies be linked to the single 
tier state pension? If so, how? 
18. What other retirement products do you expect to become available? Please provide 
details if possible. 
19. Is theƌe a Đase foƌ desigŶatiŶg ĐeƌtaiŶ ƌetiƌeŵeŶt pƌoduĐts as ͚safe haƌďouƌ͛ 
products? Explain. 
20. Following the impact of the Budget 2014 tax changes on annuity providers, do you 
have any concerns about supply-side contraction or other developments in the 
annuity market that might make it less competitive?  
21. (a) What is the best way to deal with stranded pots? Explain. 
(b) Two approaches have been put foƌǁaƌd to date: ͚aggƌegatoƌ͛ aŶd ͚pot-follows-
ŵeŵďeƌ͛. Do Ǉou haǀe pƌefeƌeŶĐe foƌ oŶe oǀeƌ the otheƌ? EǆplaiŶ. 
;ĐͿ Would ͚sĐheŵe-follows-ŵeŵďeƌ͛ ďe feasiďle? EǆplaiŶ 
 
2. Supporting savers to make the right choice at retirement for them and 
their family and how to build on the lessons of auto-enrolment 
It is generally agreed that the optimal drawing down of retirement assets is a considerably 
more complex activity than the initial task of accumulating those assets, in part, because 
people͛s ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes differ. We will investigate whether it is possible to design a good 
default option at retirement which will be suitable for most savers, in the same way that a 
good default investment strategy in the accumulation phase can be designed. Even if this is 
possible, we accept that more people might opt for a different retirement income plan than 
the estimated 10% of people who reject the default accumulation fund. For example, some 
retirees might be in poor health and so might choose to access their funds in full at the date 
of retirement – or over as short a period as possible (staggered to avoid paying unnecessary 
income tax).  Given the complexities of retirement expenditure decision making, we will 
examine the support that savers need to make the right choices for them and their family.  
Building on the lessons of auto-enrolment, we will examine what nudges or defaults would 
be useful to move people towards making optimal decisions.  
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The 2014 Budget and subsequent consultation on the part of HM Treasury
11
 introduces a 
new tax regime for decumulation, which takes effect in April 2015 and which confers 
greater freedom in the way DC savers draw their retirement income.
12
 As a result, from April 
2015, it is expected that DC decumulation at the point of retirement in many cases will take 
the form of cash and income withdrawal, with annuity purchase deferred until later life.  
While the tax reform legislation has been broadly welcomed, in terms of the greater 
freedom it confers on DC savers at retirement, it has also raised concerns that the new 
regime will be more complicated, costly and risky, in terms of the wider product choice and 
tax planning, for example. To help DC savers avoid making poor decisions, the government 
has also introduced the guidance guarantee, a new service that will be free and impartial 
and which aims to will help individuals consider their options and make informed choices.
 13
   
Consultation questions: 
22. It is now recognised that many people face a number of behavioural barriers which 
prevent them behaving optimally. When it comes to decumulation, what are the 
key barriers?  
23. We need to recognise that retirees: have different expenditure needs during 
different phases of their retirement; need to pace their spending throughout 
retirement in order to optimise the use of their lifetime assets and income and their 
ability to make intended bequests; and need a choice architecture that reflects the 
market segment to which they belong.  
(a) What is your understanding of the regulatory consumer market segmentation 
and is this appropriate in relation to the needs of DC retirees?
14
 
(b) What nudges and choice architecture do people need to deal with these issues 
and overcome the behavioural barriers they face? 
24. (a) What lessons from auto-enrolment in the accumulation phase can be brought 
to the decumulation phase?  
(b) Given the importance of income security for the elderly and the existence of 
longevity risk, is there a case for  defaulting people into buying longevity insurance 
via auto-enrolment (i.e., drawdown with longevity insurance becomes the default 
                                                     
 
11
 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/294795/freedom_and_choic
e_in_pensions_web_210314.pdf and the consultation response in 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/332714/pensions_response
_online.pdf 
12
 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/draft-legislation-the-taxation-of-pensions-bill 
13
 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/millions-guaranteed-the-right-to-free-and-impartial-guidance-on-
their-new-pensions-choices 
14
 Traditionally, the UK market was segmented into the mass market, the mass affluent market and the high 
net worth market, but this is changing. 
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retirement strategy)? Consider the advantages and disadvantages of such a 
strategy.  
(c) What would be the likely annualised cost of such products for individuals? 
(d) How could the default principle, upon which the success of auto-enrolment is 
predicated, be best reconciled with the individual freedoms for DC decumulation 
introduced in the 2014 Budget? 
25. What aƌe the iŵpliĐatioŶs of the ChaŶĐelloƌ͛s aŶŶouŶĐeŵeŶt iŶ Septeŵďeƌ ϮϬϭ4 
effectively ending the 55% tax rate on inherited pension pots? 
26. What are your views on the guidance guarantee and how effective it will be? 
27. (a) Will other forms of guidance and advice be needed?  
(b) For DC savers who prefer to make their own decisions, what is the best way to 
build on the guidance guarantee to help individuals avoid buying retail products 
that are inappropriate (e.g., in relation to risk) and/or poor value (e.g., in relation 
to price)? 
28. (a) What specific risks should regulatory safeguards aim to address in relation to 
financial decisions made at retirement? 
(b) At what point does individual choice cease to be a regulatory 
concern/responsibility? 
29. Some DC customers might draw down all their pots in the early years of retirement, 
a decision they might subsequently regret. What is the most effective way of 
assisting DC customers to act in their best long-term interests? 
30. (a) What is the best way of ensuring that any DB-to-DC transferees only undertake 
such a transfer when it is in their best interests? 
(b) What are your estimates of the number of DB-to-DC transferees (deferred and 
also active) and size of assets involved? 
(c)  Is the requirement for regulated independent advice for such transferees 
adequate? 
(d) Can/will the guidance guarantee process cope with DB active/deferred 
members who seek help in considering their options?  
31. Are there other ways of supporting pension savers to make the right choice at 
retirement for them and their family? 
 
3. Helping savers to manage longevity risk  
A particularly important issue in retirement income provision is longevity risk.  There are 
two components to longevity risk. The first is the uncertainty over how long any particular 
scheme member is going to live after retirement. This is known as idiosyncratic longevity 
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risk.  The second is uncertainty over how long members of a particular age cohort are going 
to live after retirement.  This is known as systematic or aggregate longevity risk.  
Research has found that most individuals underestimate how long they are going to live, 
often by many years.
15
 This is hardly surprising, given the complexity of quantifying 
longevity risk: even official agencies, like the Office for National Statistics, whose job is to 
forecast life expectancy in the UK, systematically underestimate how long people are going 
to live.
16
 What all this means is that longevity risk is a risk that the majority of individual 
savers will not realistically be able – and therefore should not be expected – to manage 
themselves. To protect them from outliving their resources, most savers are likely to need 
longevity insurance at some stage in retirement – the possible exceptions being those with 
very significant wealth or those with a serious life-shortening medical condition but without 
dependants, for example.  
Idiosyncratic longevity risk can be reduced by pooling and taking advantage of the law of 
large numbers. Systematic longevity risk, however, cannot be reduced in this way. It is a 
trend risk and can only be hedged with a hedging instrument such as a longevity bond. We 
will consider the role that longevity bonds might play in helping pension scheme providers 
hedge the systematic longevity risk they face when they provide longevity insurance. 
Consultation questions: 
32. What eǀideŶĐe is theƌe of iŶdiǀiduals͛ aďilitǇ to ƌeliaďlǇ estiŵate hoǁ loŶg theǇ aƌe 
going to live?  
33. How easy is it for individuals to quantify longevity risk? What evidence is available 
on this question? 
34. Is longevity risk a risk that individual savers are able – and should be expected – to 
manage themselves? 
35. Where people receive tax incentives to save into pensions, should people be 
required to secure a minimum lifetime income in retirement? 
36.  (a) Do you believe that the DC retirement income market could benefit from the 
introduction of a market in longevity bonds? Explain. 
(b) Do you believe that a market in longevity bonds is viable (in the sense of having 
sufficient demand to justify its introduction)? Explain. 
37. Do you have a preferred design for a longevity bond?  
38. Is there a case for the government to issue longevity bonds? Explain. 
                                                     
 
15
 Chƌis O͛BƌieŶ, Paul FeŶŶ, aŶd “teve Diacon (2005) How long do people expect to live? Results and 
implications, Centre for Risk and Insurance Studies, Nottingham University Business School, CRIS Research 
Report 2005-1. 
16
 David Blake (2014) The consequences of not having to buy an annuity, Pensions Institute, June 
(www.pensions-institute.org/workingpapers/wp1409.pdf). 
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39. Are there alternatives to longevity bonds to hedge systematic longevity risk? Explain. 
40. Are there other ways of helping savers to manage longevity risk? 
 
4. The role of the National Employment Savings Trust (NEST) in helping 
savers to access good quality retirement products 
The introduction of NEST has been a game changer for the provision of good-value, well 
designed and governed pension schemes for low- and medium-income savers in small and 
medium-sized companies. It has brought institutional standards – in terms of low charges, 
good governance and a well-designed default investment fund – to the formerly high-cost, 
poor-value world of retail customers.
17
  It has also encouraged the entry of new multi-
employer trust-ďased sĐheŵes, suĐh as Noǁ: PeŶsioŶs aŶd The People͛s PeŶsioŶ. 18 
However, under current legislation, once members of these and other auto-enrolment 
schemes retire, they have to go to the retail market to buy annuities on an individual basis. 
Even under the proposed new decumulation regime for April 2015, those who do not wish 
to buy an annuity might end up buying a retail income drawdown product, which at present 
can be very expensive and suffer from both poor investment strategy and poor governance.  
Could institutional standards – in terms of charges, governance and design – be brought to 
the retirement income space and what role could NEST plays in achieving this?  
Consultation questions: 
41. Should NEST provide retirement income products to its members? 
42. (a) Should NEST provide a default decumulation product (e.g., scheme drawdown 
or annuitisation)? 
(b) If so, what quality standards should apply (e.g., in terms of charge caps, 
governance)? 
43. Are there any other ways in which NEST can help savers to access good quality 
retirement products? 
44. In an aggregator model for stranded pots: 
(a) Would it be desirable for NEST to act as one of the aggregators?  
(b) Which other schemes could act as aggregators? 
45.  Could NEST do more in decumulation for the self-employed and workers excluded 
from auto-enrolment?  
                                                     
 
17
 In July 2014, the government announced that in 2017, it would remove the contribution cap and lift the 
transfer ban imposed on NEST. 
18
 Debbie Harrison, David Blake and Kevin Dowd (2012) Caveat Venditor: The brave new world of auto-
enrolment should be governed by the principle of seller not buyer beware, Pensions Institute, October 
(www.pensions-institute.org/reports/caveatvenditor.pdf) and Debbie Harrison, David Blake and Kevin Dowd 
(2014) VfM: Assessing value for money in defined contribution default funds, Pensions Institute, January 
(www.pensions-institute.org/reports/ValueForMoney.pdf). 
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46. (a) Could NEST become a collective pension scheme? Explain. 
(b) Should NEST become a collective pension scheme? Explain. 
 
5. The role of collective pension schemes and how these could be 
introduced in the UK  
The analysis of the risks outlined in the Introduction suggests that these might be more 
effectively managed if they (or at least those that can be) are pooled and shared.  This 
requires scale and, at present in the UK, DC pension schemes are treated as individual 
accounts. While the contributions of scheme members can be invested in a common 
investment fund, so that all members with the same length of membership in the same fund 
get the same return, there is no pooling or sharing of risks.  
Collective DC (CDC) pension schemes that pool and share risks are not currently allowed in 
the UK. 
 
However, in the 2014 Pension Schemes Bill, the government is introducing 
legislation that is expected to change the traditional UK DC system in several important 
ways. The Bill includes provisions for new risk-sharing strategies for DC schemes that aim to 
improve the predictability of the retirement income. This is enabling legislation only; it does 
not include the full regulatory details. Effective regulation will be crucial, as the following 
extract from an article published in the Financial Times notes:
19
 
Regulation is especially important because, unlike DC pots, individual CDC members 
have no clearly defined property rights. And unlike DB pensions, there is no 
sponsoring employer standing behind it, so target pensions can only be paid from a 
CDC͛s own assets. For members to judge the likelihood of their target pensions 
aĐtuallǇ ďeiŶg paid, it is ĐƌuĐial that theǇ ĐaŶ uŶdeƌstaŶd the sĐheŵe͛s oǀeƌall 
funding position easily. 
The current bill, however, says nothing specific about CDC regulation. In particular, 
CDC trustees, advised by actuaries, are left to decide for themselves how target 
pensions for all members should be valued, so overall funding can be measured 
against the market value of assets. 
This ͞DIY͟ appƌoaĐh ŵeaŶs theƌe is Ŷo oďjeĐtiǀe aŶd consistent benchmark for CDC 
ŵeŵďeƌs to judge the likelihood of theiƌ taƌget peŶsioŶs ďeiŶg paid. ͞Tƌust ŵe, I͛ŵ 
aŶ aĐtuaƌǇ͟ is Ŷot good eŶough as the ďasis foƌ a ǁhollǇ Ŷeǁ aŶd uŶtested tǇpe of 
pension. 
                                                     
 
19
 John Ralfe, CDC pensions will work only if strictly regulated, FT 16 November 2014, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d34f4288-69b8-11e4-8f4f-00144feabdc0.html?siteedition=uk#axzz3JEGVI3Nk 
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We will examine overseas examples of collective schemes that pool and share risks and 
hence make incomes in retirement more predictable (at least in principle).
20
 Broadly 
speaking, there are two types of CDC scheme in existence: one that is a form of DB 
replacement and one that is a form of DC replacement. Because collective schemes claim to 
have economies of scale that are additional to those of individual-account-based DC 
sĐheŵes, ǁe ǁill eǆaŵiŶe ǁhetheƌ this ŵodel foƌ ͚ĐolleĐtiǀe͛ sĐheŵes ĐaŶ also ďoost 
incomes in retirement or at least make such incomes more stable across different cohorts of 
members. We will investigate how their performance might compare with standard DC 
schemes. We will also consider how the ability of the member to transfer out and also the 
greater flexibility in drawing on the pot in retirement can operate in tandem with a CDC 
pension. 
Consultation questions: 
47. What should ͚ĐolleĐtiǀe͛ ŵeaŶ iŶ the UK ĐoŶteǆt ;e.g., ĐolleĐtiǀe iŶ teƌŵs of sĐale 
and governance, and collective in terms of risk-sharing)? 
48. What are the main benefits of CDC schemes over individual DC schemes? 
49. What are the main disadvantages of CDC schemes over individual DC schemes? 
50. CDC schemes may be able to generate incomes that are higher than individual DC 
schemes as the latter are currently operated.   
(a) Are there reasons why an individual DC scheme could not follow the same 
investment or decumulation strategy as a CDC scheme?  
(b) Would trustees of an individual DC scheme be willing to accommodate the 
greater investment risk, given the need to enable members to transfer out and to 
take their pension pot with them? 
51.  (a) Would a CDC scheme have any additional risk-sharing advantages over a large 
master trust DC scheme which followed the same investment and decumulation 
strategies where possible? 
(b) Can the benefits from any additional sources of risk sharing available to CDC 
schemes be quantified? 
52. (a) What is your preferred design for a CDC scheme, in terms of targeted benefits? 
(e.g., a CDC scheme that is intended to replace a DB scheme and hence would be 
earnings-related (specify accrual rate, earnings measure, pre-retirement indexation 
rule, post-retirement indexation rule); or a CDC scheme that is intended to replace 
an individual DC scheme and hence would be with-profit and a target return, unit-
linked and a target return, etc).  
(b) Explain why 
 
                                                     
 
20
 CDC schemes are common in Netherlands, Denmark and Canada.  
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53. (a) What is the best estimate contribution rate to achieve the target benefit?  
(b) How should the contribution rate be shared between employer and member? 
54. (a) Can a CDC scheme work with a planned contribution rate that is fixed 
iŶdepeŶdeŶt of a ŵeŵďeƌ͛s age oƌ is aŶ age-dependent member contribution rate 
required? 
(b) If the latter, is a change to equality legislation required? 
55. What investment strategy would be appropriate for CDC schemes: (a) in 
accumulation and (b) near retirement and (c) in decumulation? 
56. What are the main benefits of a CDC scheme in terms of intra-generational risk 
pooling? 
57. What are the main benefits of a CDC scheme in terms of inter-generational risk 
sharing? 
58. (a) Over how many generations should risk be shared?  
(b) Explain why this is optimal 
59. How should the risk-sharing rules in a CDC scheme be defined? 
60. Hoǁ ŵuĐh disĐƌetioŶ should a CDC sĐheŵe͛s ŵaŶageƌs haǀe ǁheŶ it comes to 
smoothing or adjusting benefits to target benefits, or should the rules be fully 
transparent? 
61.  (a) If the actual pension is above the target pension, when should adjustments be 
made? 
(b) How and in what order should the adjustments be made (consider adjustments 
to pension indexation, pension amount in payment, investment strategy, active 
member contribution rate, active member retirement age)? 
62. (a) If the actual pension is below the target pension, when should adjustments be 
made? 
(b) How and in what order should the adjustments be made (consider adjustments to 
pension indexation, pension amount in payment, investment strategy, active member 
contribution rate, active member retirement age)?   
63. What mechanisms are needed to ensure that no CDC scheme becomes insolvent? 
For example, a CDC scheme might try to use a high target return to attract more 
customers. 
64. Is it necessary for a CDC scheme to start with or build up a reserve fund to give it 
credibility? 
65. CDC schemes in other countries (e.g., Holland) have virtually no flexibility with 
respect to member choice (e.g. contribution rate, investment strategy, retirement 
date, form of decumulation (i.e., pension). Do the freedoms and flexibilities 
introduced by the 2014 Budget render CDC schemes unfeasible or more risky in the 
UK? Explain why not or, alternatively, how freedom and flexibility would need to 
be tailored in the context of CDC schemes?      
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66. One of the biggest growth areas prior to the 2014 Budget was the medical 
underwriting of annuities and the growth of enhanced annuities. But in a standard 
CDC scheme, everyone gets the same pension irrespective of health status.  
(a) Would it be feasible in a CDC scheme to medically underwrite the pension in 
retirement? 
(b) Would it be desirable to do this? 
67. How should a CDC scheme best be organised: (a) on a company-wide basis, (b) an 
industry-wide basis, or (c) a nation-wide basis? 
68. What is the minimum number of members in a CDC scheme to make it viable? 
Explain this figure. 
69. Effective regulation, governance and quality standards will be crucial, given the 
absence of member property rights (which apply in standard DC schemes) and also 
the absence of a sponsoring employer that guarantees benefits (which applies in 
DB).  
(a) What regulation is requiƌed to pƌoteĐt ŵeŵďeƌs͛ ďeŶefits?  
(b) What governance mechanisms and quality standards are needed in CDC 
schemes, especially to ensure inter-generational equity? 
70. Could CDC schemes operate both on a trust basis and a contract basis? Explain. 
71. Could a ͚foƌ pƌofit͛ oƌgaŶisatioŶ ƌuŶ a CDC sĐheŵe? EǆplaiŶ. 
72. What communication strategy would be appropriate for CDC schemes (a) in 
accumulation and (b) near retirement and (c) in decumulation? 
73. What measures should the government take to make CDC attractive to: (a) potential 
sponsors, and (b) potential members? 
74. How should transfer values be treated in CDC schemes, both in and out? 
75. Is it possible for a CDC scheme to work within a charge cap of 0.75%? 
 
6. Other issues 
The five sections above reflect our initial expectation of the areas that would need to be 
covered, and the issues that would need to be addressed, in our response to the remit set 
out the beginning of this document. However there may be other issues you would like to 
raise or areas you think we should be looking at.  
76. With the remit in mind, please tell us if there is anything else you think we should be 
considering that is not covered in the sections and questions above. 
 
 
